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Abstract 
 
This thesis investigates whether there is a social cleavage structure across the Russian regions 
and whether this structure is mirrored in the electoral vote shares for Putin and his party United 
Russia on one hand, versus the Communist Party of the Russian Federation and its leader 
Gennady Zyuganov on the other. In addition to mapping different economic, demographic and 
cultural factors affecting regional vote shares, this thesis attempts to determine whether there is a 
party system based on social cleavages in Russia. In addition, as the Russian context is heavily 
influenced by the president, this thesis investigates whether the same cleavages can explain the 
distribution of vote shares during the presidential elections. 
Unemployment, pensioners, printed newspapers and ethnicity create opposing effects 
during parliamentary elections, while distance to Moscow, income, pensioners, life expectancy, 
printed newspapers and ethnicity created opposing effects during the presidential elections. The 
first finding of this thesis is not only that the Russian party system is rooted in social cleavages, 
but that it appears to be based on the traditional “left-right” cleavage that characterizes all 
Western industrialized countries. In addition, despite the fact that Putin pulls voters from all 
segments of the society, the pattern found for the party system persists during presidential 
elections. The concluding finding shows that the main political cleavage in today’s Russia is 
between the left represented by the communists and the right represented by the incumbents. 
The data used to answer the research question is comprised of regional electoral results 
and statistics. The methodological approach accounts for the unique nature of the data, with a 
random effects model specified to control for endogeneity bias as well as to let the effect of each 
variable vary both within and between regions.  
 The findings significantly contribute to future studies of Russia in general, but also to 
research fields studying party systems and political cleavages, elections under authoritarian rule, 
electoral systems and the relationship between parties and presidents in a semi-presidential 
system.  
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i. Introduction 
	
In democratic political systems, political parties are indispensable in that they convert citizens’ 
demands and interests into policy options and work as a link between the government and 
society. Although other political institutions also aggregate interests, among them the mass 
media, parliaments, and large interest groups, it is the parties that are the quintessential agency 
for performing this task. Parties give voters a choice over competing policy directions for 
governance and a chance to hold public officials responsible for their performance (Remington 
2012:171). In Russia, political parties have historically been weak, until the emergence of Putin’s 
United Russia party, which joined the biggest party CPRF in their competition for voters. The 
other two parties that have occupied seats in the Duma since 2003 are according to multiple 
scholars “fake opposition” (Turovsky 2014:76, Gelman 2008:920, White 2006:188-190). The 
only democratic party in the country, Yabloko, has failed to gain representation in the Duma 
since 2003, and the non-system democratic opposition similarly failed to organize into a political 
party after the anti-Putin demonstrations of 2011-2012, raising questions about the lack of 
democratic orientations in the society.  
 This thesis investigates whether there is a social cleavage structure across the Russian 
regions and whether this structure is mirrored in the electoral vote shares for Putin and his party 
United Russia (UR) on one hand, versus the Communist Party of the Russian Federation (CPRF) 
and its leader Gennady Zyuganov on the other. The goal of this thesis is to try and understand not 
only the relationship between socio-economic and demographic factors and support for opposing 
parties and candidates, but this relationship in the Russian context, where the “party of power” 
UR has no direct power, and the president under the Constitution practically has the powers of an 
elected tsar (Gelman 2008:922,927, Roberts 2012b:226, Reuter & Turovsky 2014:666). The 
president is however not the cause, but a product of the dominant-power politics employed by the 
Russian government. Kremlin and the presidential administration is the apogee of power in the 
Russian political system, and makes UR just an agent of the federal executive branch (Levitsky & 
Way 2010:183,233, Roberts 2012a:98). 
Parliamentary elections are held four months before the presidential elections, and as the 
presidential campaign-period starts almost immediately after the results have been announced, 
parliamentary elections have been called “presidential primaries” (White 2009:171, 2006:88). 
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The electoral success of United Russia indicates the electoral success of Vladimir Putin and 
CPRF does the same for Zyuganov. In addition to these two groups creating the biggest political 
blocs on the political scene, it is also interesting to see whether there are differences between 
parliamentary and presidential elections themselves.  
 
Figure 1: National electoral vote shares for each party and candidate between 2003 and 2012. 
 
 
Even though Putin’s first victory was in 2000, Russia has seen pro-government majorities with 
the victory of United Russia in 2003, marking the starting point of true presidential dominance by 
Vladimir Putin and the start of this analysis (Roberts 2012a:100). Support is measured by the 
electoral vote shares received by United Russia and CPRF during the 2003, 2007 and 2011 
parliamentary elections; and by Putin and Zyuganov during the 2004, 2008 and 2012 presidential 
elections. It is however important to keep in mind that support and electoral vote shares are 
different in that voting is a physical act that requires prior decision, it limits the choice to only 
one person and doesn’t even need to measure support at all, as the individual might vote for other 
reasons than political (Colton & Hale 2009:474).  
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There has not been any alternation of power in Russia since 2000 and the dominance will 
last to at least until the December 2016 parliamentary election and March 2018 presidential 
election. The regime is widely regarded as undemocratic, with their manipulation of elections, 
high corruption levels, harassment and violence against journalists and intensifying crackdowns 
on civil society, media, and the Internet. In addition, a number of laws, including the “foreign 
agent law” from 2012 and the “anti LGBT propaganda law” from 2013 further deteriorate the 
human rights situation in Russia (Human Rights Watch 2015). The ongoing crisis in eastern 
Ukraine, which started with Russia’s annexation of Crimea in March 2014, caused a tremendous 
deterioration of Russia’s relationship with the West. Russia was criticized by all international 
organizations, including EU, UN, NATO and the Council of Europe, got suspended from G8 and 
the number of sanctions imposed by the different organizations and countries occurred within the 
context of an already deteriorating economy, sinking oil prices, and a devaluated ruble. 
Inside the country however, Putin’s ratings jumped to 80 percent immediately after the 
annexation of Crimea, increasing to 86 percent in June and reaching its record high of 88 percent 
in October (Volkov 2014). Considering the fact that there is an international consensus that 
Russia has not been democratic for at least ten years (Freedom House 2005-2015), Putin’s rating 
has never been below 60 percent, and makes his popularity a phenomenon very worthy of 
exploration in itself. 
Throughout the 2003-2012 elections, Putin and United Russia’s main challengers were 
the communists (White 2009:173, Hale 2011, Roberts 2012a:96). Even though it traditionally 
was assumed that CPRF with time would lose its electorate due to demographic and economic 
changes, the party gained 19.2 percent of the vote in the 2011 parliamentary election (a 7.6 
percent increase from 2007), maintaining its position as the most obvious alternative to an 
otherwise entirely dominant United Russia (Ryabov 2015, McAllister & White 2008a:946). The 
communist leader Zyuganov however, has not had the same success as his party, actually losing 
0.5 percent in 2012 (gaining 17.2 percent of the vote), but still occupying the position as the main 
challenger to Putin.  
The theoretical approach chosen in this analysis builds on the social cleavage model 
proposed by Lipset and Rokkan (1967). This model argues that the party system of Western 
democracies in the 1950s reflected deep social fault lines of a structural nature rather than just 
ideological differences. They identified four salient cleavages: two cultural cleavages of ethnicity 
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and religion and two economic ones, the urban-rural cleavage between consumers and producers 
and the labor-capital cleavage between industrial workers and owners. The validity of this 
theoretically embedded paradigm may be challenging in any other unique historical context, 
including the one we find in Russia. I will therefore also investigate how other economic, 
demographic and cultural factors affect the vote shares for “the incumbents” and “the 
communists”. The research questions of this thesis are: 
 
1. Which demographic and socio-economic variables affect the regional vote shares for the 
incumbents and the communists in Russian national elections between 2003 and 2012? 
 
2. Is there a party system based on social cleavages in Russia? Can the same cleavages explain 
the distribution of vote shares during the presidential elections?  
 
The units of analysis are the 83 Russian regions observed over the years 2003, 2007 and 2011. 
The dataset used to answer the research questions is created by the author and comprises regional 
electoral results and aggregate statistics. The method employed accounts for the unique nature of 
the data, with a Random effects (RE) model specified to control for endogeneity bias often 
associated with panel data, as well as to let the effect of each variable vary both within regions 
(change over time), and between regions (averages).  
 The thesis employs a combination of deductive and inductive approaches to answer the 
research questions. A deductive approach is concerned with developing a hypothesis (or 
hypotheses) based on existing theory, and then designing a research strategy to test the hypothesis 
(Wilson 2010:7). The deductive part of the analysis explores Lipset and Rokkan’s theory and 
tests if that theory is valid in the Russian context. The inductive approach is reverse and involves 
a search for patterns from observations thought to capture elements of a concept (this part of the 
process is deductive) (Gerring 2012:173). The inductive part of the thesis involves the search and 
testing of different variables thought to affect electoral vote shares (although derived from 
economic, demographic and cultural theories). 
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The structure of the thesis 
The thesis is comprised of 11 chapters with each chapter following a certain logic I want to 
outline here. Because of the unique Russian context in which elections take place, five full 
chapters are devoted to a detailed discussion of Russia’s institutional environment. Chapter 1 is 
concerned with identifying Russia as a case, with an emphasis on the type of the regime that has 
developed under Putin, the role of United Russia and the disappearance of the democratic 
opposition. Chapter 2 identifies Lipset and Rokkan’s theoretical framework employed in this 
analysis and its limitations when applied to the Russian case. Chapter 3 addresses the specific 
institutional context of Russia, with an emphasis on the electoral system and the role of the 
presidency. This chapter also presents the presidential candidates and the evaluation of their 
electoral success, establishing two of the dependent variables in the analysis. Chapter 4 is 
concerned with the Russian party system and the Russian parties, where I argument for why 
United Russia and CPRF were chosen as dependent variables and why the other parties were 
excluded. Chapter 5 is concerned with the identification of a potential cleavage structure in 
Russia, as derived both from Lipset and Rokkan’s theories and their cleavages, but also through 
other economic, demographic and cultural factors expected to have an effect on electoral vote 
shares. 
 Chapters 6 to 9 are devoted to the methodological approach of the study. Chapter 6 is 
concerned with the dataset, mapping the step-by-step identification of valid and reliable 
independent variables. Chapter 7 creates hypotheses for all of the independent variables that the 
previous chapter identified as appropriate to investigate. Chapter 8 is the methodological chapter 
where the results from the standard Random Effect model are compared to the superior Random 
Effects model with a “within-between” formulation. Chapter 9 addresses the regression 
assumptions that the models rely on to produce valid estimates, after which the final model is 
presented in the beginning of chapter 10. The last two chapters are concerned with answering the 
research questions of the analysis, with Chapter 10 mainly focusing on the first research question, 
and the concluding chapter on the second. 
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Chapter 1: Russia as a case 
	
1.1 Russia’s modern developments – From Yeltsin to Putin 
The 1990s Russia was a new country, with a new political system, a new economic orientation 
and the first presidential and multiparty elections in history. Post-Soviet Russia was a “regime of 
transition”, with researchers all over the world holding their breaths to see in which direction 
Russia would develop. Under Boris Yeltsin, Russia had unpredictable elections, competitive 
political parties, a parliament capable of opposing the president and a somewhat independent 
media that provided a platform for the opposition (Moser 1998:66, Hanson 1998:100, Levitsky & 
Way 2010:191). However, Russia was never a full-fledged democracy. Yeltsin had been accused 
of using crude administrative pressure, informational terror, manipulation of electoral legislation 
and ballot counting. Yet without a party, Yeltsin lacked the means to manage elite fragmentation 
or maintain legislative control, making governance across the country more difficult (Sakwa 
1998:134, Levitsky & Way 2010:191-194).  
Putin became acting president when Yeltsin stood down from office on New Year’s Eve, 
six months before the end of his second term. As he himself admitted, his premature exit meant 
that Russia wouldn’t see one democratically elected president transfer power to another in 
accordance with the constitution. The maneuver gave Putin the advantage of double incumbency 
as both the acting president and prime minister in the following presidential election. 
Additionally, because the presidential election had to be moved from June to March, opponents 
were deprived of precious mobilization and campaigning time. (Colton & Hale 2009:478-479, 
Sakwa 2008b:177). 
Yeltsin had declared Putin as someone “who could consolidate society, based on the 
widest possible political spectrum, and ensure the continuation of reforms in Russia” (as cited in 
Sakwa 2008a:18-19). The success of United Russia’s predecessor Unity in the parliamentary 
election of 1999 (where they came in second with 23.3 percent of the vote) laid the solid ground 
for the successful election of Putin. Unity was by itself only a part of a larger political plan, but 
the success of the party reflected Putin’s growing popularity among the citizens. His support rose 
astronomically, from two percent in August 1999 to 62 percent by January 2000 (McAllister & 
White 2008b:612, Roberts 2012a:65,69). At that time, more than two-thirds were prepared to 
support demonstrations calling for the removal of Yeltsin and if there had been an election “next 
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Sunday”, only 0.2 percent said they would have voted for him (McAllister & White 2008b:612, 
Roberts 2012a:100). 
 With Putin and United Russia, the legislative defections and conflicts that plagued Yeltsin 
disappeared. A more institutionalized ruling party and increased state and party capacity under 
Vladimir Putin eliminated the parliament as a site for oppositional challenges. United Russia 
became the dominant force in the Duma, rationalizing the executive-legislative relations in the 
country, but making the legislative branch entirely dependent on the executive. The period 2000-
2010 is characterized by the advent of dominant-power politics1, in which one group 
monopolizes power, despite the presence of opposition and elections (Levitsky & Way 2010:197, 
Roberts 2012a:37). Still, elections matter and pre-electoral polls show that electoral 
manipulation, even though present, doesn’t significantly affect the outcomes of the electoral 
results (see section 1.5). 
  
1.2 Russia as a regime type: Electoral Authoritarianism 
Many adjectives have been used to qualify the type of regime that has emerged under Putin. Most 
convey something between authoritarianism and a diminished democracy. Conceptualizations 
include delegative democracy (O’Donnel 1994:55) illiberal democracy (Zakaria 1997:22), 
managed democracy (Colton & McFaul 2003), defective democracy (Croissant & Merkel 2000) 
or quasi-democracy (Villalón 1994). Because many hybrid regimes violate the minimal 
democratic norms so severely, Andreas Schedler (2002:36) argued that it made no sense to 
classify them as democratic at all, however qualified (Rose et al. 2011:64). Linz (2000:34) 
proposed adding adjectives to “authoritarianism” rather than to “democracy”.  
Andreas Schedler (2006) introduced the term electoral authoritarian as a label for 
regimes in which formal democratic institutions exist and where an opposition can participate in 
elections. Nevertheless, such regimes are not democratic because they violate liberal-democratic 
minimum standards of elections, using electoral manipulation, unfair media access, abuse of state 
resources and varying degrees of harassment and blackmail to skew the playing field in their 
favor (Schedler 2013:1). Recognizing that electoral regimes can be authoritarian was the first 
step towards the conceptualization of electoral authoritarianism. Scholars also recognized that 
																																																						
1	“Dominant-power	politics”	relates	to	states,	where	despite	the	presence	of	democratic	institutions,	one	political	
group	dominates	power,	undermining	any	sense	of	power	contestation	and	alternation	(Carothers	2002:9-14).	
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there were substantial differences between elections in authoritarian states and that they could 
range from relatively free and fair to those in which citizens’ choices are more constricted. An 
election is  free if many parties compete and there is a possibility that the opposition can win 
(Przeworski, Alvarez, Cheibub & Limongi 1996:50-51). It is fair if electoral procedures provide 
a level playing field to competing parties (Levitsky & Way 2010:3). Free and fair elections are 
the first condition of a democratic regime. In Russia however, even though the competition is 
free, it is not fair (Sakwa 2008a:24, Rose et al. 2011:1).  
As the incumbents have stayed in power for three presidential and parliamentary 
elections, Russia can be regarded as a stable competitive authoritarian regime (Levitsky & Way 
2010:21-22). The regime in Russia is focused on the presidency, but is broader than the post of 
president itself. It can include the president, the presidential administration, the government and 
the informal links with powerful oligarchs2, regional bosses and other insiders (Sakwa 
2008a:137). The case of Russia illustrates how multiparty elections are by themselves not a 
sufficient condition to the emergence of democracy, and how successful state- or party- building 
can contribute to the consolidation of non-democratic rule. 
 
1.3 The “Putin Effect”  
«The leader’s popularity in Russia is an effect and not a cause of his perceived grip on power» 
(Krastev & Holmes 2012:34). 
	
This section will address how Putin managed to create a strong connection with the Russian 
electorate, with the majority agreeing with him on the most important issues (Colton & Hale 
2009:493). Putin succeeded in projecting leadership qualities the electorate has valued for 15 
years, and identifying those qualities can significantly contribute to our understanding of the 
unique Russian context in which elections take place.  
Putin’s Millennium Manifest (Putin 1999), which was published online just hours before 
Yeltsin stepped down from office, can be considered as something resembling his first political 
program. The article contained general principles about the need to improve the economy and 
people’s living conditions, but was vague on specific policies (Sakwa 2008a:31). Putin outlined a 
																																																						
2 Oligarchs	were	people	with	financial	and	industrial	capital	that	had	direct	access	to	the	government	(Sakwa	
2008a:136). 
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three-point strategy for the renewal of Russia: a strong state, an effective economy, and “a 
Russian idea” (Sakwa 2008a:55). This idea was not supposed to represent a new ideology, as 
Putin was against an official and state-supported ideology, but an idea of aims and values 
supported by most Russians. He made a distinction between universal values, like freedom of 
expression, the right to leave the country and other political rights and liberties; and Russian 
traditional values that have stood the test of time. These values were according to Putin 
“patriotism”3, “great-powerness” (derzhavnost), “state-centeredness” (gosudarstvennichestvo) 
and “social solidarity” (Sakwa 2008a:216). To the Russian, he claimed, “a strong state is a source 
and guarantor of order. […] Russian society does not equate a strong and effective state with a 
totalitarian state” (Putin 1999).  
After the collapse of the Soviet Union, Russia was left without generally recognizable, 
unifying national symbols. In order to survive in the long run, modern states must have a 
population that possesses some sense of unity, or that they at least regard themselves as members 
of the same nation. This is often referred to as “nation-building”, conceptualized by Stein Rokkan 
as the first stage of state formation (Flora, Kuhnle and Urwin 1999:163-166). Nation-building is 
defined in a variety of ways, but is understood as an active process pursued by the state leaders, 
intellectuals and others to create a sense of being one common nation-state (Kolstø 2004:8). The 
Russian society was according to Kolstø (2004:3) ready for a new unifying ideology with Putin’s 
emergence.  
Putin represented the widespread yearning for stability in a society traumatized by 
disintegration and decline after the turbulent years following the collapse of the Soviet Union. 
Given political fragmentation and weak party development in the country, Putin’s “anti-political” 
approach to the election, in which he waged a “non-campaign”, made sense (Sakwa 2008a:35). 
Even though this anti-political approach easily could slip into populism, especially under the 
1993 constitution that gives the president all the real power, an acceptance of a strong state is 
more common in Russia than in most other countries. “Order in society”, should according to the 
Russian public be the government’s first priority (Shlapentokh 2004:226). Hale (2000:1) 
similarly wrote: “Russians clearly want a strong leader, capable of bringing order to their 
tragically unpredictable lives”. The people’s perception of Putin as someone able to restore law 
																																																						
3 With	patriotism,	Putin	meant	a	“feeling	of	pride	in	one’s	country,	its	history	and	accoplishments	[and]	the	striving	
to	make	one’s	country	better,	richer,	stronger	and	happier	(Sakwa	2008b:359). 
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and order (both with the Chechen war, the oligarchs and the stabilization of the economy), led the 
majority of the Russian electorate to unequivocally support him (Colton & Hale 2009:493).  
Putin’s popularity has also in part been sustained by the absence of anyone else who came 
even close to him in trust ratings. According to Sakwa (2008a:88), Putin won elections not 
because of deliberate suppression of alternatives, but because of their genuine lack. According to 
surveys, it was the perception of Putin as “energetic, decisive and strong-willed” that attracted 
ordinary Russians to him. About 50 percent of the electorate had nothing negative to say about 
him as all (McAllister & White 2008b:615). Indeed, personal influence on the vote is according 
to Colton and Hale (2009:499) a very strong factor, but reflects more than Putin’s perceived job 
performance. In terms of Max Weber’s (1947:115,328) legal-rational, traditional and charismatic 
forms of governmental legitimacy, the latter has particular relevance to Putin. The charismatic 
leadership describes a leader displaying a quality or character that citizens admire, able to replace 
the existing regime (ibid:64). Putin’s charisma is that of the mass type, as he generates broad 
popular sentiment across the entire population. Putin has attracted personal popularity by 
presenting himself as a leader with pride in Russia and its multiple traditions, cultures, and its 
victory in World War II (Rose et al. 2011:18). White and McAllister (2008b:620) similarly find 
something they call “leadership cult”4 that has risen around Putin, clearly indicating that Kremlin 
has been mindful in sustaining and developing Putin’s personal image in voter’s minds (Roberts 
2012a:162).  
 
1.4 The role of the “party of power” - United Russia  
Party dominance in a non-democratic regime is generally characterized by either a single party, 
where only one party exists and is allowed to exists, or by a hegemonic party, which “tolerates 
and discretionally allocates a fraction of its power to subordinate political groups” (Sartori 
1976:205,197). In 2011 United Russia gained victory for the third consecutive time, thereby 
meeting Sartori’s criterion for dominant or hegemonic party rule (ibid:1976:175). One could 
compare UR to hegemonic parties like PRI in Mexico (Partido Revolucionarion Institucional), 
where presidentialism coincides with a party-based authoritarian regime (Roberts 2012a:4). Or, 
one could mention Barbara Geddes’ (2003:82) ruling party regimes, which according to her are 
																																																						
4 “Leadership	cult”	should	not	be	confused	with	“cult	of	personality”,	because	the	public	still	perceives	Putin	as	an	
elected	and	replaceable	figure	(Roberts	2012a:162). 
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more resilient than both personalist and military regimes. However, both Sartori’s and Geddes’ 
party dominance is irrelevant in the Russian case. United Russia was an elite creation, desirable 
to provide the authorities with greater control over Russia’s political arenas, but having no real 
power on its own. The parliamentary majority does not form the government and the source of 
authority lays completely outside of the party, making United Russia’s state supervisory role 
smaller than that of the PRI (Gelman 2008:922,927, Roberts 2012b:226, Sakwa 2008a:106, 
March 2009:510, Turovsky 2014:73). In fact, some legislation passed by UR undermines the very 
idea of a ruling party governing in its own interest (Roberts 2012a:125).  
Several authors refer to it as a “party of power” (March 2009:504, Roberts 2012a:7). The 
term “party of power” was originally a political term dating back to 1990s Russian media circles. 
Several authors have since adopted it as an analytical term distinguishing pro-regime from anti-
regime parties. The term “party of power” may however be misleading, first of all because the 
“power” component doesn’t apply to UR, and second because the term “party” is problematic. 
UR is party-like only at the bottom, with the top often colluding with the state (Roberts 
2012a:184). A party of power is by Gelman (2008:915,921) and Roberts (2012a:39-42) believed 
to have three distinguishing characteristics: (1) they were established and are controlled by the 
executive branch in order to get a majority in the federal and regional legislatures, (2) they lack 
any definite ideology, and (3) they shamelessly use state resources for campaigning. The party 
performs several roles that together help the government generate dominant-power politics. They 
manage elections, govern the polity in the interests of the rulers, and integrate the elites and 
society to stabilize the regime (Roberts 2012a:22). Moreover, UR deflects negative opinions 
away from Putin and the Kremlin. Even when laws are initiated by the federal executive branch, 
public opinion polls show that UR gets disproportionally blamed for unpopular policies (Roberts 
2012a:125).  
In addition to rationalizing executive-legislative relations, the party rationalizes center-
periphery relations. Out of the 15 Soviet Republics that emerged as independent states after the 
collapse of the Soviet Union, only Russia emerged as a federation, with the remaining 14 
emerging as unitary states. As the loose federalism gave more autonomy to regional 
administrations, a link between Moscow and the regions through an all-national party of power 
became both possible and desirable. United Russia could be viewed as a creation not to govern, 
but to integrate elites across all the regions into a structure easily controlled by the federal 
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executive branch, acceptable to the elite, as joining the party became a secure path to a successful 
career (Roberts 2012a:142-146,165). Elections in Russia are then not merely uncompetitive 
elections benefitting preselected candidates, but are also exercises in “competitive clientelism” 
(Gandhi & Lust-Okar 2009:407, Rose et al. 2011:61).  
Roberts (2012a:179) makes a good point mentioning the exceptionalism of the Russian 
case, because unlike in other dominant-party regimes, history and context have combined to 
reverse the arrows of causality, making the party of power an outcome of dominant-power 
politics rather than its cause. Moreover, the Kremlin attempts to manipulate the whole party 
system and all the parties, not just one (Hale 2006:89). So even though United Russia has been 
the most successful party in Russia for more than a decade, its success simply reflects the 
strength of the power holders in and around the federal executive branch (Laverty 2015:84).  
 
1.5 The importance of electoral manipulation  
Domestic and international observers have for a while regarded elections in Russia as unfair. The 
blatant abuse of state resources by Putin and United Russia, the one-sided media coverage, 
administrative pressure and intimidation of voters and opposition has been widely documented 
(Gelman 2008:915, McAllister & White 2008a:943-944, March 2009:506). The OSCE’s report 
on the 2003 Duma election was critical, complaining that it had “failed to meet a number of 
OSCE commitments for democratic elections”, including a clear separation between United 
Russia and the state itself (Clark 2005:512, McAllister & White 2008a:932). In the OSCE’s view, 
the Russian election process was flawed not by instances of vote fraud or ballot stuffing, but by a 
more subtle bias in favor of United Russia. By 2007, the criticism increased as the media was 
said to have been heavily biased in favor of Putin and United Russia; the new election law made 
it extremely difficult for parties to compete; and there had been “widespread reports of 
harassment of opposition parties” (PACE 2007).  
Putin’s centralizing policies and the undermining of the separation of powers created a 
wholly dependent institutional structure, enhanced the role of the bureaucracy and naturally led to 
increased levels of corruption and the use of the so-called “administrative resource”. There are 
many examples where the use of the “administrative resource” caused problems for the federal 
executive branch. As Roberts (2012a:170) puts it, regional branches of the party often “over-
fulfill the plan”, undermining the electoral process itself. A survey from 2007 showed that 6 
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percent of the respondents were personally aware of electoral violations, including bribing and 
threatening voters, campaigning inside polling stations as voting was taking place, casting votes 
for people not present or even dead and miscounting votes (Roberts 2012a:172).  
However, in a poll conducted by Levada Centre in 2011, 78 percent of the respondents 
said they didn’t experience any pressure whatsoever. Only 15 percent said they noticed some sort 
of pressure to vote for a particular party, usually coming from bosses or coworkers (Rose et al. 
2011:135). This could partially be explained by a drop in administrative pressures on voters by 
2012 (Korgunyuk 2015:10). However, previous experiences significantly affect the evaluation of 
situations. For example, the delegation from post-Soviet states, CIS (Commonwealth of 
Independent States) Executive Committee, reported that the 2008 presidential election was free, 
the nomination of candidates “competitive” and media coverage “positive in tone” (Rose et al. 
2011:141). The difference in the judgments made by the Western and Eastern European 
evaluators implies that the idea of a fair election does not mean the same thing everywhere. 
People who have experienced the Soviet system are more prone to evaluating elections in terms 
of their outcome rather than by the procedures by which they were conducted. A ballot that offers 
a choice of multiple parties is regarded as a democratic leap compared to the one-party elections 
of the Soviet years. 
Elections in Russia differ from elections in established democracies: they are less a 
mechanism of transferring power, and more a provider of legitimacy for power-holders. They can 
be viewed as a signal of silent agreement by the electorate of the way things are, or as Lipset and 
Rokkan (1967:4) call them, “rituals of confirmation”. This silent agreement gives the regime 
democratic legitimacy, something the regime needs both for maintenance of public support and 
its relations with the West (Whitmore 2013, March 2009:507). 
Even though elections in Russia are far from fair, they are still free: major opposition 
candidates are rarely excluded, opposition parties are able to campaign publicly and there is no 
massive fraud. Electoral manipulation does probably alter the electoral outcomes to a certain 
degree, but not so much as to make the act of voting meaningless (Levitsky & Way 2010:8). The 
outcomes of the elections are substantively fair, because the party and incumbent favored by most 
Russians wins the elections (Rose et al. 2011:135). The outcome of the 2007 Duma election was 
in line with the Levada Center’s pre-electoral poll that estimated a United Russia victory with 67 
percent of the vote. Similarly, the polls before the 2012 election predicted a Putin victory with at 
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least 60 percent of the vote (Keesing’s World News Archives 2012). As the electoral results were 
very close to the forecasts made by several survey agencies and opinion polls, direct falsification 
must have been minimal (White 2009:173, McAllister & White 2008a:942-944, Colton & Hale 
2009:474).  
If we assume that manipulation of the elections is redundant, why is it so prevalent? 
According to Krastev and Holmes (2012:39), Kremlin manipulates elections to create the illusion 
of an authoritarian and an all-encompassing power, able to reach into all corners of the Russian 
society. “Managed democracy” is then valued by Kremlin not because it simulates democracy, 
but because it simulates management (Krastev & Holmes 2012:40). According to Molinar 
(1991), not only is manipulation unnecessary to achieve the ruling elites’ victories, it is often 
employed in areas where opposition already is weak or where there is no opposition at all. 
Simpser (2013:276-283) also explains how ruling elites may manipulate the electoral scene to get 
supermajorities, with the sole purpose of signaling to the opposition that a contest is hopeless. At 
the regional level, electoral manipulation is employed not to win elections, but to test governor’s 
loyalties. As practically all the regional governors are on United Russia’s party list, gathering 
votes for Putin and United Russia may be their safest road to a successful career (Sakwa 
2011:175, Whitmore 2013). Governor’s survival index shows that in regions where UR does 
well, governors get promoted, but where the party achieves less success, governors resign or get 
fired (Keesing’s World News Archives 2011, Krastev & Holmes 2012:36-37).  
The control over the electoral process by the Kremlin is strong, but by no means total. 
United Russia and Putin must secure election victories, but in a way that preserves the integrity of 
the electoral process as a whole and when blatant fraud doesn’t undermine the results. For 
elections to be meaningful, there must exist a competing opposition (Roberts 2012a:23-24).  
Even though fraud and voter pressure explain a big portion of the party of power’s 
success, scholars seem to agree that they are far from the whole story of why Putin is popular 
(Rose et al. 2011:132, Colton & Hale 2009:502). Sakwa (2008a:83,135) wrote that Putin’s 
popularity cannot be reduced to electoral manipulation, because without political charisma, a 
determined personality and a vision for Russia’s future, no amount of manipulation would have 
ensured victory.  
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1.6 Where is the democratic opposition? – A hidden middle class 
The only systemic democratic opposition in Russia is the party Yabloko, which since 2003 has 
failed to clear the electoral threshold and gain seats in the Duma (Gelman 2007:13). The most 
prominent line of argument for why Russia lacks a democratic party is that liberalism simply has 
too little support to define a major social cleavage in Russia. Another interpretation is that the 
Soviet-era destroyed the ‘middle class’ that would otherwise have become a natural supporter of 
a liberal party (Huntington 1991:67, Hale 2004:994). However, Yabloko appears to have an 
identifiable social base of support, appealing to the better educated, more urban and those who 
have an above average social status. Yabloko indeed appears to represent a middle class, even 
though very small. The largest vote shares for Yabloko are found in the most urban cities of 
Moscow (8.5 percent in 2011) and St. Petersburg (11.6 percent in 2011) (Golosov 2015:414, Hale 
2006:104, White 2006:76,117).  
The same social strata characterized the non-systemic democratic opposition that flooded 
the streets in the end of 2011 and 2012. Up to 100,000 protesters went to the streets against 
corruption, electoral fraud, and demanded Putin’s resignation with the slogans “Russia without 
Putin” (de Vogel:2013, Roberts 2012a:88). The triggers for the demonstrations were allegations 
of electoral fraud in the 2011 parliamentary election, and a political maneuver that resulted in 
both national and international criticism. September 24th 2011, the acting president Dmitry 
Medvedev announced that he wouldn’t stand for reelection, that the presidential candidacy would 
be returned back to Putin, and that the two men had planned this power-exchange already back in 
2007 (Shevtsova 2012:23). In addition, Medvedev had engineered a constitutional amendment 
that raised the presidential term by two years and would allow Putin to serve for two new terms 
of six years each (White 2012). The Medvedev-Putin power exchange alienated those Russians 
who favored political modernization and democracy. The interesting observation is that the street 
opposition of 2011 and 2012 also largely belonged to the middle class, with 80 percent of the 
protestors having higher education and 70 percent categorizing themselves as relatively wealthy 
(Chaisty & Whitefield 2012:191, White 2012, Remington 2012:132). The protests also occurred 
in the cities of Moscow and St. Petersburg, where Yabloko had its greatest electoral success5 
(White 2006:76,117, Golosov 2015:414). A number of authors find that Moscow residents have 
																																																						
5 Additionally,	the	pro-market	and	pro-American	presidential	candidate	Mikhail	Prokhorov,	who	ran	as	an	
independent	in	the	2012	presidential	election,	received	his	best	results	in	Moscow	(20.5	percent)	and	St.	
Petersburg	(15.5)	(gaining	7.94	percent	nationwide)	(Clark	2013:376). 
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more respect for democracy, are more individualistic and are more inclined to support liberal 
values. These are regions where citizens are more mobilized, and where the Kremlin only has 
marginal room for electoral fraud and manipulation (Kuchinsky 2014:263, Tyldum & Kolstø 
2004:45, Shlapentokh 2004:223-225).  
There are numerous ways to define a middle class, with the most traditional way being 
based on a scale that measures higher social status, through indicators like income, education or 
occupation. However, the middle class expected to promote democracy is a metaphorical 
conceptualization and represents an embodiment of particular behavioral and attitudinal 
syndromes. This middle class is traditionally expected to promote democratic values because 
their standard of living gets better, but also due to the bearing of values of civic and social self-
worth, like feelings of solidarity or self-realization (Huntington 1991:67, Remington 
2011:104,108). When asked to choose between two alternatives, a society of social equality or a 
society of individual freedom, 60 percent of the urban middle class in Russia preferred the 
former, and only 36 percent preferred the latter (Remington 2011:110). Particularly, out of those 
who assessed their material standing as ‘above average’, 100 percent said they preferred a 
democratic political system (Shlapentokh 2004:227).  
Even though the non-systemic opposition was identifiable, it was not strong enough to 
pose any real challenge to the current regime. The protestors failed to include the majority of the 
population, didn’t articulate political stands on important issues and failed to organize into a 
political party (Russia Votes 2015, Kuchinsky 2014:262,271, Shevtsova 2012:24). A poll 
conducted in November 2012 showed that 57 percent of the surveyed did not think the 
demonstrations led to anything positive, disagreeing with the demonstrators (Levada Center 
2012a). By the end of 2012, only 20 percent of the surveyed believed that opposition actually had 
a political program, while 57 percent though they only criticized the government without offering 
any alternatives. Only 15 percent were interested in participating in a demonstration, against 75 
percent that were not (Levada Center 2012b, BBC News 2012). 
 A potential reason for the failure of the non-systemic opposition could be explained by 
the unique nature of the middle class in Russia compared to that one finds in Europe. More than 
half of the Russian middle-class individuals depend on the state for their livelihoods (Remington 
2011:106). A poll conducted by Levada Center in 2010 showed that 77 percent of the 
respondents believed that most people would not be able to survive without governmental 
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insurances. The reliance on state support could partially explain why protesting wasn’t a viable 
option for the majority of Russians or the middle class (Volkov 2012:57, Levada Centre 2010c). 
In addition, fear of political instability and overturning of the government, which Russians 
historically perceive as something negative, could contribute to the explanation to why the 
opposition lost the majority of their followers (Volkov 2012:60). 
	
1.7 Public opinion and perceptions of democracy 
Scholars expressed worries about the lack of support for key democratic values in Russia, 
especially during the 1990s, when favorable attitudes towards democracy plummeted (Tyldum & 
Kolstø 2004:41-42). The electoral failure of Yabloko also created concerns about the 
population’s lack of democratic orientations.  
Indeed, there appear to be several peculiarities in opinion polls on issues related to 
democracy. Freedom of speech is supported by 47 percent, but 32 percent are against it, 21 
percent support the multiparty system, but 50 percent are against it, and 49 percent are in favor of 
letting the president go unchecked by the parliament, however with 46 percent against it 
(Shlapentokh 2004:222). These splits may be caused by wrong conclusions about what 
democracy is. Even though I will not devote space conceptualizing democracy, it could be argued 
that the experiences the Russians have with it are quite different than most people in Western 
countries. With the fall of the Soviet Union, Russia was introduced to democratic freedoms, but 
together with a number of harsh economic reforms. Democracy as a concept may therefore lack a 
clear meaning and be associated with loss of social security, increased unemployment and 
increased poverty (Tyldum & Kolstø 2004:43). There was a Soviet joke: What is the difference 
between capitalism and socialism? Answer: Under capitalism, man exploits man; under 
socialism, it is the other way around. Indeed, only 10 percent of the respondents were satisfied 
with their life in the 1990s, with 50 percent regarding it as only “tolerable” and more than one-
third as “not tolerable”. A survey from 1998 found that 48 percent of Russians rejected capitalism 
as a good system for Russia, with only 30 percent in favor of it (Shlapentokh 2004:221).  
Despite the authoritarian turn of the 2000s, those respondents who supported the idea of 
democracy and market economy were the ones most likely to evaluate the current state of 
democracy in Russia positively (Chaisty & Whitefield 2012:200). Polls indicated that there was 
significant public support for key liberal values and that around 80 percent were positive about 
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democracy as a form of government. However, only 23 percent wanted the type of democracy 
found in Europe and America with a majority of Russians (56 percent) wanting a democracy in 
accordance with national traditions (Hale 2004:1016, Rose et al. 2011:75). The shift in favor of a 
more democratic system is according to McAllister and White (2008a:953) associated with the 
rise of United Russia, with causality probably operating in both directions.  
When asked to define democracy, 35 percent rightly said that “freedom of speech, press 
and religion” was the most important attribute of democracy. However, 27 percent of the 
respondents said the most important attribute was “the economic prosperity of the country”. A 
very big share of the population equates democracy with economic growth. Another 29 percent 
said the “order and stability” was the most important attribute of democracy, ranking it above 
“rule of law”, “political pluralism” and “elections of the executive”. In 2008 and 2009 both “the 
economic prosperity of the country” and “order and stability” were actually above “freedom of 
speech, press and religion” (Levada Center 2010i, Sakwa 2011:76-77). It appears as though the 
Russian electorate is increasingly willing to sacrifice democratic freedoms and individual rights 
for the sake of prosperity and order. However, Russian voters do not vote for Putin based on an 
abstract preference for autocracy, the majority just doesn’t perceive him as undemocratic: he 
seems to represent the values people associate with democracy (Colton & Hale 2009:114,498, 
Rose et al. 2011:107, Whitefield 2005:157, Sakwa 2008a:87). If this is indeed the case, the 
gradual disappearance of a democratic opposition in Russia is not surprising.  
Even though Russians have very low levels of trust in political institutions, with the Duma 
and the political parties being the least trusted, Putin has enjoyed very positive approval ratings 
over the years. The average approval rating of Putin has been 76 percent, while that of the 
government has averaged 42 percent (Rose et al. 2011:95,125, Roberts 2012a:99, Kolstø 
2004:11). A possible explanation for this trend is that the president is not held responsible for the 
political system currently in place in Russia. Indeed, 49 percent of the surveyed by Colton and 
Hale (2005:30) believe that Russia would benefit from a strong leader who ‘does not have to 
bother with parliament or elections’. A poll conducted by Levada Center in 2010 shows a similar 
trend, with 44 percent of the respondents saying Russia “always needs a ‘strong hand’”, and 33 
percent believing that “there are situations (like now), where the power needs to be concentrated 
in the hands of one person.” (Levada Centre 2010b). Putin may be therefore be seen as a leader 
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who can solve the problems of the country or as someone who can “shake things up” (Kolstø 
2004:11, McAllister & White 2008b:618).  
The preference for Putin seems to triumph traditional democratic demands. Colton and 
McFaul (2002:8) actually study the popular view that Russians prefer order above democracy. 
There does however exist a theoretical assumption that order in changing societies sometimes 
requires a strong hand that by itself is not subordinate to democratic politics. In this line of 
thought, authoritarian rule is the only way that a country can achieve economic growth after a 
turbulent political transition, with democracy only possible once the institutions of market 
capitalism are firmly installed (Remington 2012:8). Prior to the 2008 presidential election, almost 
half of the surveyed actually wanted the constitution changed in some way to allow Putin to 
either stand again or appoint his successor. In addition, fourth-fifths thought that Putin remaining 
in office for a third consecutive term would have a positive impact on them and their family 
(Rose et al. 2011:127). He was simultaneously supported by those who felt like the country was 
moving towards democracy, and by those who desired to see the president gaining more power 
than the parliament.  
 
Chapter 2: Cleavages and the Russian case 
2.1 Cleavage theory 
The commonly used term “cleavage” has been conceptualized in a variety of ways, often leading 
to conceptual confusion, in addition to the amount of adjectives often employed without 
clarification, like “social”, “manifest”, “latent”, “politicized” or “particized” cleavages. When 
studying political behavior, ‘social cleavage’ has generally been employed to mean large-scale 
sociological divisions between individuals (Stoll 2004:15). Robert Dahl (1966) defined cleavages 
as long-standing conflicts around issues that characterized the political system. Newer scholars 
though, have recognized that some of the divisions that arise may be short-term and still 
consequential for the structure of the political system (Cantillon 2001:20). 
  The definitional clarification concerns where “social” cleavages start as latent differences 
in a society to become full-fledged “political” cleavages. Political cleavages are divisions 
institutionalized in the party system, or criteria that divide the electorate into self-aware and 
organized groups to express their interests. Social, or latent cleavages on the other hand, do not 
generate a set of common values institutionalized in an organizational form (Stoll 2004:18,26).  
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 Social cleavage theory posits that parties emerge to represent the political demands of 
groups that form around major social divisions (class, ethnicity, religion, rural or urban place of 
residence) (Greene 2007:18, Korgunyuk 2014:401). This process is mediated trough electoral 
institutions, where the deliberate choices of politicians, institutional rules and strategic 
configurations strongly influence how such cleavages translate into representation in the party 
system (Kitschelt 1995:448, Østerud, Goldmann & Pedersen 1997). 
Lipset and Rokkan’s (1967) seminal work on societal cleavages in Europe articulated the 
way social structures translate into political parties. As newer research has identified social and 
political cleavages not anticipated by the researchers, we may need to apply their model in a 
different way, but analysis of any cleavage structure should be based on Rokkan and Lipset’s 
models. How scholars understand and operationalize their concepts depends on what they are 
planning on doing with them (Collier & Adcock 1999:539). This thesis will conceptualize 
cleavages in a less restrictive way: as any potential division that could divide the electorate along 
the given political alternatives.  
Although the term cleavage is central to Rokkan’s thinking, he never tried to define the 
term explicitly. Cleavages are by him understood as fundamental oppositions within a territorial 
population, which stand out from the multiplicity of conflicts rooted in the social structure. 
Cleavages are therefore not synonymous with conflict: “Conflicts can arise out of a great variety 
of relationships in the social structure, but only a few of these will polarize the politics of any 
given system” (Lipset & Rokkan 1967:6). According to Rokkan, social cleavages broke out at 
critical junctures and took on “manifest” organizational and institutional forms in the process of 
political system-building. Cleavages vary from country to country and form different 
combinations of cleavages, which he called cleavage structures. Mass alignments would occur 
when there was collective action among classes/groups that clash along historically distinct 
cleavage lines (Flora et al. 1999:7,34,136-139). 
When analyzing a potential cleavage it is important to remember that electoral cleavages 
only can be regarded as full if they can be interpreted both politically and socially. If we only can 
interpret an electoral cleavage politically but not socially (they have no connection to certain 
demographic and socio-economic indicators), it means that we are dealing with pure “political 
cleavages” which occur merely due to the impact of political actors and the mass media on 
voters. If on the other hand these electoral cleavages have no political interpretation but are 
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linked to certain demographic and socioeconomic indicators, it means that some actors affect the 
voters directly (“administrative resources”) (Korgunyuk 2014:403). 
 
2.2 Stein Rokkan’s methodology 
Stein Rokkan’s fame in the academic world is largely based on his and Lipset’s comparative 
analysis of the evolution of democracy and political institutions in Western Europe. Rokkan’s 
overriding concern was to understand political behavior – particularly the voting behavior of 
citizens. The approach to dealing with the issue had however changed substantially over time. 
Rokkan started off with survey research at the individual level, but quickly became interested in 
variations of citizen behavior across countries. After 1970 he sought to understand more broadly 
the historical development of up to 16 European states, developing his “conceptual map of 
Europe” (Flora et al. 1999:136-137). The focus of this thesis will be limited to Rokkan’s initial 
concern with social cleavages and how these shape the development of a political party system in 
a country.  
Social areas were by Rokkan divided into three: (1) economy, (2) territory/politics and (3) 
culture (ETC). His models were strictly multidimensional, and equal weight was given to 
economic, political/territorial, and cultural/ethnic/religious dimensions (Mjøset 2015:521, Flora 
et al.1999:140). Rokkan emphasized for his own research, that one should “start from a general 
theory of conflict”. This was an adaptation of experimental logic, where internal principles 
represented higher theory, with bridge principles that would link such theoretical concepts to 
actual measurements (variables) (Mjøset 2015:513). Rokkan was always shifting between formal 
theory, which he called paradigms, and empirical observations. Paradigms are his “conceptual 
frameworks” that define concepts in an abstract way and relate them to each other (Mjøset 
2015:519).  
The first and the simplest of Rokkan’s paradigms was that of an axis cross. The axis cross 
was initially combined with Parsons’ scheme of the functions of a social system, the AGIL-
scheme (Flora et al.1999:278). Rokkan called the horizontal axis the functional axis 
(economy/culture) and the vertical the territorial axis (center/periphery), often using territory as 
synonymous with politics (Mjøset 2015:521, Lipset & Rokkan 1967:10). Cleavage structures in 
any country would be placed within this two-dimensional space and always have both territorial 
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and functional dimensions. Territorial dimensions would however become less significant with 
political centralization, economic integration and cultural standardization (Flora et al.1999:7,63).  
Lipset and Rokkan (1967:3) defined “party” as something that throughout the history of 
Western politics has “stood for division, conflict or opposition within a body politic”. Lipset and 
Rokkan explained the emergence of parties as a response to cleavage lines generated by the great 
Industrial and National revolutions of the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries (Lipset & 
Rokkan 1967:19). Four main cleavages were identified as particularly important in the structuring 
of party competition up until the 1960s. The first two were seen as direct products of the National 
Revolution that forced the population to choose sides in conflicts over cultural identities. The 
center-periphery cleavage was the result of a conflict between “the central nation-building 
culture and the increasing resistance of the ethnically, linguistically, or religiously distinct subject 
populations in the provinces and peripheries”. The second was the religious-secular/state-church 
cleavage between “the centralizing, standardizing and mobilizing nation-state and the historically 
established corporate privileges of the Church”. The last two cleavage lines were brought by the 
Industrial Revolution and forced the citizenry to choose sides in terms of their economic interests. 
The urban-rural cleavage was between “the landed interests and the rising class of industrial 
entrepreneurs” and the owner-worker cleavage was between “owners and employers on one side 
and tenants, laborers and workers on the other” (White 2006:13, Flora et al. 1999:38).  
 
Figure 2: The four main cleavages according to Lipset and Rokkan. 
 
Source: Lipset and Rokkan (1967:14). 
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Lipset and Rokkan’s four social cleavages fit within the sociological tradition of Parsimonian 
modernization theory, where regional, religious, rural and to some extent labor parties reflect the 
“traditional” orientations, while urban, secular, central and bourgeois parties represent 
“modernity”. Similar to Rokkan and Lipset’s thinking, the modernization theory sees parties as 
representing important social cleavages (Hanson 1998:101). 
 
2.3 Limitations of the traditional cleavage theory when applied to Russia 
By the time of their writing, the countries in Rokkan and Lipset’s analysis had universal or at 
least manhood suffrage and most of them had passed to proportional representation (Flora et 
al.1999:20). Russia was however already a fully industrialized country at the time of post-
communist party development. The process of enfranchisement and industrialization did not help 
parties appeal to particular groups in society, as was the case in Western democracies. By 
contrast to the older, slowly developing nation-states analyzed by the authors, newer nations had 
to cope with issues of national/cultural identity, issues of participation, and issues of economic 
inequality all at once (four stages of modern state formation) (Flora et al.1999:133). In the 
Russian case, this was happening in the context of a governmental collapse, introduction of 
political institutions and a transition to a market economy. However, if the communist rule 
almost entirely wiped out the autonomous regional, religious and peasant communities that 
formed the social bases of a “traditional society”, and the transition failed to create new ones, 
how can we approach social cleavages in Russia? (Hale 2005:150-51, Chaisty 2012:284).  
Herbert Kitschelt (1995:451,453) acknowledged the limits of Rokkan and Lipset’s theory 
when applied to Russia. Because parties in Russia lack the societal and political anchors that 
would permit programmatic structuring, political parties would according to him be built around 
charismatic personalities and clientelistic ties. However, Hanson (1998:103) found that the 
structuring of party voting in the 1995 Duma election appeared to be far more programmatic than 
Kitschelt’s argument initially would predict. Hanson’s argument is that the leading Russian 
parties are becoming increasingly programmatic, but with programs that don’t reflect the kinds of 
social cleavages identified by Lipset and Rokkan.  
A further limitation of Lipset and Rokkan’s theory is their ‘freezing thesis’, which 
assumes that political structures are frozen over time. This has been seen as deterministic, failing 
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to account for significant societal developments in the latter half of the twentieth century, making 
it impossible to apply cleavage theory to the study of unstable party systems, such as the one in 
Russia after 2000 (Bornshier 2009:1, Korgunyuk 2014:402). The freezing thesis echoes the 
theoretical expectations tied to path dependency and historical institutionalism. Path dependency, 
when applied to institutions, shows that once institutions are established, they perpetuate 
themselves and close other paths of development. Similarly, historical institutionalism suggests 
that historical choices institutionalize themselves and later affect both actors and their choices 
(Roberts 2012a:9-10).  
 
Chapter 3: Russia’s Institutions and the Role of the Presidency 
A “party system” is according to the dominant school of thought a product of deep social 
cleavages as mediated, channeled and influenced by political (especially electoral) institutions 
(Hale 2004:993). In the study of the Russian party system it is therefore crucial to specifically 
address the political and electoral environment in which Russian elections take place. 
	
3.1 Institutional Factors 
Two fundamental factors can be said to drive the process of political party development: social 
cleavages and state (especially electoral) institutions. While some have divided theorists into 
‘cleavage’ and ‘institutional’ camps, most leading scholars recognize that both combine to shape 
the evolution of parties (Hale 2005:147). According to the cleavage-institutions school, post-
communist countries should have different kinds of cleavages and institutions than their West-
European counterparts, but the parties that emerge will nevertheless be grounded in these 
particular cleavages and institutions. The cleavage model itself remains useful (White 2006:11, 
Colton & Hale 2005:4).  
 Sartori (1976:176) alerted us to the danger of analyzing party development from a purely 
societal angle. Institutional choice is very important in determining the type of party system to 
emerge in a country and some cleavages may not be translated into political cleavages at all. 
Sartori argued that the salience of any factor is an effect of the willingness of parties or 
presidential candidates to politicize it.  
Lipset and Rokkan were themselves clear about the importance of transitional timing and 
the institutional constraints that would determine the social bases of partisanship: “Crucial for the 
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translation were the opportunities, the pay-offs and the costs of mergers, alliances and coalitions, 
favoring the aggregation of interest and outlooks within broader party fronts or their 
fragmentation between competing parties” (Flora et al.1999:45, Evans & Whitefield 2006:23-24). 
Rokkan was interested in the effects of different electoral systems and the role political 
institutions played in forming citizens’ participation in the political life. More specifically, 
Rokkan was interested in the development of institions that would secure citizens’ democratic 
rights, the resilience of these institutions, and the kinds of party systems that would emerge with 
reference to the cleavages in the society (Flora et al. 1999:136-139, Mjøset 2015:542-543).  
Another issue that should be addressed is the actual translation of social cleavages into 
political blocs. A single structure of social conflicts can result in different combinations of 
political parties if politicians find it beneficial to deemphasize a conflict or an issue. Electoral 
institutions are not independent of the social and political context in which they operate (Moser 
1998:72, Zielinski 2002:184).  
The institutional context in Russia was greatly influenced by the Soviet legacy of 
patrimonial communism, which played a big role in the choice of the political landscape during 
the transition. Patrimonial communism was a highly repressive regime, combined with extensive 
patterns of patronage politics, and accordingly led to the creation of a very strong presidency, 
extensive patron-client relationships and weak parties in today’s Russia (Hale 2006:28, Kitschelt, 
Mansfeldova, Markowski and Tóka 1999:23, Perepechko, ZumBrunnen & Kolossov 2010:585). 
Unlike in the countries of East-Central Europe, where the earliest elections after the fall of 
communism normally were structured along party lines, Russia’s founding election of 1990-1991 
was largely centered on the personalities of individual candidates. Subsequently, individuals 
could compete in elections without relying upon meaningful affiliations with political parties 
(Golosov 2015:400). 
Institutions create incentives for political actors, shape actors’ identities and establish the 
context in which policy making occurs. Institutional choices have great consequences for the 
establishment and development of any party system. In Russia, institutional design, the separation 
of powers, party legislation and the electoral system, all inhibited the development and success of 
programmatic parties and made even the party of power subordinate to power from above. 
Specifically two factors are argued to have a significant impact on the development of political 
parties in Russia: the electoral system and the presidency. These will be addressed below.  
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 3.1.1 The electoral system 
Russia is a semi-presidential system with dual executive of president and prime-minister, similar 
to the French Fifth Republic upon which Russia’s system is based (Roberts 2012a:115; 
2012b:234). However, unlike the French system, the Russian prime minister doesn’t depend on a 
parliamentary majority, he doesn’t have to represent the largest party (or any party), and although 
the parliament can pass a vote of no confidence, the president could instead choose to dissolve 
the parliament and call new elections. So even though Russia officially is a ‘semi-presidential’ 
system, the president holds virtually all the power, with the prime-minister mainly responsible for 
economic affairs (McAllister & White 2008b:604, Sakwa 2008b:106). 
The electoral system for the presidential elections in Russia is majoritarian with two-
rounds. If no candidate wins the majority of the votes cast in the first round, a second ballot is 
held two weeks later between the candidates who finished first and second (Clark 2008:343) 
Presidential elections are believed to suppress local sentiment in the electorate by appealing to 
national political forces. Indeed, Brancati (2008:158) finds that presidentialism is positively 
related to party nationalization, but only if the presidential and parliamentary elections are 
concurrent, something that at least until the electoral cycle of 2016-2018 has been the case in 
Russia (four months between elections). As presidential elections concentrate on the candidates’ 
personalities rather than their policy programs, they also naturally increase the effects of 
personalized attachments in the electorate (Evans & Whitefield 1999:262, Remington 2012:179).  
The relationship between elections and parties is clear. Elections are the raison d’etre of 
political parties (White 2006:20). Regularly held elections are therefore a “necessary but not 
sufficient condition for the development of competitive political parties” (Moser 1995:377). In 
order to hold elections that appear competitive, opposition parties must be tolerated or even 
created in order to show their limited support (Rose et al. 2011:159). Legislations passed under 
Putin significantly changed the role of opposition parties in Russia. In the early 2000s, the 
requirements for registration of parties were raised. A party now needed at least 50,000 members 
and branches in at least half of the regions to register. Additional electoral law reforms of 2005-
2006 increased the electoral threshold from five to seven percent and smaller parties could no 
longer form ‘blocs’ with other groupings to reach that threshold. To obtain the right to nominate 
candidates, the parties had to either be represented in the outgoing Duma, collect the signatures of 
at least 200,000 electors, or pay a non-refundable electoral deposit of 60 million rubles (approx. 
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$1 million). In addition, up until the 2007 election, Russia used a mixed electoral system, with 
half of the seats allocated through proportional representation and half through single member 
districts. By 2007, the entire Duma was elected by proportional representation, further limiting 
small parties and increasing the centralization of the country (Roberts 2012a:165, Brader & 
Tucker 2009:850). The amendments were intended to work as a mechanism to encourage smaller 
parties to coalesce into larger, more coherent blocs (Sakwa 2008b:143). Indeed, after the changes, 
only 11 out of the 46 previously existing parties registered for the 2007 Duma election, with only 
seven parties remaining by 2011. Putin’s reforms transformed Russia’s political space and a lot 
fewer, but perhaps stronger parties remained. According to Hale (2006:231), the introduced 
reforms actually enhanced the role of parties in the society, favoring the largest ones. And of 
course mainly United Russia.  
 
3.1.2 The Presidency 
Robert Moser (1998:57) sees presidentialism as having two competing effects on party formation. 
For one, a directly elected executive tends to promote consolidation of smaller party formations 
into larger ones, in the chase of a single prize – the executive office. The second effect of 
presidentialism is that parties become less cohesive. Geddes (1996:29) explains how 
parliamentary regimes tend to produce much more disciplined parties, and that there is a 
correlation between strong presidencies and weak parties. Because there are separate electoral 
constituencies of executive and legislative power, the formation of disciplined parties is not 
needed in order to keep the executive office (Moser 1998:58). According to Kitschelt (1995:452), 
presidentialism promotes a concentration of power on charismatic individuals and leads to the 
disintegration of parties.  
There is a high concentration of power in Russia’s presidency, ironically inherited from 
the democratic movements of the early 90’s. The ‘super-presidentialist’ constitution of 1993 took 
on features of the Tsarist and Soviet systems, giving the president far more power than any other 
state official or institution through both formal and informal channels (Hale 2006:31). The 
president in Russia has the power to form and direct the government, appoint executives, veto 
legislation of the Duma and in extreme cases dissolve it, issue decrees with the force of law, and 
command the armed forces without parliamentary authorization (Remington 2012:20, Sakwa 
2008b:108). The super-presidential constitution was however imposed after Boris Yeltsin had 
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illegally and violently suppressed the parliament, making the presidential power a product, not 
the cause of authoritarianism (Levitsky & Way 2010:183,187,233).  
In the Russian political system, the presidency is effectively ‘the only game in town’ and 
the effectiveness of the state depends on the presidency in general and the character of the 
incumbent in particular. In terms of party development, whoever aspires to be president doesn’t 
need a party affiliation and once elected can rule without cooperation with parties (Sakwa 
2008a:137). Neither Yeltsin, Putin nor Medvedev were ever party members, and even though 
there is an actual law from 2004 that prohibits an elected president to be a party member, there is 
a general understanding that the power holders have preferred to stay ‘beyond’ or ‘above’ parties, 
seeing them as limiting their legitimacy (Roberts 2012a:69, Turovsky 2014:82, Korgunyuk 
2015:2). Even though Putin never formally joined the party, he endorsed UR more unequivocally 
than any president during any Duma election (Hale 2006:233).  
According to Hale, the main reason for the weakness of parties in relation to the president 
is the existence of more cost-effective options in a principle-agent framework, that don’t come 
with the many string and costs attached to parties (Hale 2006:173,206). These ‘party-substitutes’ 
are understood as alternative routes to gain power, with the main options in Russia being the 
political machines of regional governors and politicized financial industrial groups (Hale 
2006:195). I will not go into detail on Hale’s discussion here, but will mention his observation of 
Kremlin itself being a party-substitute in Russia, using its vast resources to influence electoral 
outcomes (Hale 2006:193). Kremlin’s administrative capital includes everything from the 
outright ownership of national TV-channels, to direct influence over media, governors and the 
entire governmental apparatus. Post-communist presidents then, getting everything they need 
from the government, have little need for the kinds of support a party can provide with, and has 
resulted in them avoiding party labels (Hale 2006:206). 
The concentration of presidential power is reinforced by the lack of checks and balances 
on its use. The institutions that could monitor the president and his government, like the mass 
media, the parliament or interest groups, are monitored by the Kremlin and don’t have free access 
to the resources they need. For example, the government can deny licenses to oppositional 
broadcasts and newspapers. By concentrating state power on the executive, and reducing the 
autonomy of other political centers like the parliament, parties, governors and the mass media, 
Putin strengthened the state and placed the entire executive and legislative branches under his 
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direct control. For Putin, a strong state meant an unbroken chain of executive authority stretching 
from the president down to the governors, with accountability running upwards to the center 
rather than downwards to the citizenry (Remington 2012:10,21). 
However, Putin’s hold on the post as Russia’s president is less due to his constitutional 
prerogatives and more due to his personal authority (McAllister & White 2008b:606). A 
president that looks powerful on paper may be quite weak in reality, as was the case with Yeltsin. 
 
3.2 Presidential candidates 
Even though the Russian presidency has been argued to hinder the successful development of a 
party system in Russia, presidential elections may have had a different effect. Even though the 
three post-communist presidents have avoided party labels, all the other major presidential 
candidates have been party members (with the exception of Mikhail Prokhorov in 2012). 
Presidential elections themselves are according to Hale (2006:107) partisan affairs.  
Consolidating Russia’s party system and creating a party-based government was 
according to Sakwa (2008a:127) on top of Putin’s political agenda upon his coming to power. 
The shift to a wholly proportional system for electing the Duma did indeed strengthen the role of 
parties at the national level. However, allowing a party or a coalition of parties to form the 
government and nominate the prime minister was considered a risky move in the unstable 
political environment Russia was in during the 2000s. The Putin administration feared that a 
decision like that would deliver the country into the hands of the oligarchs and Putin dropped the 
question, saying: “We have not yet developed stable national political parties. How under such 
conditions can we talk about a party-based government? […] while we have a developing 
economy, a statehood that is being consolidated and are finally determining the principles of 
federalism, we need strong presidential power” (as quoted in Sakwa 2008a:128). 
Given the fact that the 1993 Russian constitution gives the president almost tsar-like 
powers, in addition to all the reforms that have limited the role of the Russian parties, it is clear 
that one cannot study the political system in Russia without taking the presidential role in 
general, and Putin’s role in particular, into account. United Russia does not simply provide the 
president with a support base, it actually gains its position from its support of the president 
(Gelman 2008:921, Roberts 2012a:66,188). Already by 2003, 80 percent of the respondents 
expressed the belief that Putin fully supported UR and 84 percent believed that UR fully 
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supported Putin. Support for Putin was by far the most important single predictor of a vote for 
United Russia. When asked about the motives to vote for United Russia, 69 percent said they did 
so simply because Putin headed the party list (Rose et al. 2011:59, Roberts 2012a:160, McAllister 
& White 2008b:624). A survey in 2007 found that the intention to vote for UR was strongly 
linked with Putin’s ideological positions and his performance in office. However, growing mass 
loyalties to United Russia have also been and continue to be a distinct source of votes for Putin 
(Colton & Hale 2009:481,499).  
According to the Eurasia Party chairman Alexandr Dugin (as cited in Sakwa 2008:185), 
Russians do not believe in parties, and judge politics according to entirely different standards 
than those offered by political parties. According to him: “Mr. Putin basically stands alone as a 
political party. Contrary to United Russia, he epitomizes a real political party, representing the 
historical interests of a social and national majority”.  
 
3.2.1 The President - Vladimir Putin 
Upon his appointment to the presidential post, Putin had lived abroad for five years, learned 
German, worked as head of the FSB, worked for over a decade as a security official, and had 
successfully defended his doctoral dissertation. Additionally, as a senior member of the 
presidential administration in Moscow, he was quite familiar with the problems of the regions, 
and the workings of the government, the presidential apparatus and the security services (Sakwa 
2008a:15). During his first term in office, Putin’s popularity grew due to several factors. Studies 
of voter behavior tended to conclude that his personality and leadership style were large parts of 
his victory in 2000 with performance being a strong predictor of his continued popularity and 
support (Colton & Hale 2009:478,491). Four factors can explain his meteoric rise. First, the 
country experienced an economic boom in 2000, and even though the boom was strongly 
influenced by the rise of oil prices, it was viewed as the greatest achievement of Putin and his 
government. He also made the economy more stable, managing to pay wages and pensions on 
time, something considered an achievement in the unstable environment Russia was in (Sakwa 
2008a:83, Rose et al. 2011:142, Robinson 2013:452). Second, in September 1999, terrorist 
explosions destroyed two apartment buildings in Moscow killing hundreds of sleeping Russians. 
Putin’s response, his resolute statements, decisive actions and the willingness to take personal 
responsibility in the second Chechen war contributed both to his electoral success in 2000, and to 
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the continuing growth of his popularity after the election (Sakwa 2008a:83). The third factor is 
the Kremlin’s entire weight behind Putin, using their resources to manipulate the candidate field, 
the political system and the elections themselves. The tightened laws on political parties, the 
reduced autonomy of regional governors and the overtaking of most influential television 
networks all played their part in securing Putin’s popularity. However, as Sakwa (2008a:83,135) 
wrote, Putin’s popularity can’t be reduced to electoral manipulation, which leads us to the fourth 
factor. Putin appeared able to restore Russia’s national dignity. As noted by Sergei Kovalev, 
Putin came to epitomize Russia, its sufferings and its aspirations and thus became ‘the president 
of hope’ (Sakwa 2008a:23). Putin was viewed as a decisive leader who was prepared to stand up 
against Western powers, but still treat the West as an “ally or a friend” (Remington 2012:176). 
Ideologically, the electorate placed Putin on the right as early as 2000 (Colton & Hale 
2009:495). Still, his political position was not clear to everyone. While about half associated 
Putin with a “market economy”, 30 percent of the respondents found it impossible to classify him 
in terms of political positions (McAllister & White 2008b:615). This could be explained by the 
unique ideological approach taken by Putin. According to Sakwa (2008a:98), Putin created a 
‘third way’ that attempted to find a balance between socialism and capitalism, between market 
and non-market and between individualism and collectivism. This third way was linked with 
genuine politics of the center, drawing from the older tradition of liberal conservatism. Liberal 
conservatism supports liberal principles in the economy (market reforms and international 
economic integration), state authority and patriotism in domestic policy, and great power 
nationalism in foreign policy (Sakwa 2008a:42,217).  
The strengthening of central authority was at the heart of Putin’s reform of federal-
regional relations. The most important factor in strengthening the state was the centralization of 
power and “a unified system of executive power in the country” (Sakwa 2008b:275). The first 
step towards this goal was the creation of seven federal district, each headed by a Kremlin 
appointee responsible for supervising regional activities and its regional governors. In 2004, 
Putin centralized further, abolishing direct elections of regional governors and claiming the right 
to appoint them himself (Hale 2006:232, Sakwa 2008b:267). Putin insisted that the reforms were 
intended to secure individual security and to prevent the misuse of power and financial 
resources by the regional and local authorities. Indeed, regional autonomy had under Yeltsin 
years often taken undemocratic forms, threatening the right of minorities and individuals (Sakwa 
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2008a:186,213). The reforms naturally weakened the federal element in the separation of powers, 
and raised questions about whether Russia could be defined as a federal system at all6. 
 The relative uniformity of Putin’s support across all Russia reflected the success of his 
policies aimed at centralizing the country, but also his success in appealing to all classes, social 
forces and ends of the political spectrum. He drew support from the communists and from the 
liberals, from the old and the young, educated and economically successful (Sakwa 2008a:34,86). 
People strongly identified with Putin and supported his decisions related to the economy, 
followed by his decision to restore law and order in the country (with Chechen policy most 
frequently cited). By 2008, the majority of the Russian electorate tended to agree with most of 
Putin’s national policies, believing that Russia both had an increased influence in the world (71 
percent) and experienced increased national stability (60 percent) (Colton & Hale 2009:493).  
 
3.2.1.1 Vladimir Putin’s electoral support between 2004 and 2012 
Putin won his first election in March 2000, gaining 53.4 percent of the vote. If Chechnya was the 
predominant theme in the 1999-2000 electoral cycle, by 2004 it was the struggle against the 
oligarchs and their dominance in the political sphere. Oligarchs were people with financial and 
industrial capital that had direct access to the government (Sakwa 2008a:136). Hoping to remove 
one of the sources of their domination and corruption in general, Putin increased the paychecks of 
his administration, the police and judges, actually increasing the judges’ salaries fourfold (Sakwa 
2008a:156,165). The fact that Putin weakened leading business oligarchs by prosecuting or 
exiling them, secured him another wave of popular support (Levitsky & Way 2010:197).  
A weak opposition also contributed to his success in 2004. Following UR’s victory in the 
2003 Duma election, all other major parties withheld their strongest candidates from the 
presidential elections, with CPRF being represented by Kharitonov, LDPR nominating 
Zhirinovsky’s bodyguard Oleg Malyshkin and Yabloko not filing a candidate at all. Opposition’s 
withdrawal could have given the electorate the impression of their weakness and defeat on the 
electoral playing field, resulting in Putin achieving his electoral peak with 71 percent of the 
ballots in 2004 (Colton & Hale 2009:479). 
																																																						
6	Riker	(1975:101)	defines	a	federal	political	organization	as	one	dividing	the	activities	of	government	between	
regional	units	and	a	central	government	(Flora	et	al.1999:209).	The	direct	elections	of	governors	were	introduced	
again	in	2012.		
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If in 2001 his approval rating was 76 percent, by December 2007 it was 87 percent, an 
almost unprecedented situation for any leader in any peacetime democracy (Remington 2012:9, 
McAllister & White 2008a:950). After his two four-year terms in office, Putin stepped down as 
president and took the post as Russia’s prime minister. With popular approval ratings of over 80 
percent, and with 70 percent believing that the president could be “completely trusted”, it was 
widely believed that whomever Putin picked as his successor easily would win the election 
(McAllister & White 2008b:613-615). Putin endorsed Dmitry Medvedev, his earlier assistant and 
the deputy head of the presidential administration (Sakwa 2008a:29). He promised to continue 
Putin’s policies, and much of the electoral campaign came down to a referendum on Putin’s eight 
years in power (Clark 2008:344). Medvedev won a landslide victory securing 70.3 percent of the 
vote, gaining at least 60 percent in all but one region7.  
The succession was not perceived as democratic, as the Kremlin controlled every aspect 
of the election process and effectively allowed Putin to abide by constitutional term limits while 
retaining effective power. The mass media, the regional governors, big businesses and the 
electoral commission all demonstrated that the entire Russian political elite supported Medvedev 
(Remington 2012:1). Approval of Putin’s performance was according to Colton and Hale 
(2009:491) the single strongest predictor of the Medvedev vote and he is in the analysis treated as 
an extension of the presidential incumbent vote. Only 9 percent thought that Medvedev actually 
had ‘real power’, compared to 36 percent that believed it was still held by Putin (McAllister & 
White 2008b:624-625). Of those who voted for him, 73 percent saw him as someone who either 
would be subordinate to or share power with Putin (Rose et al. 2011:134). The temporary 
president helped avoid changing the constitution, simulate democracy and at the same time 
preserve Putin’s policies (Levitsky & Way 2010:199-200, Roberts 2012a:2). 
In 2011 Medvedev announced that he wouldn’t stand for reelection and that the 
presidential candidacy would be returned back to Putin. The two men revealed that they had 
planned this power-exchange already back in 2007, leading to widespread criticism both from 
within and outside Russia, including large-scale demonstrations in Moscow and St. Petersburg 
(Roberts 2012a:88, White 2009:171, Nichol 2007:4). OSCEs election observation report stated: 
“This move was widely perceived as being a prearranged handover of power and contributed to 
widespread public discontent” (OSCE 2012:3). On top of that, Putin announced that if elected, he 
																																																						
7	Smolensk	oblast	is	the	exeption,	where	he	still	won	59.3	percent	of	the	vote.	
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would nominate Medvedev for the post of prime minister (White 20099:173). Still, Putin won 
with 63.3 percent of the vote, and even though this was 7 million votes less than what Medvedev 
secured in 2008, he still received three times as many votes as Zyuganov. Only in Moscow did 
Putin come short of the 50 percent mark (still gaining 46.7 percent) (Clark 2013: 374-376).  
 
3.2.2 Gennady Zyuganov 
Gennady Zyuganov has been the First Secretary of the Communist Party since 1993, and 
presented a real challenge to the incumbent power in the 1996 presidential election. That year, he 
came in second with 32.5 percent of the vote, right behind Boris Yeltsin, who captured 35.8 
percent8 (Mathews 2015). In all the subsequent elections, Zyuganov has been Putin’s main 
challenger, however not coming close to him in ratings or electoral results (Sakwa 2008a:29). 
Zyuganov’s thinking was traditionally characterized by such terms as sobornost’ (unity of 
the nation), derzhavnost’ (great power status) and narodnost’ (community, populism). His 
thinking was a mix of a desire for a strong state, Slavophilism9 and populism. He believed in 
ethnos, or nation, as the moving force in history. From this comes the idea about Eurasia as a 
geopolitical entity dominated by the Russian ‘super ethnos’. Here, Zyuganov explicitly drew on 
Samuel Huntington’s notion of the ‘clash of civilizations’ to justify his ‘Russian Idea’ (Sakwa 
2008b:460, Hanson 1998:115-118). While stressing the reintegration of the old USSR, Zyuganov 
sought to reassure Western businesses that he would not destroy the private sector if he came to 
power. His policies were incoherent in that elements of the market were accepted, but market 
forces had to be constrained. The contradictory nature of his policies, in addition to ideological 
rigidity contributed to Zyuganov’s weak electoral performance (Sakwa 1998:146,153,172).  
It could be argued that while United Russia is the party of the president, Zyuganov is the 
leader of the Communist Party. In other words, while Putin enhances the vote of UR, Zyuganov 
gains votes from CPRF’s core supporters. Zyuganov’s rating have always lagged behind that of 
the party itself (White et al. 1997:209). His general lack of charisma and old age could partially 
explain why the communist party, even though representing a real opposition to the government, 
is allowed to exist: their leader is ‘unelectable’. 
 
																																																						8 This	was	in	the	first	election	round,	in	the	second	Zyuganov	gained	41	percent,	versus	Yeltsin’s	54.		
9 Slavophilism	strives	to	achieve	the	restauration	of	territories	like	Crimea,	has	a	confrontational	attitude	towards	the	West	and	is	based	on	autachic,	non-market	oriented	economic	policies	(Sakwa	2008a:99).		
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3.2.2.1 Gennady Zyuganov’s electoral support between 2004 and 2012 
In the 2000 presidential election, Zyuganov gained 29.5 percent of the vote. Even though the vote 
itself only sank by three percent in four years, compared to Putin’s 53.4 percent, the loss was 
obvious. About a fifth of the communist vote was drifting to Putin, and Zyuganov, together with 
his party, was from that election on condemned to a second place in all of the following Russian 
elections (Levitsky & Way 2010:194, Sakwa 2008a:29,33). 
The first presidential election of study in this thesis is the 2004 presidential election, 
which Zyuganov chose not to run. To demonstrate the resentment towards unfair elections 
Zyuganov appointed the former Agrarian Party member, Nikolay Kharitonov as CPRF’s 
candidate (Clark 2005:517). Kharitonov did well, coming in second with 13.7 percent of the 
votes cast. Ideological and programmatic attachment to CPRF was by far the most important 
influence on voting for Kharitonov, and he is in the analysis treated as an extension of the 
presidential communist vote (Rose et al. 2011:134, Clark 2008:342). CPRF’s choice not to run 
their strongest candidate in the presidential election of 2004 raised doubts about their own 
willingness and ability to remain important (Hale 2006:98-99).  
In 2008 Zyuganov chose to run again, this time against Dmitry Medvedev. He gained 17.7 
percent of the vote, which was up from what Kharitonov got in 2004, but still 53 percent less than 
Medvedev. In 2012, Zyuganov emphasized his commitment to the renationalization of resources 
and calling for a reduction in influence of international organizations such as the NATO and 
WTO (Mathews 2015). Unlike CPRF, that in 2011 increased their vote shares by 7.6 percent, 
Zyuganov actually lost 0.5 percent, gaining 17.2 percent of the vote. 
 
Chapter 4: Russian party system 
Much of the literature on the Russian party system has been a debate of whether social cleavages 
providing bases of support for political parties, exist or not. Scholars seem to disagree about the 
strength and quality of political parties in Russia (White 2006:12).  
Most insist that Russian parties are organizationally weak and stagnating, pointing to their 
lack of penetration of state organs (Hale 2006:3, Roberts 2012a:118, Sakwa 2008a:144-145). 
Rose and Munro (2002:118-119) claim that Russia has an underdeveloped, ‘floating’ party 
system. There are many reasons for why parties in Russia are regarded as weak. Voters are 
suspicious of the very idea of “party” after their experience with Communist Party rule; the 
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Soviet regime destroyed the social cleavages and the related social infrastructure that was 
expected to create parties; and the transition has failed to create new stable ones (White et al. 
1997:135, Hale 2005:150-51, Chaisty 2012:284, Roberts 2012a:7). In addition, according to the 
federal law, parties have the right to nominate presidential candidates, but candidates may also 
nominate themselves and run for presidential office without the support of any party, something 
all the post-communist presidents have done, further weakening the parties’ position (Hale 
2006:3, Roberts 2012a:69). Sakwa (2008b:151-159) actually lists eleven factors that prevent the 
development of strong parties and a party system in Russia, including; the electoral system, 
Russian history and political culture, the powerful presidency, the legacy of patrimonial 
communism, the weakness of the civil society, the fading of ideological cleavages, and the 
existence of party substitutes. 
On the other hand are scholars who believe that Russia’s parties distinguish themselves in 
the minds of Russian citizen, and that voters base their voting on different parties’ stated views 
on policy positions (Hale 2006:100). Whitefield (2001:235) for example found that Russian 
partisan voting was rooted in socioeconomic class cleavages. Perepechko et al. (2010:590) argue 
that contemporary Russian parties are expressions of both new and rediscovered cleavages 
engendered by the Tsarist and Soviet history as well as by post-Soviet developments. According 
to this group of scholars, parties still influence public opinion and do so both ideologically and 
along social cleavage lines. Indeed, already by the 1995 and 1999 elections, at least three quarters 
reported knowing each of the major parties and their political stands on important issues, 
implying that parties had established themselves in the minds of the electorate (Turovsky 
2014:70-71, Brader & Tucker 2009:844,857, Hale 2005:148; 2006:92-93).  
The two views are however not mutually exclusive and can both be correct. Their 
difference might be rooted in the different approaches to studying party strength. Most of the 
optimistic analyses are based on surveys of potential Russian voters, where the voters’ 
connections with the parties are established, while most of the pessimistic analyses focus on 
macro political outcomes where the parties appear weak with low penetration of provincial 
organs. However, there is still disagreement in the literature, with several authors claiming that 
parties in Russia are not embedded in the country’s social structure and that they don’t effectively 
represent social interests (Sakwa 1998:128;2008a:134, Hanson 1998:107, Hale 2005:151-152).  
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4.1 Russian Parties 
Russian political tradition involves strong executives and weak legislatures, leaving parties little 
role to play between elections. One of three considerations prevail when voters chose parties: 
sympathy with the personality of the party’s leader (charismatic party), expected personal and 
selective advantages derived from the victory of the party (clientelistic party), or the production 
of advantages and collective goods if the party wins the election (programmatic party) (Kitschelt 
1995:449). Programmatic parties have historically not done so well in Russia, as with the party 
Yabloko, and as the Soviet legacy damaged the idea of ideologically-based appeals, voters turn 
instead to charismatic and clientelistic parties (White 2006:173,225).  
During the Soviet period, one party claimed to represent the interests of the entire society. 
Since the end of the communist era, numerous parties have emerged, but a stable party system 
has not formed. During the 1990’s, parties had shallow roots, often forming right before an 
election and fading soon afterwards (Rose et al. 2011:45). In the 2000s, the regime attempted to 
create a more stable party system, but placing it under tight state control. The success of United 
Russia suggests that the country might be turning back to a new form of single-party rule 
(Remington 2012:172). But as political parties consistently come in last in approval ratings of 
political institutions, it is not surprising that all the presidents chose to run as independents 
(Roberts 2012a:99, Sakwa 2008a:84). 
The definition of party groupings does not always make sense in Russia. Words like left, 
right, conservative, liberal, socialist, communist and nationalist are often applied in conflicting 
and confusing ways. A big majority of Russians don’t know how to understand the typical 
political divisions of “left” and “right” that is commonly used in Europe (Kitschelt 1995:462, 
Colton 2000:148). When the European Social Survey asked Russians in 2007 to place themselves 
on a left/right scale, almost half said they did not know where to place themselves and an 
additional 29 percent put themselves in between the two alternatives (Rose et al. 2011:56). Given 
the ambiguities, several authors have argued that the Russian political spectrum is almost 
unidentifiable because parties often shift their political positions and make it hard to qualify them 
even for the political scientists, not only for the voters (Sakwa 1998:128, Hanson 1998:107).  
Fish (1995:372-7) for example, insists that the ideological spectrum of Russian party 
politics during the 90’s was ‘one-dimensional’, with market liberalism at one pole and the ‘red-
brown’ coalition at the other. Rose and Tikhomirov (1996:375-376?) similarly found that Yeltsin 
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and Zyuganov appealed to diametrically opposed constituencies. Back then, the electoral success 
of the Communists was explained by the enormous dislocation produced by marketization in the 
post-Soviet context, which pushed voters towards the anti-liberal and anti-market side of the 
spectrum. While White (2006:2) thinks the emergence and the popularity of the ‘party of power’ 
means that Russia’s party system is not developing along the traditional left-right axis, Colton 
and Hale (2005:iii; 2009:488) find the main political cleavage to be between the left represented 
by the communists and the right represented by the incumbents. 
Regardless, until the emergence of United Russia, CPRF was the only real mass party 
with its half million members. Even according to Putin himself, the only stable party in Russia by 
2008 was CPRF, with United Russia still emerging, but already becoming a stable political force 
(Sakwa 2008a:129,145).  
 
4.2 Selection of parties 
Analysts of the Russian party system usually select parties based on the criteria that they surpass 
the threshold to achieve parliamentary representation. This selection makes sense, as over the last 
three consecutive elections, only four parties enjoyed parliamentary representation, and in 2007 
received together almost 92 percent of the vote (Gelman 2008:914). These parties are United 
Russia, Communist Party of the Russian Federation (CPRF), Liberal Democratic Party (LDPR) 
and Just Russia. LDPR and Just Russia are however not regarded as real opposition (Turovsky 
2014:76, Gelman 2008:920, White 2006:188-190). Out of all the parties competing against 
United Russia only two can be viewed as opposition parties: CPRF and Yabloko. As Yabloko 
since 1999 has failed to gain representation in the Duma, the most significant opposition to date 
is according to several authors CPRF (White 2009:173, Hale 2011, Roberts 2012a:96).   
Studying the political parties and examining the organizational differences between them 
help illuminate the real, but often hidden, intentions of people and institutions involved in party 
formation and development (Perepechko et al. 2010:582). Opposition parties in authoritarian 
regimes are often idealized as “freedom fighters”, but this underestimates their opportunistic 
behavior and even their role in providing de facto support for the regime. From the beginning of 
the 2000s there has been a huge record of opposition’s collaboration with the authorities, 
provoking some authors to speak of its extinction (Gelman 2008:913). Opposition parties in 
Russia lack the collective strength to challenge UR, and become what Lenin called “useful 
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idiots”, giving the appearance of competition but not threatening United Russia’s dominance 
(Rose et al. 2011:61). The existence of multiple competing parties lets the Russian government 
demonstrate to the electorate and the outside world that democracy in Russia isn’t waning, while 
providing an outlet for the opposition (March 2009:518,515, Roberts 2012a:95).  
 
4.2.1 United Russia 
The rise of United Russia can be traced back to the equally sharp rise of the party’s predecessor, 
Unity, that came in second after the Communist Party with 23.3 percent of the vote at the 
parliamentary election in 1999. Unity’s success was largely based on Putin’s endorsement of the 
party, which in turn provided a platform for the successful election of Putin himself in 2000. 
Unity was created less than three months before the election, and a number of reports indicate 
that it got much of its funding through governmental structures and oligarchs (Boris Berezovsky) 
(Gelman 2008:920, Hale 2006:82-84).  
Several attempts by the Kremlin to create a “party of power” in the 1990s went in vain, 
but when the party Fatherland – All Russia (FAR) ended up with almost as many seats in the 
Duma as Unity in 1999, FAR was given an offer to merge with Unity to create United Russia10. 
The first regional branch for United Russia was opened in Moscow in 2001 and by May 2002 the 
party had branches in all but one of the then 89 regions (Golosov 2014:272, Hale 2006:230). 
Within a relatively short time, UR became the most successful party since the demise of the 
Soviet Union, winning all the consecutive elections for the state Duma with a super-majority 
since 2003 (Turovsky 2014:69, Roberts 2012b:226, 2012a:116,148-151). In addition to the “Putin 
factor”, UR’s electoral result largely benefitted from the ability of the federal, regional and 
municipal power holders to control financial flows, governmental structure and the media.  
United Russia has tried to avoid having an identifiable ideology, and has unequivocally 
supported virtually all bills proposed by Putin and his government since its formation. The 
party’s program was in 2007 titled “Putin’s Plan: A worthy future for a great country”. Putin was 
described as Russia’s “national leader”, which had the “political support” of United Russia 
(White 2009:172). Roberts (2012a:161) calls this the party’s ideological strand of “Putinism”. 
Putinism is an embodiment of qualities associated with a strong leader and an authority figure, 
with the party becoming an extension of Putin’s personality. More recently, the party has 
																																																						
10	Unity	also	incorporated	the	party	Our	Home	is	Russia	in	2001	(Hale	2006:231).		
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attempted to develop Putin’s personality politics into a coherent set of ideas, uniting the often 
contradictory ideas of liberal reform, social justice, national pride and patriotism (Roberts 
2012a:162-164). According to survey evidence, only 6 percent of the respondents actually knew 
what “Putin’s Plan” was, but no less than 65 percent approved of it. In short, Putin’s plan was: 
“preservation of Russia as a ‘unique and great civilization’”, “building of a competitive 
economy”, “new quality of life”, “establishment of the institutions of civil society” and “further 
development of Russia as a sovereign democracy” (McAllister & White 2008a:938). Surveys 
conducted between 2006 and 2008 show that only 4 percent of those positive towards UR cited 
the party’s program as the reason for the positive attitude (Roberts 2012a:160) 
Since the party considers itself as a basis support for the president, it has argued that it is a 
party of neither left nor right, but a centrist one, capable of resolving “real problems for real 
people”. Its key principles are “order and legality” (Sakwa 2008a:112). The party’s statements 
however, in addition to voters’ perceptions, place UR slightly right of center. Three quarters of 
the people surveyed believe that UR wants to continue and deepen market reforms, such as 
cutting taxes and reducing regulation (Hale 2006:83, Remington 2012:176). 
In terms of electoral strategy, the party is best described as a non-ideological catch-all-
party, where the party employs a fuzzy programmatic focus to reduce the risk of alienating 
segments of the population with concrete policy promises (White 2006:32). They don’t have an 
ideology but tailor their message so as to resonate with as many as possible, resting upon three 
“isms” of centrism, conservatism and Putinism11 (Levitsky & Way 2010:189, Roberts 
2012a:63,77,85,181). According to Roberts (2012a:87-88), 80 percent of the party’s first 
manifesto (“Programma Vserossiiskoi Politicheskoi Partii “Edinstvo” i “Otechestvo” Edinaya 
Rossiya”) were valence issues, or rhetoric of good and bad (for example strong economy is good, 
corruption is bad), as opposed to position issues that would inform voters about the party’s 
positions on important issues. Unity’s partisans were against socialism, preferred market 
economy and a strong presidency. United Russia’s partisans were similarly against socialism, 
pro-presidential and antinationalist (believing that Russia should treat the West as an ally/friend).  
There are actually several similarities between the system we see in today’s Russia and 
the French Fifth Republic. Specifically, United Russia resembles the presidential party under 
																																																						
11	Conservatism	reflects	stability,	something	that	resonates	with	ordinary	voters	and	is	probably	the	strongest	
collective	benefit	that	the	party	offers.	Putinism	is	the	party’s	extremely	close	association	with	the	president,	while	
centrism	is	best	understood	in	terms	of	the	commitment	to	the	catch-all	strategy	(Roberts	2012a:160-163).	
	 		41	
	
Charles de Gaulle. It gained its legitimacy largely from its identification with the national leader, 
making it a personalist movement of “Gaullism”, similar to UR’s ideological strand of 
“Putinism” (Cole 1993:50, Roberts 2012a:161). The party hoped to transcend the left/right divide 
in an attempt to represent the majority of the population. De Gaulle’s authority over the Gaullist 
party was immense, and similar to United Russia, Cole (ibid:63) identified it as a “dominant, but 
dominated” party. Similar to the Russian case, it was the systemic constraints of the country’s 
semi-presidentialism and the French constitution of 1958 that gave the president overwhelming 
power and reduced the ability of parties to act independently. In fact, all of the presidents under 
the Fifth French Republic12 wanted to be above parties and party-politics, subordinating them to 
their executive power (Cole 1993:54-60).  
In addition to similarities between UR and the “Gaullist” party, Vladimir Putin reminds of 
de Gaulle himself. De Gaulle emphasized a “certain idea of France” with a strong state and a 
strong executive, a strong economy and a stable society. In foreign policy, de Gaulle emphasized 
French exceptionalism, seeking to impose French influence on world politics. De Gaulle didn’t 
like the idea of a bipolar world and sought independence from United States to achieve greatness. 
The development of an independent French nuclear capability and the withdrawal of France from 
NATO military operations was an outgrowth of this worldview (Bernstein 1993:333). 
 
4.2.1.1 United Russia’s electoral support between 2003 and 2011 
The 2003 election marked the first time that a pro-governmental party gained two-thirds majority 
in the Duma, winning the largest percentage (37.6%) of any party in the four post-communist 
elections in Russia. The victory ensured the passage of the president’s legislative agenda and he 
could now undertake constitutional amendments if he so desired (Wegren & Konitzer 2006:678, 
Clark 2005:513, Remington 2012:179).  
 Retaining high popularity ratings throughout its first term, UR won the 2007 Duma 
election with 64.3 percent of the vote, with almost twice as many individual votes as in 2003. 
Putin was still very popular and if in the 2003 Duma campaign the party used the slogan 
“together with the president”, in 2007 they adopted “Putin’s Plan” and the entire election itself 
became a referendum on the president’s two terms in office. UR’s connection to Putin and his 
																																																						
12	De	Gaulle,	Pompidou,	Giscard	d’Estaing	and	Mitterand.  
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own association with a rapid rate of economic growth was a major reasons for the enormous 
success of the party (McAllister & White 2008a:931,948, Gelman 2007:12).  
 The electoral support for United Russia declined from 64.3 percent in 2007 to 49.3 
percent in 2011. Several factors could explain the party’s failure to gain as high ratings as in 
previous elections. The personal popularity of Putin went down as his plans of returning back to 
office became official and the election was followed by the biggest anti-regime protests since the 
fall of the Soviet Union (Clark 2013:374). Other reasons for the decline in support for UR could 
be weaker “administrative resources”, both in form of governors as pushers and in financial terms 
(Whitmore 2013). Regardless, United Russia still gained over three times as many votes as the 
Communist Party and dominated the political scene.  
 
4.2.2 Communist Party of the Russian Federation (CPRF) 
The Communist Party was established in 1993 and as a direct successor of the Communist Party 
of the Soviet Union (CPSU), had a unique claim to represent the old regime. During the 1990s, 
CPRF was the only party that managed to increase the number of voters in each successive 
election. It was by far the largest in Russia, and had over half a million members, at least double 
of all the other parties combined (Sakwa 1998:130, Wegren & Konitzer 2006:680). In 2003 
however, the party suffered great electoral defeat and has been coming in second in all the 
elections that followed.  
It is commonly assumed that the transition to market economy created two economic 
groups in the society: “winners” and “losers”, which differed substantially in their support for 
parties. The winner-loser split was found to be one of the strongest predictors of voting in post-
communist countries in general (Evans & Whitefield 2006:30, Mateju, Rehakova & Evans 
1999:233). In Russia, those who suffered from the economic and political transition, traditionally 
comprised CPRF’s support base. In addition, CPRF’s support base was with those who were 
nostalgic over the social guarantees of the Soviet era13 (Sawka 1998:131, McAllister &White 
2008a:939). Even though the party kept its “national communist” approach and continued 
opposing market-oriented policies, they recognized political pluralism, private property and no 
longer believed in violence and revolution as means to achieve their goals (Remington 2012:174, 
																																																						
13	The	Soviet	Union	was	identified	with	industrialization,	victory	over	Nazi	Germany,	superpower	status,	and	the	
development	of	a	modern,	urbanized	and	literate	society	(Sakwa	1998:145).		
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Sakwa 2008a:178, Ryabov 2015). However, the Communist Party is ideologically rigid: if it 
moves too much to the center of the political spectrum, it will lose its distinctiveness as a clear 
alternative to the government, but if it moves more to the left, it will further marginalize itself 
given the widespread anti-communism sentiments in the electorate (Sakwa 1998:135). Fish 
(1995:348) argued that CPRF had become the leading conservative party in Russia, embracing 
nostalgia for the Soviet’s socio-economic system and power blended with Russian nationalism 
and anti-system sentiment. White, Rose & McAllister (1997:233) could predict four-fifths of the 
communist voters in 1997 because of their distinct political attitudes. CPRF has a clear-cut 
ideological identity and organizational stability that let it maintain its position as the main 
opposition to United Russia under the increasing pressures from the authorities (Gelman 
2008:925, Golosov 2014:275). CPRF is also according to a Levada poll, regarded as the main 
opposition to United Russia by 54 percent of the surveyed (KPRF 2007).  
According to Buzgalin (as cited in Sakwa 1998:151), the party “had to be radically 
oppositionist in appearance (otherwise, it would not have won support from below) but only 
mildly oppositionist in substance (otherwise, it would have been prohibited from above).” After 
Putin became president, the CPRF adopted a less oppositional stance, allying itself on some 
major issues with the Kremlin (Roberts 2012a:97). On one hand, it consistently offered a 
negative view of the introduction of the free market in Russia and of cooperation with the West. 
On the other, the CPRF leadership was gradually integrated into the political elite, creating 
contacts with many businesses on their own. Despite the fact that CPRF now often supports the 
budgetary bills submitted by the president and the government, it is still regarded as the strongest 
(if not the only) opposition party in Russia (Ryabov 2015). The CPRF is caught in a paradox: it is 
an anti-system party with coalition potential. It is unable to become a party of government, but is 
strong enough to have the major say in the passage of legislation in the Duma. Consequently, 
CPRF had been obliged to cooperate with the government on key issues  
 
4.2.2.1 The Communist Party’s electoral support between 2003 and 2011 
In 2003 The Communist Party suffered great electoral defeat with their vote share almost halving 
from 24.3 percent in 1999 to 12.6 percent in 2003. There are three major reasons for the party’s 
electoral decline. For one, The Agrarian Party of Russia, which used to cooperate with CPRF 
over their party lists in 1993 and 1995, formed a bloc with the Kremlin backed party Fatherland-
	 		44	
	
All Russia in 2003, and effectively siphoned voters away from CPRF (Wegren & Konitzer 
2006:685, Roberts 2012a:146). Second, United Russia managed to become the main 
representative of the many issues CPRF previously dominated, like protection of the rural 
interests, the pensioners and the post-Soviet transitional “losers” (Wegren & Konitzer 2006:683-
686). Third, CPRF became a major Kremlin target during the 2003 electoral campaign, with 
large-scale negative coverage on television further damaging what was left of CPRF’s electoral 
support (Gelman 2008:925, Hale 2006:109).  
In the 2007 Duma election, CPRF came again in second with just under 12 percent of the 
vote, slightly down on its 2003 support. Even though the party experienced a big defeat in the 
previous election, they rejected any major changes to the party structure. Greene (2007:5) notes 
that those casting their ballots for the opposition, particularly in dominant-party states, appear to 
have stronger ideological positions and strongly disagree with the status quo policies offered by 
the incumbent. CPRF’s immobilization helped them preserve their organizational and electoral 
bases from a total collapse, something their strong performance in regional elections witnessed 
about (Gelman 2008:925). As CPRF traditionally devoted a significant portion of their campaign 
to berate the existing government for destroying the economy and threatening the wellbeing of 
Russians (criticism comprised 40 percent of CPRF’s electoral platform in 1993) (Oates 1998:83), 
the economic growth of the last years made the criticism futile.  
Demographic changes, increasing incomes and the declining support for the return to the 
Soviet regime all predicted the decline in electoral support for the communists. Indeed, rural 
voters, pensioners, long-time communists and those hit hardest by the economic reforms are all 
constituencies that have shrunk over time (Rose et al. 2011:92). However, in the 2011 
parliamentary election CPRF again stood strong, gaining 19.2 percent of the electoral vote, a 7.6 
percent increase from their 11.6 percent in 2007. The traditional assumption that the Communist 
Party would lose its electorate seemed to fall through, as the party maintained its position as the 
most obvious alternative to an otherwise entirely dominant United Russia (Ryabov 2015, 
McAllister &White 2008a:946). 
 
4.2.3 Just Russia and Liberal Democratic Party – Fake Opposition 
In electoral authoritarian regimes, opposition parties take part in a game that is designed to defeat 
them (Schedler 2013:295). Liberal Democratic Party (LDPR) and Just Russia are by several 
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authors regarded as fake opposition, as they have been turned into loyal and weak political 
groups supporting Kremlin in all their initiatives (Turovsky 2014:76, Gelman 2008:920, White 
2006:188-190). The two parties serve Kremlin in two important ways. First, they form a reserve 
or substitute to the party of power if UR’s popularity goes down, and second, they weaken the 
different opposition parties by siphoning votes away from them (Just Russia from the left, LDPR 
from the right) (Wilson 2005:187, Gelman 2008:922) 
Just Russia was a successor of the nationally developed and centralized party, Rodina 
(that contested the 2003 election). Rodina was established four months before the 2003 election 
as a project party with the sole goal of stealing votes from the communists (March 2009:516, 
Sakwa 2008b:147). Just Russia explicitly sought to tap the protest vote with mimicking a leftist 
ideology as a “party of the working people”. In 2007 however, the party failed to attract voters 
away from CPRF, probably as it could not outbid the communists in their “oppositionness” 
(Turovsky 2014:76, Gelman 2008:923, March 2009:511,521, Roberts 2012a:97). Just Russia was 
designed to balance UR from a center-left perspective, and was by the party leader himself called 
the “left leg” in a managed two-party system. The leader of the party Sergey Mironov is also one 
of Putin’s close political associates and ran in the 2004 presidential election as an “insurance” 
campaign in support of Putin, coming in last (Roberts 2012a:97, Clark 2013:376). March 
(2009:508) describes Just Russia as a “parastatal” party, a party that mimics opposition and 
attempts to channel it in regime-supporting directions, without being an opposition party in any 
meaningful sense of the word. Oversloot and Verheul (2006:392) similarly describe the 
“alternative party of power” as ideologically identical to the party of power, but designed as a 
sparring partner to keep the elite on its toes and test new personnel.  
The misleadingly named Liberal Democratic Party of Russia (LDPR) is a pure 
charismatic party, basing its support on the party’s outspoken leader, Vladimir Zhirinovsky. 
Zhirinovsky has self-consciously embraced offensive extremism and authoritarianism, leading 
Hanson (1998:120) to even calling it Nazi ideology. Zhirinovsky has for a long time been viewed 
as a useful Kremlin tool, representing a fake nationalist alternative, without threatening the status 
quo (Gelman 2008:924, Clark 2008:344, White 2009:172). Hale (2006:105) actually finds a 
complete lack of issue-grounding for loyalties to LDPR, because the support is based on the 
appeal to the leader. Nationalist attitudes in the electorate, like spending more on the armed 
forces, retaining nuclear weapons and a commitment to Slav traditions, didn’t influence support 
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for Zhirinovsky at all, even before Putin came to power, suggesting that the LDPR vote is a non-
ideological protest vote (White et al. 1997:145). LDPR has been a faithful supporter of the 
government in the Duma, in addition to blocking several initiatives of the opposition (Nichol 
2007:2, Gelman 2007:14). Roberts (2012a:47) calls the party an “unspecified party of power”, 
created to mitigate the effects of competitive elections. In a personal interview with Sean Roberts 
(2012b:236) a former senior figure from LDPR said: “LDPR has been used for articulation ideas 
which the presidential party in not able to pronounce in public. LDPR moves certain ideas and 
then they check how people react to them”.  
 
 4.2.4 Yabloko – The failure of the democratic opposition 
Yabloko was created in 1993, as an electoral bloc under Yavlinsky, Boldyrev and Lukin (their 
names form “YABL”, “Yabloko” means apple in Russian) and it is the only party in today’s 
Russia that represents western and liberal-democratic values. Union of Rightist Forces was also a 
party that initially won votes on the basis of democratic appeals, but lost its distinction before 
2003 because of a too close association with Putin (Hale 2006:113). Yabloko has contested every 
election since the beginning of elections in Russian and was in 1999 among Russia’s top three 
parties. In 2003 however, Yabloko suffered great electoral defeat, and has ever since failed to 
clear the electoral threshold (Gelman 2007:13, Hale 2004:999; 2006:109, White 2006:222). 
Yabloko is a programmatic party, with a distinct, consistent and coherent programmatic 
and ideological agenda. That does not necessarily serve the party well in Russia, as the Soviet 
legacy damaged the idea of ideologically-based appeals (Gunther & Diamond 2003:187, White 
2006:173). Maximov (in Roberts 2012a:171) argued that the demise of the vote for Yabloko was 
a natural consequence of the administration pushing too hard to get votes for UR, with an 
unfortunate consequence for the regime itself, as having a democratic faction in the Duma would 
have had legitimizing effects.  
White (2006) identified both endogenous and exogenous factors for the explanation of the 
demise of electoral support for Yabloko. In some ways, the party was itself responsible for its 
electoral failure. Yabloko failed at making clear its ideological brand of social liberalism to the 
electorate, and their 1999 campaign strikingly neglected the ideas in which the party had invested 
so much over the years (Hale 2004:994). As Hale (2004:1010) put it: “Yabloko failed in 1999 not 
because it was liberal but because it failed to be liberal during the campaign”. Following two 
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deadly terrorist attacks in Moscow in September 1999, there was disagreement within the party 
on how to approach the crisis. With the party leaders unable to forge a common line of argument, 
Yabloko effectively dropped the Chechen war as an issue from the campaign completely (Hale 
2004:1011-1012). Yabloko’s leaders also failed to co-ordinate their positions on other issues, 
confusing the electorate with their ambiguities. About half of the people initially planning to vote 
for Yabloko, abandoned the party during the campaign period (Colton and McFaul 2003:152-
153, White 2006:8,109).  
Exogenous factors also damaged the party. Their ability to campaign was effectively 
undermined by the marginalization of oppositional parties, increasing media imbalance and the 
use of administrative resources favoring United Russia (White 2006:7,204). Several Duma 
deputies and regional activists left the party ranks, Yabloko lost the financial support of major 
sponsors that accounted for at least half of its funding, and it lost access to the independent 
television network NTV where it previously had enjoyed favorable coverage. In addition, the 
electoral laws of 2007 made Yabloko weaker and its electoral vote share of 1.59 percent in 2007 
made its very survival questionable (Gelman 2008:927, White 2006:170). The actual results 
achieved by Yabloko during the elections were not far off those predicted by the polls (Sakwa 
2008a:115). In a poll conducted by the Levada Center in 2010, only one percent of the 
respondent said they would vote for Yabloko if there was an election next Sunday (Levada 
Center 2010f). By 2014 and 2015, that one percent turned into zero (Russia Votes 2015). 
It has also been argued that Putin and United Russia have co-opted the policies of 
Yabloko, consistently winning votes from people who are pro-market, who position themselves 
on the right and who advocate a pro-western policy. As Putin stands for market reforms, voters 
previously attracted to Yabloko because of their liberal economic policies are now able to vote 
for the party that has the support of the president (Colton & Hale 2009:494, Perepechko et al. 
2010:586, White 2006:198). In addition, if the majority sees Putin as someone who represents the 
values associated with democracy (see section 1.7), the ideological appeal of the party also 
weakens.  
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Chapter 5: Searching for Russia’s cleavage structure 
5.1 Identifying voter preferences 
Voters cast ballots for candidates and parties they think will best represent their interests. 
Candidates and parties compete to show that they represent those interests the best (Hale 
2006:10). The lack of party identification and ideological loyalties makes it necessary for voters 
to seek alternative cues for making a choice at the polls. The literature on voting behavior 
establishes two such cues: the so-called “personal component” and national political influences 
(Golosov 2015:399). The personal component is especially important in the Russian context, and 
it embraces all personal characteristics of the candidate that has an influence on voter choice. 
Kitschelt (1995:448) addresses this point in the Russian context: “Why should party systems be 
organized around political cleavages and related programmatic divisions, rather than around other 
incentives that bind people, such as clientelistic favors or the attraction to a charismatic 
personality?”. 
The traditionally expected patterns of voter preference in Russia rests on the assumption 
that older, poorer and less educated voters will support the communists to a greater degree, while 
Kremlin with its party of power will poll more strongly in regions where the population is 
younger, better educated, more urban and rich. After the emergence of Putin and United Russia, 
voters have according to White, McAllister and Yun (2002:144,148) become less differentiated 
socially, and resemble more of a cross-section of the entire society. Bessudnov (2011) makes the 
argument that unlike in Western countries, in Russia, people with different levels of education 
and income vote the same. Russians vote for leaders, not party programs. 
To measure latent preferences in a country is not simple, because latent cleavages are 
everything with a potential of being transformed into political cleavages (Stoll 2004:40). 
Operationalizing such phenomena is very difficult, as it is almost impossible to validly measure 
exogenous determinants of voter preferences. In addition, the variables can be so entangled or 
subconscious, that it is almost impossible to include all potentially significant variables 
(Waterhouse 1983:35, Stoll 2004:43). I will here start with Rokkan’s cleavages in the Russian 
context, and then move on to a theoretical consideration of other economic, demographic and 
cultural factors that might affect voter preferences. This chapter also lays the ground for the 
selection of variables in the next chapter.  
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5.2 Rokkan’s cleavages 
5.2.1 Center-Periphery 
Idolization of Moscow was an element of Soviet ideology. Moscow was the seat of power and to 
live there was a dream of every provincial resident. Veneration of the capital was however 
combined with deep envy and a perception of the city as the exploiter of the country, where the 
residents unfairly enjoyed much better lives than the majority of the country’s population. After 
1991, Moscow lost their monopoly on cultural, technological and scientific progress. However, 
politics in Russia remained more centralized than in most other countries. While virtually all 
important political parties in for example Ukraine are regionally based, almost none of the 
Russian parties are (Kolstø 2004:17-18). Moscow is still the biggest city and the capital of the 
country, with tremendous resources, both coercive and financial. Roughly 80 percent of the 
country’s financial capital is controlled by Moscow, in addition to general living standards being 
significantly higher there than in the rest of the country (Shlapentokh 2004:223-224).  
According to Rokkan (Flora et al.1999:7,63), center-periphery contrasts would become 
less important in politics with the spread of cultural, economic and social standardization. The 
rise of electronic communication was expected to give people in regions across the country a 
sense of closeness to Moscow and other cities around the world, regardless of whether they were 
geographically close or not. This thinking is also labeled as globalization, and supports the 
conviction that distance embodied in the physical, cultural and territorial specificities has lost 
much of its salience (Berezin & Díez-Medrano 2008:1). However, Nureev and Shulgin (2013:86) 
found that the support for the communists increases with the distance from both the capitals 
(Moscow and St. Petersburg).  
 
5.2.2 State-Church – the religious cleavage 
Religion has formed a major political cleavage across the industrial democracies in the West, and 
a variety of studies have concluded that it still has an important influence on political alignments. 
In the Russian context however, religion has not provided a basis for political mobilization 
(White & McAllister 2000:359,370).  
Even though it has been argued that the Orthodox Church benefits Unite Russia (Rose et 
al. 2011:89, McAllister & White 2008b:620), religion has a weak influence on politics in Russia. 
One of the main reasons for this is that there is no competition between denominations. Religious 
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divisions exist, but often underpinned by ethnic or regional cleavages. Parties generally avoid any 
explicit appeal to religious voters and there is almost a complete absence of candidates or parties 
standing on explicitly religious platforms (White & McAllister 2000:367).  
 One might expect to see two layers of religion in Russia: Orthodoxy at the federal level 
and the religion of the titular ethnic groups in the republics, mainly Islam (Kolstø 2004:20). The 
number of Muslims in Russia is estimated to be around six percent (Rose et al. 2011:171).  
 
5.2.3 Urban-Rural 
The 1930s-1950s were marked by Soviet industrialization and a rapid urbanization of the regions. 
Soviet policies blurred the urban population and its culture, mixing it together with the rural one, 
as a big majority of Russians growing food lived in the city rather than the countryside (Borisova 
& Zubarevich 2005:9, Rose et al. 2011:89). Indeed, the Soviet society had a high degree of 
homogeneity as their ultimate goal. Not only the economic classes would cease to exist, but the 
social and cultural differences between the town and country would also disappear (Tyldum & 
Kolstø 2004:30).  
Following the post-Soviet reforms, urban-rural incomes diverged, rural unemployment 
and poverty increased and the rural parts of the country became the transitional “losers”. It was 
on this basis that CPRF was able to cultivate the rural vote in the 1990s and Gennady Zyuganov 
performed significantly better in the rural areas than Yeltsin during the elections of 1993 and 
1996 (Nureev & Shulgin 2013:86, Sawka 1998:131, McAllister &White 2008a:939). However, 
as Putin made rural social development a priority during his first term, CPRF lost a part of its 
rural votes to United Russia (Wegren and Konitzer 2006:686). 
 
5.2.4 Owner-worker – The class cleavage 
Social class has always been defined as one of the main cleavages that parties form around to 
gain political support. The traditional perspective is that classes differ in their economic 
conditions and resources and therefore will have different political preferences (Evans & 
Whitefield 2006:23). This explanation is sociological, and implies a “bottom-up” approach to 
structuring political division based on class. Another school of thought emphasize political 
factors and elite choices to mobilizing voters on class grounds. This approach is “top-down” and 
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echoes Sartori (1969:84), who said that the salience of any factor depends on the willingness of 
the elites to politicize it.  
During the beginning of the last century, the Communist Party claimed to represent the 
working class, or the industrial proletariat, which eventually was intended to become the only 
societal class (Tyldum & Kolstø 2004:34, Bessudnov 2011). Rose, Tikhomirov and Mishler 
(1997:807) wrote, “If 70 years of communist rule did little else, it made traditional social 
structural cleavages of limited significance in post-communist Russia”. However, with the 
development of the market in Russia, class bases to partisanship were expected to increase in 
importance (Evans & Whitefield 1999:254). Evans and Whitefield (2006:23) found an 
association between class position and presidential choice already in 1993, continuing into the 
2000s, in which the two largest classes, the working class and professional and managerial 
workers, provided a stable basis of support for the main free market versus socialist axis of 
political division. Class is argued to be more closely associated with the economic left-right 
division because of the different economic effects the transition had on different classes, creating 
groups of “winners” and “loser”.   
 
5.3 Economic cleavages 
Economic developments matter profoundly for voter choice in parliamentary and presidential 
elections. Voters are expected to reward the “good” and punish the “bad” performance of elected 
officials (the classical “sanctioning model”), or they are expected to select candidates and parties 
they trust to be competent managers of the economy (the “selection model”) (Bartkowska & 
Tiemann 2015:203). The general expected relationship between economy and support is positive.  
There is a further distinction in the literature between how voters view their own 
(egocentric) economic situation and how they evaluate the country’s (sociotropic) economy. 
Some scholars hold the view that evaluations of the country’s economy exert more influence on 
voting behavior (McAllister & White 2008a:947-948, Rose et al. 2011:8), while others say that a 
person will tend to vote for the incumbent party only when he or she personally has benefitted 
from the country’s economic performance (Colton and Hale 2005:4).  
From 2000 to 2008 average incomes in Russia rose by 250 percent and pensions more 
than doubled. Living standards in Russia were higher than ever before, poverty and inflation were 
falling and unemployment halved. Russians viewed this as the greatest achievement by Putin and 
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his government (de Vogel 2013, Robinson 2013:452). Economic progress is according to theories 
of economic voting believed to influence the popularity of the incumbents positively, and several 
authors have found the relationships between Russia’s economy and the popularity of the 
incumbents to be positive (Colton & Hale 2009:488, McAllister & White 2008b:617-623).  
However, even though poverty has been declining in Russia since Putin came to power, 
income inequality has been rising. Economic growth is concentrated in the biggest cities and has 
mainly befitted the wealthier segments of the population. Lower incomes have been stagnant and 
in 2010, 12.8 percent of Russians lived under the poverty line (Minaev 2011, Ria Novosti 2012b, 
Remington 2011:102,110). Average per-capita income is according to Bashalkhanova, 
Bashalkhanov and Veselova (2012:158) the most important economic determinant of social 
inequality. In the Russian context, not only will a decline in personal economic well-being hurt 
the incumbents, it can be expected to benefit the communists, because they constitute a systemic 
leftist opposition (McAllister & White 2008a:949-950). Another economic factor expected to 
influence voter preferences is unemployment, with rising unemployment expected to damage the 
popularity of the incumbents (Nureev & Shulgin 2013:85, Layton & Smith 2015:854).  
 
5.4 Demographic Cleavages 
Demographic influences are factors related to the structure of a population as a whole (in our case 
regional population) (Oxford Dictionaries 2015). Demographic characteristics such as gender, 
age, ethnicity, birth rate, death rate, life expectancy and urbanity (grouped with Rokkan’s 
variables) are among factors that can influence voter choice. 
Age is actually according to several authors the best predictor of voter preferences in 
Russia, explained by the nostalgic voting for the communists by the older constituency 
(Bessudnov 2011, Evans & Whitefield 2006:29). This is in line with socialization theories that 
assume continuity in individual values and outlooks (Rose et al. 2011:17). Lipset (1960:269) 
noted that people keep the perspectives and the loyalties they had when they were young.  
Ethnicity is a second factor often assumed to affect voter preferences. In a competitive 
authoritarian regime, geographically concentrated ethnic minorities can contribute to 
authoritarianism through collusion with (rather than competition against) central authorities, 
especially when it comes to manipulation of elections. Here, central authorities and regional elites 
enter into a patronage relationship where the former provides economic and political benefits in 
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exchange for votes that regional elites provide. From the perspective of the central authorities, 
large concentrations of ethnic minorities are perceived as a potential threat, as the local elites 
have the opportunity to use nationalism for mobilization. The central authorities will thus have 
additional incentives to try and manipulate elections in these regions. The local elites on the other 
hand, have resources to manipulate elections and engage in patronage through ethnic networks 
with the titular minority group (Tatars in Tatarstan, Bashkirs in Bashkortostan) (Dennis & Moser 
2009:8, Goodnow Moser & Smith 2014:15-16,20, Hale 2006:170-172).  
Ethnic Russians today comprise around 82 percent of the population, making Russia a 
more ethnically homogenous state than most of the other Soviet successor states. Russia’s system 
of ethnic federalism has however promoted a degree of regional autonomy to the elites in 
ethnically non-Russian regions14 (Goodnow et al. 2014:16). They alone are defined as “states”, 
they alone have a right to adopt their own constitutions and only their regional leaders can call 
themselves “presidents” (Kolstø 2004:6).  
Despite Putin’s centralizing policies that have undermined regional autonomy in the 
ethnic republics, and the war in Chechnya that was followed by a turmoil across the entire 
Caucasus, non-Russian regions have provided some of the strongest support for Vladimir Putin 
and United Russia (Whitmore 2013, Korgunyuk 2014:411). However, several authors explain the 
high turnout and support for the incumbents with the high degree of electoral manipulation 
reported in those regions (Roberts 2012a:170). Goodnow et al. (2014:16-18) define a region as 
fraudulent when reported voter turnout is higher than 75 percent. Both United Russia and Putin 
have gained over 80 percent in six of the regions in North-Caucasus15 throughout the last six 
elections, with UR gaining 99.4 and 99.5 percent in Chechnya in 2007 and 2011 (Roberts 
2012a:170). These exact six regions are by Korgunyuk (2015:18) identified as least competitive 
by the degree of their electoral competitiveness. The electoral life is here “fully substituted with 
fraudulent manipulations”. Given the anomalous distribution of voter support for UR and Putin, it 
might be reasonable to assume electoral misconduct based on the quantitative indicators.  
Other demographic factors that can have an influence on voting preferences are variables 
associated with the health and prosperity of the population. Life expectancy or infant mortality 
																																																						
14	The	21	Republics,	four	autonomous	okrugs	and	the	Jewish	Autonomous	Oblast	(26	regions)	are	named	after	a	
non-Russian	ethnic	group	and	were	initially	designated	as	homelands	for	these	particular	groups	(Goodnow	et	al.	
2014:20-21,	Hale	2006:152).	
15	Karachay–Cherkessia,	Kabardino-Balkaria,	North-Ossetia,	Ingushetia,	Chechnya	and	Dagestan.	
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rates are examples of such measures and have both been widely used as indicators of the level of 
health in a society16 (Mackenbach 2013:134). 	
Even though gender is a common demographic measure believed to affect voter 
preferences, it is hard to measure this on an aggregate scale. Rose et al. (2011:90) did however 
find gender to have a slightly negative effect on regime support among women. Colton and Hale 
(2009:502) and McAllister and White (2008b:608) on the other hand, find the opposite pattern, 
with the vote for the incumbents being positively influenced by the female gender.  
 
5.5 Cultural cleavages 
Cultural cleavages (especially Rokkan’s) are traditionally not expected to play a major role in the 
Russia because of the homogenous nature of the Russian culture, with the majority being ethnic 
Russian and virtually the entire population speaking the same language (White et al. 1997:64). 
However, other cultural factors than ethnicity and language are believed to influence voter 
preferences.  
The traditional West-European approach assumes that rising levels of education are 
associated with one’s orientation towards liberal views (Chaisty & Whitefield 2012:194). In 
Russia, Shlapentokh (2004:42,227) finds that people with higher education exhibit stronger 
support for democracy as a political system. Similarly, Gibson and Duch (1993:86) find that 
higher education is positively correlated with rights consciousness in Russia. Contrary to the 
traditional expectations, Rose et al. (2011:89) expect education to affect the popularity of Putin 
and UR positively, as people with higher education are more able to adapt to and benefit from the 
opportunities created by the transition. They didn’t however find education to have any effect on 
voter preferences in Russia. Education is often used as an alternative measure to status, since 
highly educated people tend to have better jobs, higher incomes and more power in the society. 
Another cultural factor strongly influencing voter choice is the national media and the 
extent of access to the national media by different political parties and different segments of the 
population (Golosov 2015:400). In a country where democratic institutions are weak, media is 
actually expected to affect political outcomes even more than in countries where democratic 
principles protect the equal representation of the opposition (Enikolopov, Petrova & Zhuravskaya 
2011:3254). Particularly important is the regional access to independent media, as media freedom 
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varies substantially across the country. According to Mikhail Zygar (Dyrnes 2013), the press 
freedom in Chechnya can be compared to the one in North Korea, while Moscow is similar to 
other European countries.  
In 2002, the government took over the last independent TV-channels, leaving Russia 
without independent television. Pressure on independent radio stations has also been documented, 
as with the famous Echo Moskva station. National television is the main source of information for 
around 80-85 percent of the population (Levitsky & Way 2010:198, Sakwa 2008a:154). The two 
media channels that have remained somewhat free in Russia are print publications and the largely 
uncensored Internet (Rose et al. 2011:48, Arapova 2012). While around 50 percent of the 
population read newspapers, only a small proportion of the population has access to the Internet. 
In 2006, 76 percent of those polled by the All Russian Centre for Public Opinion Research said 
they didn’t use the Internet at all. Out of those who did, only 19 percent said they used it as a 
source of news (Arutunyan 2009:24,159, Sakwa 2008a:152-154, Remington 2012:91). 
 
Chapter 6: Data 
6.1 The dataset 
The dataset is created by the author and is comprised of aggregate electoral results and statistics. 
Electoral data is provided by the results of the national legislative elections (2003, 2007, 2011) 
and the national presidential elections (2004, 2008, 2012), as reported in the official publications 
of the Central Electoral Commission in Russia (http://www.cikrf.ru). The statistical data is 
gathered from the Federal Statistical Service in Russia (ROSSTAT) (http://www.gks.ru) and All 
Russian Census from 2002 and 201017.  
The units of analysis are the 8318 Russian regions observed over three years (2003, 2007, 
2011), creating 249 observations. This is a short panel, in which the number of units is bigger 
that the number of observations per unit; and a balanced panel, because all the units of analysis 
are observed at all time periods (Clark & Linzer 2014:6). Panel data (also called longitudinal data 
or cross-sectional time series data) are data where multiple cases are observed at two or more 
time periods. With the right methodological approach, panel data can let us gain cross-sectional 
																																																						
17	All	Russian	Census	was	used	as	a	source	for	two	variables:	Ethnicity	and	Religion.	As	the	census	only	was	
conducted	in	2002	and	2010,	the	data	for	the	years	2007/2008	is	calculated	as	the	average	of	the	two.		
18	The	number	of	regions	was	officially	reduced	from	89	to	83	in	2008.		
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information reflected in the differences between subjects, and information reflected in the 
changes within subjects over time (Data and Statistical Service 2015).  
 
6.2 Regions as units of analysis 
Geographically, Russia is composed of 83 administrative regions with 46 oblasts, nine krais, two 
cities (Moscow and St. Petersburg), 21 republics, four autonomous okrugs and one autonomous 
oblast (Goodnow et al. 2014:20-21). Even though Russia covers 11 time zones, over 50 of 
Russia’s regions are located in one of them, all centered around Moscow (see Appendix A for a 
map of the Russian regions). The territory is also quite heterogeneous in terms of population 
density, as a third of Russia’s entire population lives in only ten regions (Roberts 2012a:72). All 
the regions are in the analysis weighted equally.  
Despite the efforts of the authorities to redistribute financial resources across Russia, the 
trend continues to be increasing economic disparity between the regions. For example, in 2003, 
31 percent of the total GDP was shared by only two regions (Moscow and Tyumen). Tyumen 
actually has 30 times larger GRP than Ingushetia (Mosley & Mussurov 2009:13). In the same 
manner, regions differ dramatically in terms of unemployment, income and other socio-economic 
factors. In 2012 for example, the unemployment rate in Moscow was one percent, while 
Ingushetia’s unemployment rate was 49 percent (Ria Novosti 2012).  
The selection of Russia as a case and the Russian regions as the units of analysis lets us 
control for event-related factors that would affect all the regions at the same time. Analysis of 
aggregated data also controls for some of the pitfalls associated with survey-data. First, one 
avoids misinterpretations of survey-questions, as the only data presented are aggregated statistics. 
Second, as long as the researcher is careful in drawing conclusions from regional trends to 
individual behavior, the generalization potential (or external validity) of aggregate data is higher, 
as they combine all of the regions’ citizens and not just draw a random sample of a subset of 
individuals later used to estimate characteristics of the whole population. 
 
6.3 Dependent variables  
The dependent variables are the regional electoral vote shares collected by the different parties 
(UR and CPRF) and candidates (Putin and Zyuganov) for three parliamentary and three 
presidential elections. As Putin didn’t participate in the 2008 presidential election and Zyuganov 
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didn’t participate in 2004, Medvedev and Kharitonov’s vote shares are used as substitutes. Unlike 
regional executive and legislative elections, federal Duma and presidential elections take place 
across the whole country on the very same day, controlling for time-related factors. 
 
Table 1: Statistical summary of the dependent variables, across all years 
Party/Candidate Mean Min Max No. of obs. 
United Russia 51.1 % 25.9 % 99.5 % 249 
Vladimir Putin/ 
Dmitry Medvedev 
68.7 % 47 % 99.8 % 249 
CPRF 14.3 % 0.1 % 32 % 249 
Gennady Zyuganov/ 
Sergei Kharitonov 
16.3 % 0.03 % 29.1 % 249 
 
The democratic party Yabloko’s vote shares were initially included in the analysis as a dependent 
variable, but as the electoral mean across the years didn’t even reach three percent (2.6%), with a 
maximum of 11.6 percent registered in St. Petersburg in 2011, the variable was dropped. 
 
6.4 Independent variables - Initial dataset 
The search for relevant independent variables combined deductive and inductive approaches. The 
deductive approach was employed in the previous chapters, exploring Lipset and Rokkan’s 
variables in addition to other economic, demographic and cultural theories. The inductive 
approach involves a search for variables expected to have an impact on voter preferences. The 
initial dataset was comprised of 25 independent variables divided into five categories of Rokkan’s 
(6) economic (7), demographic (6), cultural (3) and other (3) explanatory variables. 
 
Table 2: Overview of all the variables in the initial dataset 19 
Rokkan’s  Economic Demographic Cultural Other 
1. Distance to 
Moscow 
1. Gross regional 
product (GRP) – 
change  
1. Pensioners 1. Published 
newspapers 
1. Crime 
2. Religion – 
Orthodox 
2. Average income 2. Ethnic 
Russian 
2. Higher 
education 
2. Population per 
doctor 
3. Religion - 
Islam 
3. Unemployment 3. Working 
population 
3. Higher 
education  
among the 
3. Density of 
public roads 
																																																						
19 See	Appendix	B	for	a	comprehensive	codebook	of	the	initial	dataset. 
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unemployed 
4. Urbanity 4. Incomes below 
subsistence 
minimum 
4. Migration rate   
5. Industrial 
laborers 
5. Agricultural 
production 
5. Life 
expectancy 
  
6. Peasantry 6. Social 
Assistance 
6. Infant 
mortality rate 
  
 7. Subsistence 
Minimum 
   
	
	
6.5 Considerations towards the final dataset 
	
6.5.1 Multicollinearity  
Multicollinearity is a state of very high correlations among the independent variables and is a 
type of disturbance in the data. If present, the statistical inferences made about the data may not 
be reliable (Statistics Solutions 2015). After testing the variables included in the initial dataset for 
multicollinearity, the most important variables were kept and the ones correlated with them were 
discarded. The variable Religion-Islam was dropped because of high correlation with Ethnic 
Russian (-0.646). Since ethnicity and religion are closely associated in Russia, Dennis and Moser 
(2009:11) actually use ethnicity as a proxy for religious tradition. Other variables that were 
dropped from the analysis are: Income below subsistence level (correlated -0.625 with Income), 
Subsistence level (correlated 0.8926 with Income), Higher education among the unemployed 
(correlated 0.691 with Higher Education) and Peasantry (correlated -0.793 with Urban).  
 Unemployment is also highly correlated with Ethnic Russian (-0.614), but as these two 
variables measure different things we can look past multicollinearity.  
 
6.5.2 Reliability 
Reliability refers to the consistency of a measurement, i.e., that the application of the same 
procedure in the same way will always produce the same measure (Gerring 2012:83, King, 
Keohane & Verba 1994:25). The reliability of published statistics depend on the stability of how 
the data is collected over time. It often happens that the methods of data collection change, but 
without any indication of this to the reader. Another aspect important to be aware of is whether 
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geographical or administrative boundaries have been changed within the studied time period20. 
Other aspects of research methodology that may affect the reliability of secondary data is the 
sample size, response rate, questionnaire design and modes of analysis (Crawford 1997).  
 As the sources for the electoral data are governmental and define the electoral outcomes, 
the level of reliability is rather high. However, the abnormally high turnout and support for Putin 
in the regions of North-Caucasus21 should serve as a warning of electoral manipulation in those 
regions. The statistical data provided by ROSSTAT is according to OECD (2013) compiled with 
a high degree of professionalism, but their scope, timeliness and international comparability 
needs to be improved. The overall view of Russia’s statistical system is however positive and I 
assume that the reliability of that data also is high.   
However, even though the service itself is reliable, some of the independent variables may 
not be. For example, the variable crime doesn’t seem reliable, as the lowest numbers of crime are 
by ROSSTAT recorded in the North-Caucasian regions predominantly ethnically non-Russian 
(Chechnya, Ingushetia, Dagestan, Kabardino-Balkaria, Karachay–Cherkessia North Ossetia). 
These regions are however associated with high rates of crime, violence and terrorist acts (BBC 
Monitoring Former Soviet Union 2010). FSB chief Aleksands Bortnikov announced 365 terrorist 
acts in 2011 in these regions, while the MVD (Russian Ministry of Internal Affairs) reported 622 
terrorism-related crimes in Chechnya only (International Crisis Group 2012:2,19). Doubts about 
the reliability of the officially registered crime in some of the regions led to the exclusion of the 
variable.  
 
6.5.3 Validity 
Conceptual validity refers to the operationalization of a concept and the degree to which the 
empirical indicator measures what it is supposed to measure (Gerring 2012:442, King et al. 
1994:25). Considerations of conceptual validity led to the exclusion of several variables. For 
example, migration rate was initially meant to test whether hostility towards immigrants would 
have an effect on the dependent variables. The variable doesn’t however separate ethnic non-
Russians from ethnic Russians and makes immigration and potential xenophobia impossible to 
																																																						
20	Zabaikal	krai	was	created	in	2008	as	a	merge	between	Chita	Oblast	and	Agin-Buryat	Okrug.	For	the	years	before	
2008,	the	data	for	Zabaikal	is	the	average	of	the	two	regions	that	comprise	it	today.			
21	Regions	in	the	Russian	North-Caucasus:	Republic	of	Adygea,	Karachay–Cherkessia,	Kabardino-Balkaria,	North-
Ossetia,	Ingushetia,	Chechnya,	Republic	of	Dagestan,	Krasnodar	Krai	and	Stavropol	Krai. 
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measure. The variable population per doctor was intended to measure accessibility to health 
services, but an inspection of the values showed that accessibility doesn’t necessarily represent 
the true picture of the level of health in a region, nor of the quality of the health services 
provided. The variable was excluded from the analysis, with life expectancy kept as an indicator 
of the level of health in Russia. Another variable that might not be suitable is social assistance. 
The variable was collected to see whether voters reward incumbents or the communists for 
existing social assistance programs in a region. However, the variable is not depicted in real 
numbers, but in percentage of the total social benefits in that region (which equals 100 percent). 
The measure was therefore not valid and was dropped from the final dataset.  
 There is also a distinction between internal and external validity, where the former refers 
to the sample at hand, and the latter concern whether the findings can be generalized to a broader 
population of cases (Gerring 2012:84). In a way, both refer to degrees of generalizability. The 
internal validity of the data is very high, as the entire population of possible cases (Russian 
regions) is included in the analysis. However, given the unique Russian context, one should be 
careful in drawing any conclusions beyond the studied sample.  
 
6.5.4 Ecological Fallacy 
Because the units of analysis are regions, but the expected relationships between the covariates 
and the dependent variables are derived from theories largely based on individual relationships, 
we need to be extra careful to not draw conclusion about individuals based on our analysis of 
regional data. When results obtained from group-level data are misattributed to individuals we 
get a problem commonly known as ecological fallacy (Waterhouse 1983:36). Ecological fallacy 
occurs when a researcher mistakenly believes that the observed relationship between two 
variables at the aggregate level also applies at the individual level (Curran & Bauer 2011:587). 
Others define ecological fallacy as the more general erroneous generalization from an observed 
relationship at one level of aggregation to another (Robinson 1950:351-357, Van de Pol & 
Wright 2009:754). The relationships may ultimately be the same, but a relation at one level does 
not imply the same relation at another level. A classic case of ecological fallacy is found in 
Durkheim’s (1897) famous study of suicide in Europe. He found that countries with a higher 
proportion of Protestants were characterized by higher rates of suicide, and proposed an 
explanation that people with Protestant faith were more likely to end their own lives. The fact that 
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a certain set of geographical areas with a certain pattern of demographic and social characteristics 
behaves in a certain way, doesn’t mean that individuals in those areas possessing these 
characteristics all behave in the same manner (Jones 1972:249). It is in our case difficult to know 
whether an increase in the vote share of regions with higher proportions of ethnic minorities is 
due to increased support of minorities or members of the ethnic majority who also reside there. 
The study may however still be indicating of true patterns in a society. In fact, Terrence Jones 
(1972:262) found that the method of estimating individual relationships from aggregated data 
produced results very similar to those produced from actual individual data.  
 
6.5.5 Too many variables 
When there are too many variables in a regression model i.e., the number of parameters to be 
estimated is larger than the number of observations, the model lacks degrees of freedom and is in 
the risk of overfitting. Overfitting occurs when a statistical model describes random error or noise 
instead of the underlying relationship. Overfitting generally occurs when a model is excessively 
complex, such as having too many parameters relative to the number of observations (Frost 
2015). A rule of thumb for the sample size requires that you have at least 10-15 (Frost 2015) or 
20 (Statistics Solutions 2015b) observations per independent variable. With 249 observations, 
there should be between 12 and 16 independent variables in the final dataset.  
One common approach to decrease the size of a sample is a stepwise regression. A 
stepwise regression is a procedure that examines the impact of each variable in the model and 
removes the variables that do not have any significant impact on any of the dependent variables. 
A preliminary regression analysis was undertaken to eliminate those variables and agricultural 
production, working population and density of public roads were removed from the analysis. 
Because of their substantive interest, a few variables, such as urbanity, religion-Orthodox and 
education, have been retained despite their weak or absent influence. 
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6.6 The final dataset 
Table 3: Statistical summary of the independent variables in the final dataset, across all years. 
Variable Description Mean Min Max No. of 
obs. 
Rokkan’s variables 
1. Distance to 
Moscow 
Measured in kilometers.  1753.8 km. 0 km. 6426 km. 249 
2. Religion – 
Orthodox 
Percentage of the total 
regional population that 
identify with the 
Orthodox Church. 
38.8% 1% 78% 
	
240 
3. Urbanity Percentage of the total 
regional population that 
live in urban areas.  
69.4% 26.3% 100% 249 
4. Industrial laborers Percentage of the 
regional working 
population employed in 
manufacturing 
industry22. 
18.6% 3.7% 35.7% 248 
Economic variables 
5. Gross regional 
product (GRP) - 
change 
The change is the general 
indicator of yearly 
economic productivity 
per capita, measured in 
rubles (/10 000 in 
regressions). 
160,090.8 
rub. 
10,332.
4 rub. 
1,203,269 
rub. 
239 
6. Income Average monthly income 
measured in rubles 
(/1000 in regressions). 
11,667.5 
rub. 
1,438 
rub. 
54,632 rub. 247 
7. Unemployment Percentage of 
unemployed of the total 
regional population. 
8.9% 0.8% 70.9% 249 
Demographic variables 
8. Pensioners Percentage of pensioners 
of the total regional 
population. 
27.4% 11.8% 36.6% 249 
																																																						
22	Manufacturing	industry	is	defined	as	the	branch	of	manufacture	and	trade	based	on	the	fabrication,	processing,	
or	preparation	of	products	from	raw	materials	and	commodities	(NASA	1996).	It	the	dataset,	the	variable	is	
composed	of	the	proportion	of	people	working	in	mining	and	quarrying,	and	manufacturing.		
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9. Ethnic Russian23 Percentage of the total 
regional population that 
are ethnic Russian.  
74.3% 0.8% 96.6% 249 
10. Life expectancy Life expectancy at birth, 
in years.  
66.7 54.3 79 249 
Cultural variables 
11. Higher education Percentage of the 
regional working 
population with higher 
education. 
24.2% 12.4% 47.6% 248 
12. Published 
newspapers 
Daily circulation of 
published newspapers 
(copies), per 1000 
people. (/1000 = 
newspapers per person) 
864.8 19 10867 247 
	
	
Chapter 7: Hypotheses  
Combining the deductive approach of the theoretical chapters and the inductive approach 
employed in the process of data-collection, this chapter will present the hypotheses for each 
variable included in the analysis. For all of the following variables, I assume a null-hypothesis 
(H0), but refrain from presenting it for each variable. A null hypothesis is always stated in the 
negative and assumes that there is no relationship between variables. This is because one needs to 
prove something to be true (Carroll 2015). In addition to the null-hypothesis, I will through a 
careful consideration of the relevant literature, create alternative hypotheses (H1, H2). These 
hypotheses either state that the relationship between the variables is different from the null-
hypothesis (non-directional), or that the relationship between the variables is positive or negative 
(directional) (Minitab 2015a). A two-tailed test will be applied to all the variables. The reason for 
this is the appreciation of inductive discovery and the decision of letting the variables affect the 
variation in all directions even if theory assumes otherwise.   
Given the ideological and factual similarity between Putin and United Russia on one 
hand, and CPRF and Zyuganov on the other, the hypotheses assume similar patterns of variable 
																																																						
23	The	reason	why	ethnicity	is	measured	by	the	regional	share	of	‘ethnic	Russians’	is	because	there	are	dozens	of	
very	small	minority	groups	in	Russia.	The	largest	minority	group,	Tatars,	makes	up	less	than	four	percent	of	the	
population	and	only	three	groups	(Tatars,	Ukrainians	and	Chuvash)	comprise	over	one	percent	of	the	country’s	
population.	
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effects on each political “bloc”. United Russia and Putin will here be referred to as “the 
incumbents”, and CPRF and Zyuganov as “the communists”.  
 
7.1 Center-periphery: Distance to Moscow 
Rokkan’s center-periphery dimension is in this thesis understood in pure geographical terms, and 
is operationalized as distance to Moscow (in kilometers). According to Rokkan (Flora et 
al.1999:7,63) himself, center-periphery contrasts would over time lose their significance, 
especially with the spread of cultural, economic and social standardization. However, Nureev and 
Shulgin (2013:86) found that the support for the communists increases with the distance from 
both the capitals (Moscow and St. Petersburg). This could partially be explained by the fact that 
Moscow still has a dominant position in the country, holding around 80 percent of the country’s 
financial capital (Shlapentokh 2004:223-224). According to Berezin and Díez-Medrano’s 
(2008:23), globalization strengthens the emotional and cognitive significance of distance by 
making people more distrustful of rule from afar. 
H1.1: In regions further away from Moscow the vote shares for the communists will be higher, 
and for the incumbents lower.  
 
7.2 Religion – Orthodox 
Rokkan’s religious cleavage is in this thesis simply operationalized as the regional share of the 
population identifying with the Orthodox Church. The connection between religion and party 
choice in Russia is ambiguous. As communism by definition is an atheist doctrine, McAllister 
and White (2000:361,368) found that believers are more anti-communist. The Communist voters 
are the least religious, and the most “religious” party that cleared the electoral threshold in 1995 
was actually the democratic party Yabloko, 80 percent of whose voters were Orthodox and just 
14 percent secular.  
While those deeply religious were among the most bitterly opposed to the Yeltsin 
government, going to the Orthodox Church is by some authors found to positively affect the 
incument (Rose et al. 2011:89, McAllister & White 2008b:620). The Church is less favorable to 
multiparty politics and the market, favoring order above democracy (White & McAllister 
2000:361,368). In today’s Russia, attitudes to religion have practically no influence on 
sociopolitical opinions and there is a general lack of religious appeals to the electorate (White et 
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al. 1997:65). The lack of competition between denominations also weakens the role of religion in 
politics and believers themselves are hostile to the idea of religious parties, almost as much as the 
atheists are (White & McAllister 2000:369). Given the theoretical expectations, I only assume the 
null-hypothesis of no relationship between regional share of Orthodox Christians and vote shares.  
 
7.3 Urbanity 
Scholars seem to agree that a big part of the CPRF’s electoral support was traditionally owed to 
rural voters and agricultural regions in the southern and western parts of European Russia, the so-
called “Red Belt” (Colton 1998:76, Wegren & Konitzer 2006:680-682, Nureev & Shulgin 
2013:86, White et al. 2002:144). The well-known dichotomy between the “red belt” and the rest, 
that was maintained in 1996, was according to Sakwa (2008a:33) completely wiped away by 
2000. Wegren and Konitzer (2006:683) similarly found a correlation between the percentage of 
the vote cast for CPRF and the percentage of the population engaged in agricultural production in 
the elections of 1995 and 1999, but this trend strongly declined in 2003.  
CPRF’s representation of the rural population was shaken by the emergence of Putin. 
During his first term as president, he made rural social development a priority, increased state 
investment in agriculture and imposed higher import tariffs on meat, poultry and sugar. Per capita 
rural incomes actually increased by 262 percent during his first term as president (Wegren & 
Konitzer 2006:685-686). Because of a split in the literature regarding the direction of the effect of 
urbanity, I create a non-directional alternative hypothesis.  
H3.1: The share of regional urban population will have an effect on vote shares for the 
incumbents and the communists. 
 
7.4 Industrial laborers 
Rokkan’s class-cleavage is in this thesis operationalized as the share of industrial laborers in a 
given region. Traditionally, the Communist Party of the Soviet Union represented the industrial 
proletariat (Tyldum & Kolstø 2004:34, Bessudnov 2011). Over the period 1993-2001, Evans and 
Whitefield (2006:23) found an association between class position and presidential choice, where 
the working class provided a stable basis of support for the socialist axis and professional and 
managerial workers for the main free market axis. Similarly, Klobucar and Miller (2000:668) 
found strong correlations between traditional class cleavages and party loyalties. 
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Class is often understood as structured differences in occupation and are operationalized 
using occupational titles (Erikson & Goldthorpe 1992). Evans and Whitefield (1999:261) 
operationalized class as a combination of workers and peasants. I tested whether the regional 
share of people employed in agriculture had an effect, both by itself and combined with industrial 
laborers, but it had no significant effects. A potential reason for the lack of effect of peasantry is 
the Soviet Union’s collectivization of farms that turned agricultural workers into employees and 
destroyed peasantry as a class (White et al. 1997:65, Sakwa 2008b:319).  
As industrial workers with time would comprise a lot smaller portion of the workforce 
than before, Sakwa (1998:145) believed that the social base for socialist parties would be 
undermined. Similarly, Kitschelt (1995:459) wrote that workers no longer preferred communist 
parties. A recent poll conducted by the Russian Public Opinion Research Centre indeed showed, 
that occupation may no longer have an effect on voter preference, with all occupational groups 
supporting United Russia equally (Bessudnov 2011).  
H4.1: Higher share of regional population employed in industry will have a positive effect on 
the vote shares for the communists and a negative effect on the vote shares for the incumbents.   
 
7.5 Gross regional product 
According to the theories of sociotropic voting, when the country’s economy is booming, people 
are more likely to vote for the party they deem most closely associated with those in charge of 
running the economy (Colton & Hale 2005:3). Bartels (2011:11-12) did indeed find that GDP 
was positively correlated with support for the ruling party. If GDP had gone up during the last 
two years, the popularity went up too, but if GDP went down, so did the popularity. The clear 
lines of accountability from the economic boom of the 2000s to Putin and United Russia imply 
that when national economy is on the upswing, their popularity will rise, while when there’s 
economic downfall, the communists will be rewarded (McAllister & White 2008a:949-950, 
Colton & Hale 2005:19). Almost all regions experienced growth in their GRP over the two years 
prior to all of the elections under study24. 
H5.1:  In the regions where GRP has grown during the last two years, the vote shares for the 
incumbents will be higher, and the vote shares for the communists will be lower.  
 
																																																						
24 The	regions	that	experienced	a	decline	in	their	GRP	is	Kalmykia	and	Ingushetia	in	2003	and	Chukotka	AO	in	2011.		
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7.6 Income 
Several scholars have found the relationship between income and support for CPRF to be 
negative; at lower levels of income, support for the communists rises. Indeed, in the 2003 
parliamentary election, 25 percent of the CPRF’s voters said they could “barely make ends 
meet”, while only 5.5 percent of the party’s support base came from those with “enough for 
durables” (Russia Votes 2003). Support for CPRF by the poorer constituency is theoretically 
logical, as people with lower incomes are more prone to supporting those favoring income 
redistribution (Rose et al. 2011:20). The same pattern seems to be present at the regional level, as 
the communists historically have done better in the poorer regions (Colton 1998:88-89, Sakwa 
1998:136). It could also be argued that people with higher incomes would reward the incumbents 
for their well-being, as well as they are generally more capable of adapting to the transitional 
reforms, making them the so-called “winners” (McAllister & White 2008b:621). 
Contrary to the theoretical expectations, Rose and Mishler (2010:52,101) find no effect of 
income on voter preferences, concluding that Russian’s are not motivated by their personal 
economic circumstances at all. Similarly, Wegren and Konitzer (2006:690) found that CPRF had 
lost its support among the transitional losers already by 2003. Neither the poorest, nor the richest 
parts of the electorate voted for CPRF. As poverty and unemployment in Russia started to decline 
with the economic boom of the early 2000s, Putin pulled votes from the transitional losers as well 
as the winners. A poll conducted in 2007 showed that 53 percent of the surveyed believed that the 
government significantly had improved the social protection of the poor, ranking it the second 
best achievement of the government, after promoting order (Sakwa 2008a:83, Rose et al. 
2011:52). Colton and Hale (2009:490) actually find that Putin largely drew voters from people 
who experienced no net change in their incomes. Although this simply could mean that people 
reward the incumbents for decreasing the economic problems of the 1990s, this differs from the 
expectation that it is a rise in incomes that has been driving the incumbents’ appeal. Actual 
economic improvement following the 2000s reforms was personally felt by no more than 26 
percent of the population and by only about 40 percent of the Putin voters. Colton and Hale 
(2009:489,493) therefore conclude that even though the economy has been a strong source of 
Putin’s electoral success, the effect is indirect and not based on egocentric economic voting.     
A different theoretical approach is to look at income as a measure of modernization. Both 
Samuel Huntington (1991:67) and Seymour Martin Lipset (1960:83) assumed that higher 
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incomes and increased living standards would create a middle class that would demand 
democratic freedoms. Shlapentokh (2004:227) actually found support for this hypothesis in 
Russia, showing that support for liberal values increased with the rise in income. Similarly, 
economic wealth is expected to favor opposition mobilization (Schedler 2013:310). Indeed, 70 
percent of the 2011 and 2012 protestors categorized themselves as relatively well off. Given the 
theoretical split, I create two alternative hypotheses. 
H6.1: Higher regional incomes will have a positive effect on the vote shares for the incumbents 
and a negative effect on the vote shares for the communists.  
H6.2: Higher regional incomes will have a negative effect on the vote share for the incumbents 
and a positive effect on the vote shares for the communists.  
 
7.7 Unemployment 
Another economic factor regarded as one of the most important parameters that voters usually 
hold the government accountable for is unemployment (Nureev & Shulgin 2013:85). Bartels 
(2011:10) discovered that unemployment has a negative effect on the incumbents, but only when 
reaching a critical level. The communists are also expected to benefit from higher unemployment 
rates as they traditionally favor redistribution from rich to the poor (Langørgen & Rønningen 
2004:9). Unemployment rates were low in Russia during the 2000s, and in 2007 Russia had their 
lowest rates of unemployment since the collapse of the Soviet Union (6.1%) (McAllister & White 
2008a:948, Robinson 2013:457). However, unemployment in general is a phenomenon not 
familiar to the Russians (at least to the older constituency), given the guarantees of the former 
communist regime, and as it varies tremendously between regions, it is expected to have an effect 
on the vote shares.  
H7.1: Higher regional unemployment rates will have a negative effect on the vote shares for the 
incumbents and a positive effect on the communists. 
 
7.8 Pensioners 
When one studies the effect old age has on voter preferences, something called “party 
identification” is especially relevant. Party identification is claimed to be one of the strongest and 
most enduring voter cues (Colton & Hale 2009:483). The concept implies that voters choose 
parties less through detached and rational understanding of the parties’ stands on important 
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issues, but through long-term processes of socialization and through deep-rooted sentiments, 
often inherited from one’s parents (Hale 2006:94). As pensioners were socialized during the 
communist rule, older Russians are expected to vote for CPRF and Zyuganov (Rose et al. 
2011:86, Hale 2006:109). In addition, the communists have a programmatic appeal to pensioners, 
as they promise higher and more reliable pensions (Colton & Hale 2005:9). Indeed, the average 
party member of the CPRF in 1996 was 52 years old, and 64.5 percent of CPRF’s voters were 55 
years or older in the 2003 parliamentary election (Russia Votes 2003, Sakwa 1998:132). 
However, by December 2010, the average age in the UR faction in the Duma was 53 years 
(versus CPRF’s 58). This can indicate that more or less the same elite comprise the party of 
power today as the one that existed in the late Soviet period (Roberts 2012a:174).  
United Russia has been claimed to pull votes from the young (Colton & Hale 2009:502). 
Additionally, as UR embraced the flat 13 percent income tax policies in 2001 and rejected the 
luxury tax, it could be suggested that the incumbents are opposed to using the tax system for 
redistributive purposes, further decreasing their support base among the pensioners (Colton & 
Hale 2009:493, Remington 2011:106,117).  
H8.1: Higher regional share of pensioners will have a negative effect on the vote shares for the 
incumbents and a positive effect on the vote shares for the communists.  
   
7.9 Ethnic Russian 
Building on the existing literature, one would expect regions with higher shares of ethnic non-
Russians to provide a very favorable environment for United Russia and Vladimir Putin 
(Whitmore 2013, Korgunyuk 2014:411). It might however be reasonable to assume electoral 
misconduct based on the anomalous distribution of vote shares favoring the incumbents. 
Goodnow et al. (2014:19) do indeed find that the incidences of electoral manipulation in 
ethnically non-Russians regions significantly exceed those in regions with a Russian majority. 
H9.1: Higher regional share of ethnic Russians will have a negative effect on the vote shares for 
the incumbents and a positive effect on the vote shares for the communists.   
 
7.10 Life expectancy 
Political decisions may influence population health either directly through decisions on public 
health measures (clean drinking water, vaccinations, road traffic safety, air pollution control etc.), 
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or on health care provisions in general (Mackenbach 2013:134). One could assume that better 
health would benefit the incumbents, as they would be rewarded for increasing living standards.  
However, increasing living standards are also associated with increasing socio-economic 
status, education and income, implying a link between life expectancy and modernization 
(Gissler 2015, Down & Hamoudi 2015). Indeed, life expectancy has by several studies been 
shown to be higher in democratic regimes (Mackenbach 2013:143). If life expectancy is 
interpreted as a measure for the general level of modernization, we could according to 
Huntington (1991:67) and Lipset (1960:83) expect the variable to affect the vote shares of the 
incumbents negatively.  
H10.1:  Higher regional life expectancy will have a positive effect on the vote shares for the 
incumbent and a negative effect on the vote shares for the communists.  
H10.2: Higher regional life expectancy will have a negative effect on the vote shares for the 
incumbents and a positive effect on the vote shares for the communists.  
 
7.11 Higher education 
The traditional expectation of the effect of education in Russia has been that less affluent and 
educated voters will favor the communists, while the prosperous voters with higher education 
would offer greater support to parties that support market economy (White et al. 2002:144).  
The traditional West-European approach however, would expect the opposite, as it 
assumes that rising levels of education are associated with one’s orientation towards liberal 
values, and hence damage the popularity of the undemocratic incumbents (Chaisty & Whitefield 
2012:194). Shlapentokh (2004:227) and Gibson and Duch (1993:86) find that higher education in 
Russia is positively correlated with rights consciousness and support for democracy as a political 
system. Colton and Hale (2005:22) similarly find that United Russia does better among people 
with lower levels of education. In addition, about 80 percent of the protestors in the 2011-2012 
demonstrations had higher education, while not more than 25-30 percent of the entire country’s 
population has that (Volkov 2012:57). However, it could also be argued that the better educated 
are better able to adapt to the economic reforms of the 90’s and the 2000s, therefore increasing 
their support for the current regime.  
By 2003 Parliamentary election, there wasn’t a big difference in support for United Russia 
and CPRF based on education. Eleven percent of the CPRF voters had a higher education, 
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compared to United Russia’s 14.5 percent (Russia Votes 2003). Similarly, Bessudnov (2011) 
didn’t find any evidence that parties managed to attract voters based on education.  
H11.1: Higher share of the regional population with higher education will have a negative effect 
on the vote shares for the incumbents and a positive effect on the vote shares for the communists.  
H11.2:  Higher share of the regional population with higher education will have a positive effect 
on the vote shares for the incumbents and a negative effect on the vote shares for the communists. 
 
7.12 Published newspapers  
Given the lack of national independency of all other media outlets, I use the amount of daily  
-published newspapers as an indicator of regional access to independent information. Gerber, 
Karlan and Bergan (2009:47) find that even short exposure to a daily newspaper appears to 
influence voting behavior. Access to independent media implies exposure to regime-critical 
media and could be expected to effect the vote shares of the incumbents negatively. Similarly, 
access to independent media is expected to benefit the communists, because of their expanded 
reach. Newspaper exposure also has a positive effect on political turnout in general, suggesting 
that increased exposure might have an important long term effect on the level of political interest 
(Gerber et al. 2009:48, Enikolopov et al. 2011:3256).  
H12.1: Higher regional circulation of newspapers will have a negative effect the vote shares for 
the incumbents and a positive effect on the vote shares for the communists.   
 
Chapter 8: Method - Random Effects Modeling  
The main methodological approach in this thesis will be random effects (RE) modeling. In the 
first sections of this chapter, I will explain why random effects modeling is appropriate, the 
problems associated with the method, and the regression results. In section 8.4, I apply a method 
that corrects for the problem most often associated with RE modeling, heterogeneity bias. The 
method separates the within- and between-effects of the covariates, and in addition to being 
statistically more sophisticated, it allows for a more informative interpretation of the results. The 
method is Bell and Jones’s random effects model with a within-between formulation (REWB) 
inspired by Mundlak (1978), and involves adding additional time-invariant predictors. I will 
explain the methodology, the benefits of the method and present the regression results. The 
regression analyses are performed in the statistical software program Stata.  
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8.1 Why Random Effects Modeling 
There are generally two main approaches when analyzing panel data and time-series cross-
sectional (TSCS) data: Fixed effects (FE) modeling and random effects (RE) modeling (Bell & 
Jones 2014:133). FE modeling works best if you have relatively fewer cases (N) and more time 
periods (T), as each dummy variable removes one degree of freedom from the model. The RE 
approach is widely used in analyses of panel data with a large N relative to T. If there are few 
observations per unit, the unit effects alone may account for most of the variation in the 
dependent variables (Bartels 2008:7). The smaller the data set, the more support for RE 
modeling, as the random effects will tend to produce superior estimates of β when there are few 
observations per unit, and when the correlation between the independent variables and the unit 
effects is relatively low (Clark & Linzer 2014:4,6). Random effects modeling is also preferable if 
there are any time-invariant variables present in the dataset, as the FE model doesn’t measure the 
effects of time-invariant variables at all (they are perfectly collinear with the set of unit dummy 
variables). If there is theoretical reason to believe that differences across entities may have some 
influence on the dependent variables, RE modeling should be used (Bell & Jones 2014:139, Clark 
& Linzer 2014:5).  
 
The RE model looks like this: 
 
(1)     yij = β0 +β1 x1ij + β2 zj + (uj + eij), 
where yij is the dependent variable, β0 is the intercept term, x1ij is a (series of) covariate(s) that 
are measured at the lower (occasion) level with coefficient β1, and zj is a (series of) covariate(s) 
measured at the higher level with coefficient β2. The “random” part of the model (in brackets) 
consists of uj, the higher-level residual for higher-level entity j, allowing for differential 
intercepts for higher-level entities, and eij, the occasion-level residual for occasion i of higher-
level entity j. Higher-level entities refer to the units of analysis, while lower-level (occasion) 
entities refer to the repeated measures nested in these higher-level entities. Consequently, time-
varying attributes are measured at the occasion level, while time-invariant observations are 
unchanging attributes measured at the higher-level (Bell & Jones 2014:135). The random error is 
separated into a within- (eij) and a between- cluster (uij) component (ibid:136, Bartels 2008:8). 
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Bell and Jones (2014:134) argue that random effects modeling is preferable over fixed 
effects in almost all occasions, because of its greater flexibility, generalizability and its ability to 
model context. Random effects is also said to be a more efficient estimator and should be used as 
long it is statistically justifiable (Data and Statistical Service 2015). Because FE uses dummy-
variables to control out context, the results derived from FE models may be overly simplistic. RE 
models on the other hand, can reveal specific differences between higher-level entities. As the 
units of analysis in this thesis are regions, controlling out context and assuming that all higher-
level entities are affected in the exactly same way, puts us in the risk of missing important 
information. The regions are indeed very different and modelling their differences should be an 
important part of the analysis.  
 
8.2 The problems of Random Effects Models - Omitted Variable Bias/Heterogeneity Bias  
Panel data in general (both FE and RE) allows us to solve a common problem encountered in 
statistics: heterogeneity bias or omitted variable bias. The bias results from a violation of the 
strict exogeneity assumption in regression models that assumes that the individual-specific effect 
is a random variable uncorrelated with the explanatory variables across all time periods. FE 
models solve the problem of heterogeneity bias (correlation between the covariate of interest x, 
and the unit effects aj) by controlling out all higher-level variance, and with it any between 
effects, using the higher-level entities themselves included in the model as dummy-variables 
(Waldinger 2014:26). RE models on the other hand don’t estimate separate unit effects, but 
assume strict exogeneity in the same manner. The assumption is then almost impossible to uphold 
as observations within a given higher-level entity are almost always related to each other. Any 
correlation between x and aj in a RE model can imply an omitted variable z that produces bias in 
estimates of β. Because FE model only estimates within effects, they cannot suffer from 
heterogeneity bias, often leading to researchers using the simpler FE model (Clark & Linzer 
2014:4, Bell & Jones 2014:137). 
 There is however a solution to heterogeneity bias in the RE model framework that doesn’t 
involve losing 82 degrees of freedom (produced by the 82 region-dummy variables in the FE 
model framework). The solution lies in the understanding of the source of endogeneity, which is 
separate “within” and “between” effects of a given time-varying covariate. The attempt to model 
the two processes in one term is what leads to heterogeneity bias (Bell & Jones 2014:141, Deaton 
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2010:430). Time-varying covariates often contain two effects that together comprise its total 
effect: one that is specific to the higher-level entity and doesn’t vary over time (between effect) 
and one that varies over time, within the higher-level entity (within effect) (Bell & Jones 
2014:137). In the standard RE model framework (equation 1 above), it has assumed that the 
within and between effects are equal. This may be the case, but as Snijders and Bosker (2012:60) 
argue, “it is the rule rather than the exception that within-group regression coefficients differ 
from between-group coefficients”. When the effects indeed are different, β1 becomes an 
interpretable average of the two processes. If the between effect is omitted and β1 attempts to 
account for both the within and between effect, it fails to account fully for either, resulting in 
omitted variable bias (Bell & Jones 2014:137). This will consequently lead to the error term to be 
correlated with the covariate, violating the strict exogeneity assumption of the RE model.  
Researchers often use a Hausman specification test (Hausman 1978) to choose between 
FE and RE modeling. The Hausman test is however not a test of FE versus RE, but a test of the 
similarity of within and between effects. It tests whether the unique errors (ui) are correlated with 
the regressors, the null hypothesis is that they are not (Bell & Jones 2014:144, Torres-Reyna 
2007:29). The true correlation between the covariates and unit effects is however never zero, and 
there will almost always exist bias (if perhaps negligible) in the estimates. The source of 
endogeneity is what is interesting and important to model explicitly (Bell & Jones 2014:137).  
The conventional understanding that any correlation rules out the use of RE models is according 
to Clark and Linzer (2014:6) misguided and they argue that the presence of non-zero correlation 
is neither a sufficient nor a necessary condition for choosing a FE model, and that the choice 
needs to be based on the nature of the data. Bell and Jones (2014:138) propose a model that 
makes the Hausman test redundant, because it eliminates the correlation (between the covariate 
of interest, x, and the unit effects aj) entirely. Before we move on to their model however, the 
regression results for the standard RE model are presented.  
 
8.3 Regression results of Random Effects Modeling 
The random effects estimator is the feasible generalized least squares (GLS) estimator and is also 
what Stata requests by default, producing a matrix-weighted average of the between and within 
results (Schmidheiny 2014:6, Stata 2015:4). The accepted significance level is in all of the 
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following regressions set to five percent, but it may also be interesting to look at the variables 
significant at the ten percent level.  
Several dozens of models were run to test how each variable and its significance level 
changed with additional variables. The results presented in Table 4 include all the variables.  
 
Table 4: Model 1: Random effects model, controlled for heteroscedasticity25 
Variable United 
Russia 
Putin CPRF Zyuganov 
Distance to 
Moscow 
-.0021066 
(-2.53)** 
-.0012421 
(-3.08)*** 
.0007381 
(2.43) 
.0002148 
(0.80) 
Religion - 
Orthodox 
-.0087191 
(-1.21) 
-.0235946 
(-0.34) 
.0046549 
(0.12) 
.0375994 
(0.83) 
Urbanity .0731603 
(0.49) 
.092621 
(1.63)  
-.1384586 
(-3.65)*** 
-.0936879 
(-2.00)** 
Industrial laborers -.9207074 
(-3.37)*** 
-.0828644 
(-0.64) 
.1105338 
(1.31)  
-.1928097 
(-1.97)**  
GRP change 25.13882 
(6.57)*** 
.9658771 
(0.63) 
-4.812988 
(-4.42)*** 
4.014138 
(3.84)*** 
Income -1.1478441 
(-0.69)  
-.3878545 
(-3.94)*** 
.2930741 
(3.86)*** 
.0172489 
(0.23) 
Unemployment -1.147467 
(-3.26)*** 
-.063463 
(-0.41) 
.1660646 
(1.01) 
-.272919 
(-3.63) 
Pensioners -.5028892 
(-1.30) 
-.4948268 
(-2.67) 
.6584587 
(4.48)*** 
.2934628 
(2.44)** 
Ethnic Russian -.3389814 
(-4.04)*** 
-.2341251 
(-4.09)*** 
.0886067 
(2.79)*** 
.0987305 
(2.81)*** 
Life expectancy .9767574 
(2.14) 
-.4163333 
(-2.11)** 
.5046111 
(3.09)*** 
.2849178 
(2.15)** 
Higher education .9767574 
(0.35) 
.0701754 
(0.67) 
-.0536991 
(-0.64) 
-.0433344 
(-0.53) 
Newspapers -3.207176 
(-3.72)*** 
-.8944639 
(-1.48) 
.310269 
(0.86) 
-.1436536 
(-0.32) 
Sig. level: * = 0.10, ** = 0.05, *** = 0.01 
Note: The regression was performed using Stata’s xtreg, re robust command. Z-values in parenthesis. 
 
As we can see, many of the variables produce significant results in line with our theoretical 
expectations. Distance to Moscow affects to vote shares of the incumbents negatively, and 
regions with higher shares of rural population vote for the communists to a greater degree. 
Income affects Putin negatively and the Communist Part positively, in addition to regions with 
																																																						25	See	chapter	9	on	regression	assumptions	and	section	9.2	for	information	about	heteroscedasticity	and	the	homoscedasticity	assumption.		
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higher shares of pensioners showing greater support for the communists. Ethnic Russian produces 
significant results for all of the dependent variables, with higher shares benefitting the 
communists and damaging the incumbents. Life expectancy appears to significantly benefit the 
communists, while newspapers produce a very significant and negative effect on Putin. However, 
the results of this table are challenged by heterogeneity bias and the interpretation of the results 
will be reserved to the estimates produced by the more superior model I turn to in the following 
section.  
 
8.4 A Random Effects solution to Heterogeneity bias: Within-Between formulation 
In longitudinal data, observations are nested within units. One of the strengths of longitudinal 
data is that it allows us to disaggregate the between- and within- effects of a time-varying 
covariate. It can be quite challenging to unambiguously separate the expected effects of a given 
influence when looking within regions versus across regions. The matter is further complicated 
by the fact that the two influences can operate simultaneously and in opposite directions (Curran 
& Bauer 2011:583,585). This can be better explained using an example of the relationship 
between exercise and heart attacks. An individual is more likely to experience a heart attack 
while exercising. This is the within-person effect. However, people who exercise more have a 
lower risk of getting a heart attack. This is the between-person effect. Generalizing the between-
person effect to the individual would be an error of inference (ecological fallacy), in addition to 
the direction of the covariate potentially being the opposite of the true value. The separation of 
the within- and between- effects lets us better test our underlying theories and hypotheses, and 
develop a more advanced understanding of true relationships (Curran & Bauer 2011:586).  
 As discussed in section 6.5.4, even without disaggregating the within- and between- 
effects, the data in this thesis puts us at risk of making an error of ecological inference. The 
statistical models disaggregating the within- and between- effects therefore need to be carefully 
specified to avoid confounding the two sources of variability. Simply put, the between 
component is unique to the unit N and the within component is unique to time T for unit N 
(Curran & Bauer 2011:592). The between effect is assessed through the average levels, while the 
within effect through variation across time. When we estimate only one effect, we combine 
potentially different effects operating at two levels of analysis (The effect of a time-varying 
covariate in the standard RE model is an aggregation of between-region and within-region 
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influences). To differentiate these effects, we need to decompose the time-varying covariate into 
components that isolate between- and within-region differences (Curran & Bauer 2011:590). 
There are several traditional methods for disaggregating between- and within- effects, usually 
involving the strategy of “within-subject centering”, that involves subtracting the subject’s mean 
value from each observation value (xij - x̄j) (Aiken & West 1991:28-48, Van de Pol & Wright 
2009:755). Centering around the subject’s mean effectively eliminates any between-subject 
variation and the new predictor variable (xij - x̄j) is used as a fixed effect that expresses only the 
within-subject variation. A second predictor variable that only expresses the between-subject 
variation is simply the subjects’ means26 
As random effects modeling is preferred where there is no correlation between covariates and 
residuals, Bell and Jones (2014:149) propose a solution within the RE model framework that 
removes this correlation entirely. Inspired by Mundlak’s (1978:69) initial formulation, they 
separate the within-subject and between-subject effects creating a “within-between RE model”: 
 
(2)                        yij = β0 + β1(xij - x̄j) + β4x̄j + β2zj + (uj + eij), 
 
where β1 is the within effect and β4 is the between effect of xij (Bell & Jones 2014:141). The 
estimation of distinct within- and between- effects makes the data more interpretable, and allows 
us to test whether the within-subject effect, the between-subject effect, or both are significant 
(Van de Pol & Wright 2009:756). Most importantly, the separation of the effects removes the 
heterogeneity bias in the model, also making the coefficients more reliable (Skrondal and Rabe-
Hesketh 2004:52-53, Bell & Jones 2014:142).  
 If the within and between effects are properly specified, the estimates of β1 in equations 
(2) and (3) will actually be identical to those obtained by a FE model. Therefore, we can use a 
corrected RE model, keeping the informative between-region effects and avoiding losing 82 
degrees of freedom (Bell & Jones 2014:144, Mundlak 1978:70).  
It is however still possible that omitted variables bias the estimates, and as with any other 
model, care is required when interpreting the results. However, as long as we account for the key 
																																																						
26 Two	additional	variables	are	created,	one	by	averaging	each	time-varying	variable	across	the	three	time-periods	
(between	estimator),	the	other	by	subtracting	the	average	value	from	the	observed	values	for	each	regian,	for	each	
year	(within-estimator). 
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source of the correlation by splitting the within and between effects, we don’t simply solve the 
heterogeneity bias, we model it. It is important to use theory to consider whether important 
variables have been omitted and whether causal interpretations are justified. 
 
8.5 Regression results of RE modeling with a “within-between” formulation (REWB) 
The interpretation of the second model is somewhat more complicated, as it separates the effects 
of the time-varying variables into one within- and one between- estimator. This is clearly 
specified in Table 5. First, we average each time-varying variable over the three time points, with 
the covariates representing the effect between regions. Second, we subtract the average value 
from the observed value for each time period for each region, with that covariate estimating the 
effects within regions, considering change over time. There are ten time-varying covariates in the 
dataset, and two time-invariant ones (distance to Moscow and religion-Orthodox). The time-
invariant covariates assess the between effects of these variables. The initial random effects 
model with the “within-between” formulation (REWB) contained 22 variables, but only the 
variables that were significant on at least one of the four dependent variables were included in the 
end. The results are presented in Table 5. 
 
Table 5: Model 2: Random Effects model with the within-between formulation, controlled for 
heteroscedasticity  
Variable United Russia Putin CPRF Zyuganov 
Distance to 
Moscow 
-.0004635 
(-0.81) 
-.0011136 
 (-4.14)*** 
.0005812 
(3.10)*** 
.000661 
(3.67)*** 
Industrial 
laborers – 
within 
-2.471974 
(-5.33)*** 
-.0741211 
(-0.37) 
.4505565 
(2.95)*** 
-.3105664 
(-1.82)* 
GRP Change – 
within 
13.15194 
(2.70)** 
-.2107259 
(-0.12) 
-.6940462 
(-0.47) 
3.873506 
(3.01)*** 
Income – 
between 
.1878844 
(0.60) 
.4061816 
(2.42)** 
-.4431985 
(-5.32)*** 
-.5998719 
(-5.93)*** 
Income –  
within  
.2180088 
(0.55) 
-.3585919 
(-2.62)*** 
.2527065 
(1.81)* 
.1606901 
(1.71)* 
Unemployment 
– between  
.2043728 
(0.76) 
.2492145 
(1.59) 
-.2528421 
(-2.66)** 
-.3357451 
(-3.59)*** 
Unemployment 
– within 
-2.425036 
(-5.35)*** 
-.4314737 
(-1.92)* 
.6463991 
(3.80)*** 
-.1653597 
(-1.41) 
Pensioners – 
within 
-3.350339 
(-2.97)*** 
-.2585112 
(-0.55) 
 1.120906 
(3.18)*** 
.0266722 
(0.09) 
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Ethnic Russian 
– between  
-.3305235 
(-4.94)*** 
-.2380131 
(-5.21)*** 
.0797134 
(3.90)*** 
.107071 
(3.97)*** 
Life expectancy 
– between 
.3068656 
(0.71) 
-.0437904 
(-0.21) 
.3541218 
(3.35)*** 
.3002286 
(2.46)** 
Life expectancy 
– within 
-.5249456 
(-0.49) 
-.69548 
(-2.00)** 
.9490001 
(2.86)*** 
-.1216558 
(-0.47) 
Newspapers – 
between 
-1.704246 
(-1.94)* 
-1.587428 
(-3.46)*** 
.5514956 
(2.06)** 
.7031212 
(1.89)* 
Newspapers – 
within  
-3.770793 
(-3.75)** 
-1.085702 
(-2.00)** 
.7926658 
(2.06)** 
-.2460308 
(-0.63) 
Sig. level: * = 0.10, ** = 0.05, *** = 0.01 
Note: The regression was performed using Stata’s xtreg, re robust command. Z-values in parenthesis. 
 
Comparing table 4 (RE model) and table 5 (within-between RE model) shows not only how 
omitted variable bias can bias our estimates, but also that the separation of the within-region and 
between-region effects produce a very different and more nuanced picture of the relationships 
between the variables. Controlling for heterogeneity bias and separating the within- and between-
effects resulted in two variables gaining significance for Putin and four variables gaining 
significance for CPRF and Zyuganov. Similarly, two variables’ effect on UR and one variable’s 
effect on CPRF and Zyuganov lost their significance. Additionally, the variable urbanity entirely 
lost its significance. Some variables are clearly only significant within regions, some only 
between, while some variables have simultaneous effects, and even in opposite directions.  
 The standard RE model is outperformed by the REWB model because of bias resulting 
from the omission of the between effect (Bell & Jones 2014:145). However, despite the fact that 
the REWB model is methodologically and theoretically superior to the standard RE model, there 
are a number of potential violations in the data we need to address. Before the final model (Table 
6) is presented, the next chapter will address regression assumptions upon which all multiavariate 
regressions rely on to produce unbiased estimates. The RE model could be further extended to the 
random coefficients model (RCM), which would allow the effects of the covariates to vary across 
units, but this is not a method I will elaborate on here. 
   
Chapter 9: Regression Analysis Assumptions 
Most statistical tests rely upon certain assumptions about the variables in the dataset. When these 
assumptions are violated, the results become unstable, with a risk of over- or under-estimating the 
size of the effects, as well as the significance levels (Osborne & Waters 2002, Wooldridge 
	 		80	
	
2013:362). The strict exogeneity assumption (that assumes no omitted variable bias/heterogeneity 
bias) was addressed in the previous chapter (section 8.2), where the final within-between RE 
model eliminated the correlation between the covariates of interest and the unit effects. This 
chapter will address the assumptions of no multicollinearity27, homoscedasticity, normality, 
linearity and no auto-correlation. I will also address the potential bias introduced by outliers.  
 
9.1 Absence of multicollinearity  
Because the final REWB model (Model 2) has several new variables, splitting most in two, we 
need to again test for multicollinearity. Repetition of the same kind of variable or the inclusion of 
a variable that is computed from other variables in the data set can result in multicollinearity. 
Indeed, there are several new critically high correlations in the dataset. The variable measuring 
the within-effect of industrial laborers has a correlation with the within-effects of income (-
0.688) and life expectancy (-0.784). The within-effect of income is also highly correlated with the 
within-effects of pensioners (0.790) and life expectancy (0.877). Stata’s user-written Collin-test 
for multicollinearity shows a very large condition number (105.5530), indicating very high 
instability. To correct for multicollinearity we need to leave out the variables causing it, leading 
to the exclusion of the variables measuring the within-effects of income and industrial laborers. 
	
9.2 Homoscedasticity assumption 
The assumption of homoscedasticity implies that the variation around the regression line is the 
same across all levels of a given independent variable. If the variance of errors differs at different 
values of the independent variable, heteroscedasticity is indicated (Skog 2004:246). Assuming 
homoscedasticity when heteroscedasticity is present will not cause inconsistency in the estimates 
of the coefficients (Baltagi 2008:87). However, marked heteroscedasticity can lead to distortion 
of findings and weaken the analysis (Osborne &Waters 2002).  
A graphic plot of the residuals versus the fitted (predicted) values indicate 
heteoscedasticity in the data (see Appendix C) However, Stata’s xtreg, re robust command 
controls for heteroscedastic errors (Hoechle 2007:285, Torres-Reyna 2007:38). This command 
was used on all of the models.  
																																																						
27 Multicollinearity	was	addressed	in	section	6.5.1	as	well,		but	all	the	regression	assumptions	are	in	this	chapter	tested	for	the	REWB	model.	 
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9.3 Multivariate normality assumption 
The regression analysis assumes that the variables are normally distributed. Non-normally 
distributed variables that are skewed, or have substantial outliers can bias the estimates and the 
significance levels of the variables (Osborne &Waters 2002). According to Bell and Jones 
(2014:136) RE models perform well even when the normality assumption is violated. This is 
because normality is required for valid hypothesis testing, and doesn’t matter for the obtainment 
of unbiased estimates of the regression coefficients. 
 A test for univariate normality in Stata (mvtest normality varlist, univariate) shows how 
kurtosis and skewness varies across the variables. Kurtosis indicates how the peak and tails of a 
distribution differ from the normal distribution. Data that follow a normal distribution have a 
kurtosis value of zero. Kurtosis that significantly deviates from zero may indicate that the data is 
not normally distributed. Skewness is on the other hand the extent to which the data is not 
symmetrical. As data becomes more symmetrical, its skewness value approaches zero (Minitab 
2015b).  
The two problematic variables are the same variables that caused multicollinearity in the 
data: the variables measuring the within-effects of income (skewness: 0.5789) and industrial 
laborers (kurtosis: 0.5894). When the data is not normally distributed a non-linear transformation 
may fix the issue (e.g. log-transformation, square root or inverse). However, as this can introduce 
effects of multicollinearity and complicate the interpretation of the results, in addition to the two 
variables already creating instability, I choose to drop them all together (Osborne &Waters 2002).  
 
9.4 Linearity assumption 
The fixed predictor variables (and their within- and between-subject components) have here been 
assumed to be continuous and linear. The assumption of linearity implies that the effect of the 
independent variables can be described in form of a straight line (Statistics Solutions 2015b). As 
there are many instances where the relationships may not be linear, it is essential to examine the 
possibility of non-linearity. Stata’s non-linearity test (nlcheck indepvars) didn’t reject the 
linearity assumption for any of the dependent variables (a significant test result indicates that the 
linearity assumption is violated).  
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9.5 The assumption of no autocorrelation 
Autocorrelation, also called serial correlation, occurs when the residuals are not independent 
from each other. Especially when the data consists of repeated measures over time, there is 
almost always dependence between observations on one variable. This is known as 
autocorrelation (Statistics Solutions 2015b). The variable measuring the within-effect of income 
was dropped because of high autocorrelation.  
Wooldridge derived a simple test for autocorrelation in panel-data models. Stata’s user-
written program xtserial by David Drukker performs this test. A significant test statistic indicated 
the presence of autocorrelation in the data. Stata’s xtregar, re command controls for 
autocorrelation, and indicated instability of the variable GRP Change. Ignoring serial correlation 
when it is present results in consistent but inefficient estimates of the regression coefficients and 
biased standard errors (Baltagi 2008:92). 
 
9.6 Outliers 
Outliers in a regression analysis are observations that are very far from the linear regression line 
(they have large residuals). Observations like this may influence the estimated regression 
coefficient (Skog 2004:249).  
A thorough examination of the data identified outliers on all of the independent variables 
(see Appendix D). There are particularly four regions that continuously have values far from the 
regression line: Moscow, St. Petersburg, Ingushetia and Chechnya. However, despite the fact that 
outliers exist, it is not always desirable to remove them unless their values are critical. All of the 
Russian regions (including the outliers) are the target population in this thesis and I choose to 
keep them as indispensible parts of Russia (Osborne & Overbay 2004). Outliers can also be dealt 
with using dummy variables in a RE framework (Bell & Jones 2014:136). 
	
Chapter 10: Analysis of the regression results  
In addition to the theoretical grouping of the incumbents and the communists that lay ground for 
the creation of the hypotheses, it is important to keep in mind that there might be a significant 
difference between presidential and parliamentary elections. This chapter is mainly concerned 
with answering the first of the research questions, while the next chapter will address the second. 
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1. Which demographic and socio-economic variables affect the regional vote shares for the 
incumbents and the communists in Russian national elections between 2003 and 2012? 
 
The following sections will evaluate the significance and the direction of each variable, in 
addition to commenting how patterns differ during presidential and parliamentary elections. 
While approaching the different effects of the variables, it is important to remember that in the 
real world, variables overlap in a great amount of ways, in addition to being in different 
relationships with each other across the regions of Russia. In Tatarstan and Bashkortostan, for 
example, ethnic non-Russians are highly educated, urbanized, modern and relatively wealthy 
compared to their fellow ethnic non-Russians in Caucasus (Dennis & Moser 2009:11). It is not 
easy account for the possibility that certain cleavages may overlap. It would require determining 
which cleavages overlap, how and why, and as Stoll writes (2004:44), even for a specialist this 
would not be a straightforward task. I will therefore interpret each variable individually. 
10.1 The Final Model 
The final model is controlled for heteroscedasticity, normality and multicollinearity and is 
presented in Table 6. The colored fields are significant variables, with the yellow fields marking 
theoretically logical and expected patterns, and the pink fields indicating unanticipated, 
ambiguous or theoretically illogical patterns.  
 
Table 6: Model 3: Final REWB model, controlled for heteroscedasticity, normality and 
multicollinearity. 
Variable United Russia Putin CPRF Zyuganov 
Distance to 
Moscow 
-.0003659 
(-0.63) 
-.0010887 
 (-4.13)*** 
.0005796 
(3.15)*** 
.0006703 
(3.78)*** 
GRP Change – 
within  
17.10615 
(3.10)*** 
.8191725 
(0.45) 
-2.466068 
(-1.63) 
4.029395 
(3.13)*** 
Income – 
between  
.1395242 
(0.45) 
.3966638 
(2.43)** 
-.440723 
(-5.47)*** 
-.6046725 
(-6.12)*** 
Unemployment 
– between  
.0521734 
(0.23) 
.2089363 
(1.59) 
-.2472735 
(-3.33)*** 
-.3463761 
(-4.29)*** 
Unemployment 
– within 
-2.807051 
(-5.75)*** 
-.4122442 
(-2.16)** 
.6290395 
(4.16)*** 
-.2336045 
(-2.16)** 
Pensioners – 
within  
-1.938558 
(-2.10)** 
-.7414145 
(-2.04)** 
 1.345212 
(4.46)*** 
.4005873 
(1.67)* 
Ethnic Russian 
– between 
-.3407375 
(-5.13)*** 
-.2406275 
(-5.36)*** 
.0801768 
(4.09)*** 
.1063683 
(4.05)*** 
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Life expectancy 
– between 
.3001228 
(0.66) 
-.0281998 
(-0.13) 
.3607626 
(3.48)*** 
.2950361 
(2.48)** 
Life expectancy 
– within 
1.91513 
(3.50)*** 
-1.390871 
(-5.31)*** 
1.066007 
(5.87)*** 
.4603659 
(3.25)*** 
Newspapers – 
between 
-1.696425 
(-1.91)* 
-1.602444 
(-3.52)*** 
.5455593 
(2.05)** 
.7093093 
(1.92)* 
Newspapers – 
within 
-3.134328 
(-2.65)** 
-.7994307 
(-0.93) 
.4466372 
(0.91) 
-.2642169 
(-0.52) 
Sig. level: * = 0.10, ** = 0.05, *** = 0.01 
Note: The regression was performed using Stata’s xtreg, re robust command. Z-values in parenthesis. 
 
10.2 Rokkan’s variables  
Out of the four variables I used to operationalize Rokkan’s four main cleavages, only one is 
significant and pulls in the expected direction: distance to Moscow. Contrary to even Rokkan’s 
expectations (Flora et al.1999:7,63), center-periphery contrasts still not only prevail in the society 
but are actually visible in the electoral results. In line with Nureev and Shulgin’s (2013:86) 
findings, regions further away from Moscow support the communists to a greater degree. The 
variable appears to create a very significant electoral cleavage during presidential elections, with  
regions further away from the capital supporting Putin less and Zyuganov more. Despite the fact 
that Moscow is the city where Putin continuously gets his lowest ratings, regions closer to the 
capital have higher vote shares for Putin. There are several potential explanations for the 
observed pattern. Berezin and Díez-Medrano’s (2008:23) explanation would rest on the 
assumption that globalization strengthens the emotional and cognitive significance of distance 
and makes people more distrustful of rule from afar. A poll conducted by the Levada Center in 
2010 showed that 85 percent believed they as an individual had “practically no” (34 percent) or 
“absolutely no” (51 percent) influence on governmental decisions (Levada Center 2010a; 2010e). 
The belief that one cannot influence national politics even if one wanted to could be a potential 
source of alienation from Moscow. However, there are doubts to whether the effect the variable 
has is reliable. The reason for this is the nature of how the regions are located over the vast 
territory of Russia. Even though Russia stretches over 11 time zones, over 50 of the 83 regions 
are clustered in only one time zone, all around the city of Moscow. Since distance is measured in 
kilometers, the regions that are far become outliers, significantly influencing the estimates. Even 
though we fail to reject H1.1, we encourage readers to keep in mind the potential instability of the 
measure and be cautious with drawing any conclusions.  
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The two variables that don’t have any significance on any of the four dependent variables 
are religion-Orthodox and urbanity. Religion’s lack of effect was expected because of the lack of 
competition between religious denominations and religious cues from parties and incumbents to 
voters. Here, we confirm the null-hypothesis H2.0. Urbanity on the other hand, having 
significance in the standard RE model, lost all of its significance in the REWB model. This is a 
good example of how a wrong model specification and heterogeneity bias can lead to misleading 
conclusions. The disappearance of traditionally expected patterns could partially be explained by 
the fact that Putin, making rural social development a priority and substantially increasing the 
living standards of the rural electorate, managed to attract the rural vote away from the 
communists. However, not enough to where they constitute a clear part of his own or UR’s 
electoral support. An alternative explanation to why regions with bigger shares of rural 
population don’t support CPRF is because the rural electorate is more controllable and prone to 
administrative pressures than the urban one (Whitmore 2013, Gandhi & Lust-Okar 2009:409, 
Lehoucq 2003:251). Regardless, even though CPRF used to draw voters from the agricultural and 
rural regions, the findings are in line with Sakwa’s (2008a:33) and Wegren and Konitzer’s 
(2006:683) findings that the urban-rural cleavage disappeared by 2003. The analysis shows that a 
new cleavage based on urbanity didn’t emerge and we confirm the null-hypothesis H3.0. 
The variable used to operationalize Rokkan’s fourth “owner-worker” cleavage was 
removed from the analysis because of a multicollinearity problem with several of the other 
variables in addition to the violation of the multivariate normality assumption (see section 9.1 and 
9.3). Industrial laborers did however produce a significant party cleavage in Model 5, with 
regions characterized by higher shares of industrial workers supporting CPRF more and UR less. 
Given the design of this thesis, we cannot draw any conclusions about this variable, but perhaps a 
different methodological approach, or a restriction to Rokkan’s variables only, would produce 
results that are more reliable. To avoid misleading interpretations I choose to drop the variable 
from the final model and neither confirm nor reject any of the hypotheses.  
 
10.3 Economic variables 
10.3.1 Gross regional product 
According to theories of sociotropic voting, when the country’s economy is on the upswing, 
support for the incumbents is higher. A higher percentage-increase in gross regional product over 
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the last two years indeed seems to have significantly benefitted UR, with a one percentage point 
increase in GRP predicting a 17 percentage points rise in the vote share for the party. The 
variable has no effect on Putin or CPRF, but has a surprisingly positive and highly significant 
(3.13) effect on the vote shares for Zyuganov. This pattern is not in accordance with the 
theoretical expectations. 
 As the variable is computed by the researcher28, there were concerns about the reliability 
of the measurement. However, the variable GRP produced the same positive and significant 
numbers for Putin and Zyuganov, not solving the puzzle. We therefore reject both the null-
hypothesis and the alternative hypothesis.   
 
10.3.2 Income 
Because of several violations of the regression assumptions (multicollinearity, normality, 
autocorrelation), the variable measuring the within-effect of income was dropped. However, the 
variable measuring the between-effect of income was unproblematic, and produced significant 
results for three of our dependent variables. As previously mentioned, the between effect looks at 
the structural characteristics of the regions and how the variable affects them differently (Curran 
& Bauer 2011:583,585). Income between regions has a significant positive effect on the vote 
shares for Putin, in line with the sociotropic expectation that economic prosperity of a region 
leads to increased support for the incumbent. Similarly, income between regions has a very 
significant and negative effect on the vote shares for both CPRF (sig. -5.47) and Zyuganov (sig. -
6.12). This is line with the theoretical expectations of Colton (1998:88-89) and Sakwa (1998:136) 
who found that the communist do better in poorer regions. In addition, in line with theories of 
sociotropic voting, incumbents are rewarded for economic prosperity of the region. The findings 
do not support the claims that the economy does not matter for voter preferences in Russia (Rose 
& Mishler 2010:52,101, Wegren & Konitzer 2006:690). Similarly, the interpretation of income as 
an indicator of modernization is not supported in the final model (Huntington 1991:67, Lipset 
1960:83). We reject both the null-hypothesis and H6.2, and conclude that H6.1 is strengthened.  
Contrary to the findings found for GRP-change, the between-effect of income is more in 
line with the theoretical expectations. The possible reason for why GRP-change and the between-
																																																						
28 GRP-change	in	percentage	=	(	!"##!!""#!!!" 	,		!""#!!""#!!!" , !""#!!""#!!!" 	).	 	
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effect of income have different effects is the nature of the measures. Gross regional product 
measures the market value of all final goods and services produced within a region during a year 
(Shafrin 2011). Regional income is on the other hand based on individual performance and does 
not incorporate any measures associated with the economic prosperity of the region itself.  
While poorer regions support CPRF to a greater degree, income does not create a regional 
cleavage during the Duma elections, because it has no significant effect on UR. This could be 
explained by the fact that UR pulls voters from regions with both high and low average incomes, 
removing the variable’s significance on the party’s vote shares (Rose et al. 2011:52, Sakwa 
2008a:83, Wegren & Konitzer 2006:690).  
Unlike for United Russia, regional wealth has significantly benefitted the incumbent 
president, with regions where the general level of income is higher, positively affecting Putin and 
negatively affecting Zyuganov. The variable for Zyuganov is actually stronger and more 
significant (-6.12) and it appears as though the communist leader has succeeded in keeping the 
representation of the poorer regions (Colton 1998:88-89, Sakwa 1998:136). The positive effect 
the variable has on Putin is in line with sociotropic economic theory: regions with higher average 
incomes reward the president. This finding is expected, as most Russians viewed economic 
growth as the greatest achievement of Putin and his government (Rose et al. 2011:142, Robinson 
2012:452, McAllister & White 2008a:948). The “Putin phenomenon” dominating Russia is 
according to McAllister and White (2008b:622) indeed largely explained by positive evaluations 
of the economy. It is however not him as an individual, but the high value placed on economic 
prosperity, which itself is associated with Putin that generates the effect (McAllister & White 
2008b:624). Similarly, Rose et al. (2011:122) find that political and economic performance of the 
government contributed to Putin’s personal popularity. Even though these evaluations are made 
by others and are mostly based on survey evidence, the regression results reflect scholarly 
consensus. 
It should be noted that nominal average income doesn’t reflect the actual differences in 
the standard of living between the regions because of very different costs of living across the 
country. To get reliable estimates we would need to control incomes with an indicator of the 
minimum subsistence level (Borisova & Zubarevich 2005:50). The regressions were performed 
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with the variable subsistence minimum29, but the variable was not included in the final model 
because it was highly correlated with income. Subsistence minimum had somewhat similar 
effects as income, with negative between-effects on CPRF and Zyuganov (however no significant 
between-effect on Putin). Given these implications, interpretation of the variable should be done 
with caution. A potential solution to establishing a central regional tendency would be to use 
median income, as it to a greater degree would represent a social collectivity (Remington 
2011:101). Unfortunately, the Russian Federation Statistical Service does not report regional 
median income.   
  
10.3.3 Unemployment 
Unemployment is the first variable in our dataset that produces significant within- and between- 
effects, in addition to operating in opposite directions on one of the dependent variables (CPRF). 
The within-effects of the variable is in accordance with our theoretical expectations: higher levels 
of regional unemployment have a negative effect on the vote shares for UR and Putin, and a 
positive effect on the vote shares for the CPRF. This is in accordance with Bartels’ (2011:10) 
assumption that unemployment affects the incumbents negatively. However, the variable also 
affects Zyuganov’s vote share negatively, contradicting our theoretical expectations. A potential 
explanation for this could be Zyuganov’s general lack of charisma and his negative candidate 
effect, as people might not believe he can solve the problems of unemployment. Unemployment 
actually affects Zyuganov negatively between regions as well, where he is joined by CPRF. This 
finding diverges from the expected pattern and the pattern we find in the within-formulation. 
However, as the between effect reflects the structural differences between the regions, another 
structural variable could be creating a spurious effect. A study of the dataset revealed that the 
highest levels of unemployment rates are found in regions with a high proportion of ethnic non-
Russians and indeed, the variables are highly correlated (.614). As regions with higher 
unemployment rates also have large shares of ethnic non-Russians, the negative effect 
unemployment has on the communists between regions could be caused by the distortion of 
electoral manipulation in the ethnic regions.  
																																																						
29	Subsistence	minimum	includes	a	minimum	set	of	food,	non-food	goods	and	services	necessary	for	the	
preservation	of	human	health	and	his	or	her	life.	
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 If we assume that the between-effect is spurious and only focus on the within-effect, 
unemployment actually creates an electoral cleavage during parliamentary elections. In line with 
Bartels’ (2011:10) and Langørgen and Rønningen’s (2004:9) expectations, unemployment affects 
UR negatively and CPRF positively. It is however not easy to say whether the unemployed 
people in a region actually are the ones voting for CPRF, or if it is due to increased support of the 
employed people who also reside there. Because of the contradictory between- and within- 
effects of unemployment, we cannot say that the alternative hypothesis H7.1 is strengthened. 
However, the variable’s significant effects during parliamentary elections might indicate the 
existence of a party cleavage based on unemployment, so we do not reject H7.1 either.   
 
10.4 Demographic variables 
10.4.1 Pensioners 
In accordance with the literature, a bigger constituency of pensioners in a region affects the vote 
shares for the incumbents negatively and the communists positively (Rose et al. 2011:86, Colton 
& Hale 2005:9, Evans & Whitefield 2006:29). The variable is significant for all of the four 
variables (however only at the ten percent level for Zyuganov), creating one of the strongest 
electoral cleavages, both during parliamentary and presidential elections.  
The negative effect the variable has on UR and Putin can be explained by the party’s pro-
market policies that favor big businesses and put the pensioners at a disadvantage. On average, 
Russians can anticipate losing about three-fourths of their incomes when they retire, receiving 
only 27 percent of their incomes as pensions. Despite the fact that average pensions have 
increased by 34.8 percent since 2009, pensions are still too low to survive on. The 20 percent of 
Russia’s pensioners who work, manage, but the majority struggles and the hard living conditions 
under the current regime could explain why regions with a higher share of pensioners support 
incumbents less (Borisova & Zubarevich 2005:44, Remington 2011:112,116, Zaostrovtsev 2013).  
CPRF and Zyuganov on the other hand, promise higher and more reliable pensions, 
making them a more natural representor of the older constituency in Russia. Additionally, the 
communists are associated with the policies of the Soviet regime, further increasing the nostalgic 
vote from those who long back to the “good old days” (Colton & Hale 2005:9). The findings 
reflect scholarly consensus and strengthen the alternative hypothesis H8.1. 
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10.4.2 Ethnic Russians 
In accordance with the previously observed patters, regions with higher concentrations of ethnic 
Russians support the incumbents less and the communists more (Whitmore 2013, Korgunyuk 
2014:411). The effect is between regions and is strongly significant on all of the dependent 
variables, creating an electoral cleavage both during parliamentary and presidential elections. 
However, interpretation of this variable is somewhat distorted by the intervening effect of 
the “administrative resources” believed to be extensively used in the ethnic regions. Indeed, the 
effect is only significant between regions, indicating that it is the pure demographic characteristic 
of the region (and not the change in ethnicity) that matters for the vote shares. Colton and Hale’s 
(2005:11) study lends some support to this finding, as they don’t find Russian vs. Non-Russian 
ethnicity to have any relevance to voting behavior in their survey study. Residency in one of the 
minority republics does not seem to have any significant influence either. This could serve as an 
additional sign of electoral manipulation, as it at the individual level does not seem to matter 
whether a voter is ethnically Russian or not, but does matter at the structural level of aggregate 
data.  
It could of course be the case that regions with very high voter turnout and a great support 
for United Russia and Putin simply are areas with high concentrations of regime supporters. 
However, it is hard to believe that results showing greater than 95 percent turnout and 95 percent 
support for United Russia in regions like Dagestan and Chechnya, where violent attacks against 
the state are a regular occurrence, are provided by pure regime support from the electorate. 
Rather, it is more likely that the trend is driven by what Sakwa (2008a:117) called “the 
enthusiastic use of ‘administrative resources’”. Allegedly, over half a million votes may have 
been added to Putin’s total in Dagestan, while Chechnya had a registered turnout of 107 percent 
in 2011 (Kramer 2012, Sakwa 2008a:32). Goodnow et al. (2014:21) find that even during the 
elections in 2007 and 2011, when electoral manipulation was deemed to have spread beyond the 
ethnic republics, the incidence of electoral manipulation in regions with large concentrations of 
ethnic minorities greatly outstripped that of majority-Russian regions.  
The invasion of the so-called “administrative resource” distorts our understanding of the 
variable. As ethnicity is not an actual factor parties or candidates use to mobilize voters, ethnicity 
is deprived of its political interpretation and cannot be regarded as a full cleavage. The variable 
can only be understood socially, linked to a certain demographic characteristic of the region 
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(Korgunyuk 2014:403,413). We should however not automatically assume that non-Russian 
ethnicity implies electoral fraud. Ethnic republics with a large proportion of the rural population 
(Ingushetia, Dagestan, Kabardino-Balkaria, North Ossetia, Mordovia, Tatarstan, Bashkortostan) 
are a lot more subject to the “administrative resource” pressures than the more urbanized 
Nenetsk, Taimyr, Arkhangelsk, Perm and Tomsk (Korgunyuk 2014:411, Hale 2006:172).  
	
10.4.3. Life expectancy 
Even though the variable produces significant within- and between- effects, they operate in the 
same direction, simplifying the interpretation of the results. Both within and between regions, life 
expectancy has very significant and positive effects on both CPRF and Zyuganov. This is 
contradictory to the expectation that regions with higher life expectancy would reward the 
incumbents for the increasing living standards. The finding is however in line with the theoretical 
expectations that interpret life expectancy as a general measure of a region’s level of 
modernization, affecting the incumbents negatively. In line with this, life expectancy has a very 
significant (-5.31) negative effect on Putin. This pattern holds despite the fact that the highest life 
expectancies are found in the ethnically non-Russian regions.  
However, the opposite pattern emerges when we look at the positive effect the variable 
has on UR. This is a within-effect, meaning that increasing life expectancy increases support for 
the incumbent party. This finding could lend some support to the hypothesis interpreting life 
expectancy as a general measure of health in a region, expected to benefit the incumbent party 
(H10.1). However, as the interpretation of this hypothesis only can be applied to one of the 
dependent variables, we only fail to reject it. The variable does not produce a significant party 
cleavage, but does create an electoral cleavage during the presidential elections. The variable has 
a very significant negative effect on Putin and a positive effect on Zyuganov, strengthening the 
interpretation of life expectancy as an indicator of modernization and lending support to H10.2. 
However, because of the ambiguous nature of the results, we fail to reject both of the alternative 
hypothesis, only rejecting the null.   
	
10.5 Cultural variables 
Out of the three cultural variables expected to potentially affect the vote shares of the incumbents 
and the communist, only one produced significant results in the analysis. Neither religion 
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(grouped together with Rokkan’s variables), nor education produces significant effects on any of 
the dependent variables in neither of the models. Newspapers however, have a significant effect 
on the vote shares for both the incumbents and the communists. 
 
10.5.1 Newspapers and the media 
Newspapers produce both significant within- and between- effects, but they operate in the same 
direction, again simplifying the interpretation of the results. Newspapers are in this thesis used as 
a measure of access to independent media, and create an electoral cleavage both during 
parliamentary and presidential elections.  
In line with the theoretical expectations that access to even partly independent media can 
damage the incumbents, newspapers have a very significant and negative effect on both UR and 
Putin. The between-effect shows the same pattern, and we see that regions that generally have 
higher circulation of daily newspapers support both UR and Putin less. The effect is significant 
only at the ten percent level for UR (-1.91), but is strongly significant for Putin (-3.52). The 
variable also produces significant positive effects for both CPRF and Zyuganov, with the effect 
however being under the accepted significance level for Zyuganov (1.92). The findings are in line 
with the theoretical expectations that regional access to independent media significantly can 
benefit the opposition in a region (Rose et al. 2011:48).  
Access to independent media could also be regarded as an additional indicator of 
modernization in a region, increasing the negative effect the variable has on Putin and UR. The 
number of published newspapers per person varies between 0.02-0.2 copies in the less 
modernized regions of Chechnya, Ingushetia, Altai Republic and Dagestan, to 3-11 copies per 
person in Moscow, St. Petersburg and Nizhny Novgorod. Even though newspapers aren’t as far-
reaching as television, around 50 percent of the population read newspapers. It is however 
important to note that not all newspapers are independent, and as we cannot separate the 
dependent from the independent ones, we need to be careful with the interpretation of the results. 
The variable also raises questions of validity, as newspapers is not a direct measure of access to 
independent media. 
The findings are to a certain degree supported by empirical evidence from the other 
somewhat independent media-channel in Russia, the Internet. Internet is mostly used in the 
biggest cities and by the younger constituency, but access to it also varies significantly across 
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regions. In 2010, over 70 percent of the population in Moscow (71.9%) and St. Petersburg 
(71.3%) had Internet, while less than five percent had that access in three North-Caucasian 
regions (Ingushetia: 2.7%, Dagestan 4.3%, Chechnya 4.6%) (Ria Rating 2013). These numbers 
again indicate a correlation between regional modernization and access to independent media.  
It was through the Internet that the opposition of 2011-2012 organized the demonstrations 
and chose the person to represent them December 24th on Prospekt Akademika Skharova. They 
chose Aleksei Navalny (Krastev & Holmes 2012:42). Aleksey Navalny was the first opposition 
figure in many years to have generated and sustained support from the Russian middle class and 
BBC described Navalny as "arguably the only major opposition figure to emerge in Russia in the 
past five years" (BBC 2014, Kuchinsky 2014:271). He was however detained and even arrested 
for leading the opposition, something that damages his political carrier and precludes him from 
running in presidential elections in the future (Wilhelmsen 2013). The fact that the 
demonstrations found place in the biggest and most modernized cities of Moscow and St. 
Petersburg, lend strength to the assumption that access to independent media can damage the 
popularity of the incumbents and benefit the opposition, in this case non-systemic.  
The effect of independent media is not independent. People with lower incomes may not 
afford a computer and therefore not have access to the Internet. As the opposition used the 
Internet to organize, the less well off part of the population automatically got excluded. Income 
then creates an economic cleavage between the rich and the poor, but also an informational one: 
between those that have access to information and those who do not. This is commonly known as 
the “digital divide” (Semetko & Krasnoboka 2003:78). Even though Internet is rapidly growing, 
its reach is quite limited. In 2006, 76 percent of those polled by the All Russian Centre for Public 
Opinion Research said they didn’t use the Internet at all. Out of those who did, only 19 percent 
said they used it as a source of news (Arutunyan 2009:24,159). Therefore, even though the 
Internet potentially is a powerful and influential medium, newspapers are ahead in terms of their 
ability to reach out to the Russian population (Arutunyan 2009:160).  
 
So can we say that there is a party system based on social cleavages in Russia? In line with 
Turovsky (2014:70-71) Brader and Tucker (2009:844,857) and Hale (2005:148), this study shows 
that several cleavages are visible through the regional vote shares, and several of these can be 
identified as full political cleavages, having both social and political interpretation. During the 
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presidential elections however, a slightly different pattern emerges, with one cleavage 
disappearing and three new ones emerging. The explanation for this pattern will draw from 
previous knowledge presented in the paper and be summed up in the following, concluding 
chapter.	
 
Table 7: Summary of party cleavages and presidential cleavages over the elections 2003-2012 
Party cleavages Presidential cleavages 
Unemployment Distance to Moscow  
Pensioners Income 
Newspapers Pensioners 
Ethnicity Life expectancy 
 Newspapers 
 Ethnicity 
 
 
Chapter 11: Conclusion – A political system rooted in social cleavages  
This chapter will attempt to summarize previous knowledge about the specific Russian context 
with the findings found in the previous chapter to answer the second of the research questions:  
 
2. Is there a party system based on social cleavages in Russia? Can the same cleavages explain 
the distribution of vote shares during the presidential elections?  
 
Even though the regime under Putin has developed to be undemocratic, the Russian electorate has 
unequivocally chosen him as their national leader three times. The domination of his “party of 
power” United Russia is also apparent, but the party does not have any real power and was 
created by the president and his administration to secure majorities in the Duma, and integrate 
elites across all the regions into one coherent framework. However, even though the regime is far 
from democratic and manipulation of the political scene has been widely documented, elections 
are free in that opposition candidates are allowed to compete for voters, and the outcomes are fair 
in that both the party and the candidate supported by the majority actually wins the election. Pre-
electoral polls show very similar support for different parties and candidates as the actual 
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electoral results. Specifically Putin’s popularity cannot be reduced to electoral manipulation, 
especially since his ratings never have been below 60, and are now over 80 percent, fifteen years 
after he first came to power. This is not to say that manipulation or an unfair playing field doesn’t 
exist, it just doesn’t significantly affect the outcome of the elections. Manipulation is a tool used 
to test regional governor’s loyalties, intimidate opposition and signal Kremlin domination.  
 Out of the four parties that have had seats in the Russian parliament since 2003, only the 
Communist Party can be regarded as real opposition. The other two parties, Liberal Democratic 
Party and Just Russia are “fake opposition”, as they support Kremlin in all their initiatives and 
help siphon voters away from both ends of the political spectrum. The democratic movement has 
largely failed to gain roots in Russia. The democratic party Yabloko has failed to cross the 
electoral threshold since 2003, and the non-systemic democratic opposition that manifested itself 
in massive demonstrations in Moscow and St. Petersburg in 2011 and 2012, failed to organize 
into a political party and disappeared into thin air.  
This thesis investigated whether there exists a social cleavage structure across the Russian 
regions and whether this structure is manifested in the electoral vote shares for Putin and his 
party United Russia (UR) on one hand, versus the Communist Party of the Russian Federation 
(CPRF) and its leader Gennady Zyuganov on the other. Beginning with Lipset and Rokkan’s 
model and their cleavages, the thesis expanded to incorporate other economic, demographic and 
cultural divisions believed to affect regional vote shares. The goal of this thesis was not only to 
try and understand the relationship between different cleavages and support for opposing parties 
and candidates, but this relationship in the unique Russian context. As the Russian context is 
heavily influenced by the presidency in general, and Putin in particular, studying cleavage 
manifestation during presidential elections became just as interesting as their manifestation in a 
potential party structure.  
 Of the twelve variables included in the study, seven produced significant and interpretable 
effects. Unemployment, pensioners, printed newspapers and ethnicity created opposing effects 
during parliamentary elections, while distance to Moscow, income, pensioners, life expectancy, 
printed newspapers and ethnicity created opposing effects during the presidential elections. 
Ethnicity was concluded to be a redundant cleavage caused by electoral manipulation in the 
ethnic regions, but the rest serve to create a more informed picture of the Russian political scene.   
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The first finding of this thesis is not only that the Russian party system is rooted in social 
cleavage lines, but that it appears to be based on the traditional “left-right” cleavage that 
characterizes all Western industrialized countries. There are no parties representing cultural, 
linguistic, rural or ethnic interests, and the two main parties pull along the traditional left-right 
axis representing opposite poles. Regions characterized by larger shares of unemployed people 
and pensioners vote for CPRF to a greater degree. These electoral constituencies are expected to 
support the communists because of their dependency on redistribution policies and the pattern 
appears to be present at the regional level as well. The variable used to operationalize Rokkan’s 
“owner-worker” cleavage was removed from the analysis because of several methodological 
issues. Industrial laborers did however produce a significant party cleavage, with regions 
characterized by higher shares of industrial workers supporting CPRF more and UR less. Given 
the design of this thesis, it is not possible to draw any conclusions for this finding, but should be 
investigated further using a different methodological approach. 
Even with the emergence of Putin, the two main parties managed to establish themselves 
on opposing sides of the ideological spectrum. This not only rejects the theories that have 
claimed that the Russian system isn’t based on social cleavages at all, it is also in line with the 
findings of Fish (1995) and Rose and Tikhomirov (1996), who claimed that the ideological 
spectrum of the Russian party system was “one-dimensional” with the largest parties appealing to 
diametrically opposed constituencies. Despite Putin’s centralizing policies and the traditional 
belief that demographic changes and increasing incomes over time would diminish its voter base, 
the Communist Party appears to have preserved its representation of the so-called “transitional 
losers”. Additionally, as political sympathies don’t fluctuate across the parties from one election 
to the next, the party system could be regarded as consolidated.  
However, this does not reject the view held by some scholars that Russian parties are 
organizationally weak (Roberts 2012, Sakwa 2008). Even the biggest and strongest party UR, 
lacks the ability to penetrate state organs, with only limited role in presidential elections and with 
its source of authority completely outside of the party itself. The success of UR might however 
suggest a significant shift in the minds of the electorate regarding their trust towards parties. It is 
questionable whether UR will manage to keep attracting significant electoral support independent 
of the current president, and the significant shift in the electorate could benefit the marginalized 
parties when the ruling regime weakens. In a comparative perspective, the German, Japanses and 
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Italian experience in the stabilization period after the WWII indicates that dominant-power party 
systems may be a prerequisite for democratic consolidation. 
The most interesting finding of this thesis concerns the second part of the second research 
question. The pattern found for the party system along the traditional capital-labor axis also 
persists during presidential elections. Even though unemployment loses its significance, income 
creates opposing poles along the same “left-right” cleavage found in the party system. Higher 
average incomes in a region significantly benefit the incumbent president and Zyuganov 
preforms better in the poorer regions. This confirms economic theories of sociotropic voting, 
where regions with higher average incomes reward the incumbent for their prosperity. In 
addition, in line with Colton’s (1998) and Sakwa’s (1998) findings, regions characterized by 
economic decline and stagnation support not only the Communist Party, but also the communist 
president. This contradicts the theories that claimed that the communists had lost the vote of the 
“transitional losers” and are consistent with Evans and Whitefield’s (2006) finding of an 
association between income and presidential choice. In accordance with the findings of Colton 
and Hale (2005;2009), the main political cleavage in today’s Russia remains between the left 
represented by the communists and the right represented by the incumbents.  
Pensioners continue to influence the incumbents negatively, with regions with higher 
shares of pensioners voting for Putin less and for Zyuganov more. This reflects scholarly 
consensus regarding both the communists and the incumbents. Zyuganov benefits from the 
“nostalgic vote” as well as from his programmatic appeal to pensioners, promising higher and 
more reliable pensions. Putin on the other hand, significantly loses in regions with higher shares 
of pensioners because the policies adopted under his rule significantly complicate the lives of 
pensioners, especially compared to their experience with the secure and “good old days” under 
the communist rule. The true representation Zyuganov and CPRF have of clear constituencies is 
limited by their low electoral vote shares compared to the ones gained by Putin and United 
Russia. However, their existence provides an outlet for the opposition, makes elections in Russia 
meaningful and demonstrates to the outside world that democracy in Russia isn’t waning. 
Zyuganov’s weakness as an old and uncharismatic leader in a context where personalities prevail 
over political programs could also be the reason why the Communist Party is allowed to exist: 
their leader is unelectable. The weakness of Zyuganov as a presidential candidate could 
potentially be indicated in the regression results. Unemployment actually affects him negatively 
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both between and within regions, and even though pensioners have a positive effect on 
Zyuganov’s vote shares, the variable is barely significant.  
Another factor that has a negative effect on Putin and a positive effect on Zyuganov is 
distance to Moscow as measured in kilometers. However, there are doubts about the validity of 
the measure. The reason for this is that even though Russia stretches over 11 time zones, over 50 
of the 83 regions are clustered in only one time zone, all around the city of Moscow. Perhaps a 
different measure for distance should have been employed. A social explanation to the pattern 
could be that regions further away don’t trust a capital ruling from afar, or that globalization 
increased identification with the local rather than with the national. However, this is not 
necessarily grounded in empiricism. First of all, there is little ground to believe that the locality is 
more important to Russians than identifying with the nation-state. It could be argued that the 
North-Caucasian regions with a unifying religion, language or ethnicity identify with locality to a 
greater degree, but these regions are among the 50 regions close to Moscow and they produce 
abnormally high vote shares for Putin and his party. Second, even though Putin’s centralization 
policies could have damaged the incumbents’ popularity in regions far away, the success of UR 
across all the Russian regions indicate the success of Putin’s centralizing policies, rather than 
their failure. 
In addition to economic growth, electoral manipulation and numerous other factors 
positively influencing Putin’s popularity, a part of the explanation could be rooted in his success 
of unifying Russia as a nation-state. After the collapse of the Soviet Union, Russia was a new 
country with changed borders. Yeltsin’s policies of ethnic federalism promoted a degree of 
regional autonomy and contributed to the decentralization of the country. Centralizing the 
country again was one of Putin’s main goals. He created seven federal districts with leaders all 
subordinate to his rule, and he abolished the direct elections of governors from 2005 to 2012, 
appointing them all himself. In addition to his purely territorial policies of state formation, Putin 
succeeded in creating a sense of a common nation, with people uniting around him. The 
embarrassing collapse of the great Soviet empire left Russians with a feeling of defeat and no 
recognizable, unifying national symbols. After the turbulent 90s, characterized by disintegration 
and decline, Russians were ready for a unifying ideology.  
Putin managed to create a strong connection with the Russian electorate, with the majority 
agreeing with him on the most important issues. His Millennium Manifest emphasized all the 
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factors valued by the Russian electorate: a strong state, an effective economy, and “a Russian 
idea” comprised of universal values, like human rights, and Russian traditional values of 
“patriotism”, “great-powerness”, “state-centeredness” and “social solidarity”. Indeed, polls show 
that Russians value order and a strong economy over several democratic freedoms. This is not to 
say that Russians prefer autocracy, but that they don’t perceive Putin to be undemocratic. In fact, 
he represents many of the values Russians associate with democracy.  
Like de Gaulle under the French Fifth Republic, Putin sought to create a great Russia, 
independent of Western powers, centered on a strong state and headed by a strong executive. The 
parties were weak, and were purposefully deprived of any real powers, with the presidential party 
getting its legitimacy from its identification with the leader. People strongly identify with United 
Russia and Putin because they achieve what Russians generally want: security and stability at 
home, and respect abroad. The fact that non-Russian regions give such a substantial amount of 
support to Putin creates the feeling that he is chosen not by ethnic Russians, but by Russians as 
citizens, strengthening the appearance of a common nation.  
 The last important finding of this thesis is that despite the fact that the Russian 
government controls the majority of the Russian media outlets, regional access to newspapers 
significantly damages the incumbents and benefits the communists. Newspapers do not 
necessarily represent a cleavage in the traditional sense, because the electorate probably is 
unaware of the effect newspapers have and does not mobilize around it as a policy issue. 
However, access to independent information as a characteristic of the regional electorate creates a 
very significant split between regions with more and less access to independent print media. In 
line with the theoretical expectations that access to regime-critical media significantly can 
damage the popularity of the incumbents, regions with higher daily print of newspapers support 
both Putin and United Russia less. These regions are more oppositionist in nature and give their 
preference to CPRF and perhaps even to Zyuganov. Access to independent media also 
significantly benefits the democratic opposition in Russia, as it was through the Internet that the 
non-systemic opposition of 2011-2012 organized the demonstrations. Access to independent 
media is highly correlated with the general level of modernization in a region and there appears 
to be a pattern between modernization and decreasing support for the incumbents. This 
interpretation is also strengthened by the significant presidential cleavage created by the variable 
life expectancy. The variable has a very significant negative effect on Putin and a positive effect 
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on Zyuganov, strengthening the interpretation of life expectancy as an indicator of modernization 
expected to damage the undemocratic incumbents and benefit the opposition.  
 Both the systemic and the non-systemic democratic oppositions performed significantly 
better in the most modernized cities of Moscow and St. Petersburg. Both the protestors of 2011-
2012, and Yabloko’s core supporters largely belonged to the middle class, with the clear majority 
having higher education and earnings well above average. Modernization decreases the ability of 
the Kremlin to manipulate the political scene, as patronage becomes redundant and electoral 
manipulation more detectable. However, the democratic opposition in today’s Russia is 
practically absent.  
 What is interesting and somewhat surprising is that despite the fact that Putin gets over 50 
percent of the vote shares in almost all of the Russian regions across all years, and survey’s have 
identified the Putin-voter pretty much as a cross-section of the entire society, the unique design of 
this thesis found significant factors affecting both the presidential candidates and parties in 
opposing ways. The study of electoral cleavages using aggregated regional data is not a common 
practice in political science, and the method employed produces estimates that significantly 
contribute to the understanding of the Russian political system. The methodological approach 
accounts for the unique nature of the data, with a random effects model specified to control for 
endogeneity bias as well as to let the effect of each variable vary both within and between 
regions.  
 With regards to the generalization potential of the analysis, the findings reflect the entire 
population of cases under study and conclusion drawn about this specific context have high 
internal validity. However, given the unique Russian context, one should be careful in drawing 
any conclusions beyond the studied sample. The results of the analysis contribute to the research 
fields studying party systems and political cleavages, elections under authoritarian rule, electoral 
systems and the relationship between parties and presidents in a semi-presidential system. The 
findings can also be used in further analyses of Russia’s political environment and perhaps of 
countries with similar historical developments, like Ukraine or Belarus.  
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Appendix 
	
Appendix A: Map of the Russian Regions 
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Appendix B: Codebook of the initial dataset 
 
 
Variable Description Mean Min Max No. of 
obs. 
Economic variables 
1. Gross regional 
product per capita 
General indicator of 
economic productivity in 
the region measured in 
rubles 
160,090.8 
rub. 
10,332.4 
rub. 
1,203,269 
rub. 
239 
2. Income Average monthly income 
measured in rubles (in 
regression/1000). 
11,667.5 
rub. 
1,438 
rub. 
54,632 rub. 247 
3. Unemployment Percentage of unemployed 
of the total regional 
population. 
8.9% 0.8% 70.9% 249 
4. Incomes below  
subsistence minimum 
Percentage of the total 
regional population with 
income below subsistence 
level.  
20.4% 5.7% 79.9% 246 
5. Agricultural 
production 
The total sum of crop and 
livestock production of all 
agricultural producers, 
including individual farm 
sectors, in millions of 
rubles.  
25,350.7 
rub. 
0 rub. 239,235 
rub. 
248 
6. Social Assistance Percentage of the total 
social benefits that goes to 
social assistance.  
23.2% 5.1% 51.4% 247 
7. Subsistence 
minimum 
The regional subsistence 
minimum set by the 
regional executive bodies 
every quarter30 
4318 rub. 1535 
rub. 
12584 rub.  248 
Demographic variables 
8. Urbanity Percentage of the total 
regional population that 
live in urban areas.  
69.4% 26.3% 100% 249 
9. Ethnic Russian Percentage of the total 
regional population that are 
ethnic Russian.  
74.3% 0.8% 96.6% 249 
10. Pensioners Percentage of pensioners of 
the total regional 
population. 
27.4% 11.8% 36.6% 249 
11. Working 
population 
Percentage of the total 
regional population that are 
of working age (16-59 for 
men, 16-54 for women).  
62.2% 57.2% 72.2% 249 
																																																						
30	Subsistence	minimum	includes	a	minimum	set	of	food,	nonfood	goods	and	services	necessary	for	the	
preservation	of	human	health	and	his	or	her	life.	
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12. Migration rate The difference between the 
number of arrivals to and 
departures from the region, 
per 10.000 people.  
-6.7 -480 190 249 
13. Life expectancy Life expectancy at birth, in 
years.  
66.7 54.3 79 249 
14. Infant mortality 
rate 
Deaths of children under 
one year of age, per 1000 
born alive. 
10.3 3.5 29.3 249 
Cultural variables 
15. Published 
newspapers 
Daily circulation of 
published newspapers 
(copies), per 1000 people. 
864.8 19 10867 247 
16. Religion – 
Orthodox 
Percentage of the total 
regional population that 
identify with the Orthodox 
Church.  
38.8% 1% 78% 240 
17. Religion - Islam Percentage of the total 
regional population that 
identify with Islam.  
4.2% 0% 49% 237 
18. Higher education Percentage of the regional 
working population with 
higher education. 
24.2% 12.4% 47.6% 248 
19. Higher education  
among the 
unemployed 
Percentage of the regional 
unemployed population 
with higher education. 
12.3% 2.1% 46.3% 248 
20. Peasantry Percentage of the regional 
working population 
employed in agriculture. 
12.3% 0.1% 31.9% 248 
21. Industrial laborers Percentage of the regional 
working population 
employed in industry 
18.6% 3.7% 35.7% 248 
Other variables 
22. Crime Registered crime (theft, 
robbery, banditry) per 
100,000 people. 
1987.3 330 4464 249 
23. Population per 
doctor 
Total regional population 
divided by the number of 
physicians employed in the 
medical organizations. 
222.3 114.7 439.2 248 
24. Density of public 
roads 
Kilometers of hard surface 
roads per 1000km. of 
territory (Moscow and St. 
Petersburg missing).  
133 km. 0.8 km. 672 km. 243 
25. Distance to 
Moscow 
Measured in kilometers.  1753.8 km. 0 km. 6426 km. 249 
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Appendix C – Heteroscedasticity: plot of the resideuals versus the predicted values 
 
 
 
 
Fitted to panel data: Xtreg dv ids, re robust 
predict double fitted, xb 
predict double residual_e, e 
scatter residual_e fit , yline(0) 
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Appendix D: Outliers31 
 
 
 
																																																						
31	Here	presented	only	for	Putin.	
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